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Chapter 0
Introduction
The thesis contains three chapters in Political Economy with a focus on text mining in Chi-
nese. In Chapter 1, I show that mass media can affect citizens’ subjective feeling of national
identity based on a case study in Taiwan. To do so, I first construct a measure of media
ideology to assess the attitude towards China of 12 Taiwanese newspapers from 2000 to
2014. Then, I study how a change in ownership influenced the attitude of two mainstream
newspapers. In particular, I employ a difference-in-difference method to show that after
two Taiwanese newspapers were sold to a businessman who has great business interest in
China and advocates unification with China, their ideologies became more pro-China. Fi-
nally, I explore the relationship between media ideology and citizens’ subjective feeling of
national identity. Adopting an instrumental variable approach with individual and time
fixed effects, I find evidence that media ideology has significant effects on national identity.
Coupled with the ownership effects, this implies that individual national identity can be
susceptible to the influence of directly or indirectly captured media.
In Chapter 2, I examine protest in China and focus on the power structure of county
leaders–whose promotion hinges on maintaining social stability in the county–and study
how power and leaders’ characteristics affect protest frequency at the county level. Using
text mining to compile two novel data sets on protests and leadership, I demonstrate that
power has negative effects on the frequency of protests. Next, I show that power influences
protests by both reducing the incentive for collective action and raising grievances. I first
concentrate on environmental protests and find that given the same level of air pollution,
a proxy for the root of grievances, people are less likely to protest under the rule of a pow-
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erful leader. Then, I show that power has opposite effects on protest frequency in terms
of leaders’ personal characteristics–under the rule of a “local” leader, whose hometown
is located within the same prefecture as his/her ruling county, higher level of power con-
tributes to more protests, whereas fewer protests are observed when an “outsider” gains
more power. The results suggest that the discrepancy is due to reduced welfare under the
rule of powerful “local” leaders, who enjoy better connections to superior authorities but
are less competent than “outsiders”.
In Chapter 3, I discuss the construction of my media ideology measure in Chapter 1, with
details in word segmentation methods, keyword extraction algorithms, word association
measures, and similarity metrics. The core concept of my measure of media ideology is to
compare the use of language in Taiwanese newspapers with the one in press conference
transcripts of the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), the official Chinese government institution
in charge of policies related to Taiwan. Based on the comparison, my measure evaluates
how closely each Taiwanese newspaper aligns with TAO. If a Taiwanese newspaper shares
similar views with TAO, then it is assigned a high score of my measure and considered more
pro-China. In line with expectations, the values of media ideology measure of the most pro-
China Taiwanese newspapers, theUnited Daily News (聯合報) and the China Times (中
國時報), are almost always above the average of all Taiwanese newspapers in the database
and much higher than the ones of the least pro-China Taiwanese newspapers, theApple
Daily (蘋果日報) and the Liberty Times (自由時報).
The thesis is structured as follows: The main findings are presented in Chapters 1 to 3.
Additional results are included in the Appendix A, and all the references are in References.
2
Chapter 1
MassMedia andNational Identity
1.1 Introduction
Mass media is often considered an essential part in nation-building policies (Karthigesu,
1988; Postill, 2008). However, empirical evidence is scarce. Can mass media really affect cit-
izens’ subjective feeling of national identity? How does mass media influence citizens’ sub-
jective feeling of national identity and how large is the effect? To explore these questions, I
conduct a case study in Taiwan.
Taiwan provides an excellent context for investigating howmass media affect citizens’
subjective feeling of national identity. On the one hand, feelings of national identity have
shifted substantially over the past two decades. Due to the special cross-Strait relations
between Taiwan and China, the citizens of Taiwan may identify themselves as Chinese,
Taiwanese, or both. According to surveys from the Election Study Center administered
by National Chengchi University (Figure 1.1), the share of people identifying themselves
as Taiwanese has grown from less than 20% to ca. 60%, while the share of people identi-
fying themselves as Chinese has declined frommore than 25% to ca. 4% over the past 20
years. It is also worth noting that ca. 30-40% of people in Taiwan think of themselves as
both Taiwanese and Chinese, suggesting the national identity of many is still in a transition
stage. On the other hand, the media industry in Taiwan also changed dramatically. Since
the lift of martial law in 1987 and subsequent media liberalization, Taiwanese media have
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transformed from state-controlled companies in favor of Chinese nationalism1 to market-
oriented ones with diverse views on the cross-Strait relations. As a result, Taiwan became
one of only two Asian countries that enjoy full press freedom (FreedomHouse, 2015). The
concurrent two phenomena naturally lead to the question of whether the diversity of me-
dia ideologies affected the changes in Taiwanese citizens’ subjective feeling of national iden-
tity.
Figure1.1:Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese identity of Taiwanese from 1992 to 2014).
Source: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University (NCCU)
To study the relationship between the stance of Taiwanese newspapers towards China
and Taiwanese citizens’ subjective feeling of national identity, I first measure how pro-
China each Taiwanese newspaper is and how its stance varies over time. Built on Gentzkow
and Shapiro (2010) andMurphy andWestbury (2013), my approach basically compares the
language used in the headlines of Taiwanese newspapers with the language used in press re-
1Generally speaking, Chinese nationalism refers to the idea that all people within the territories of China
should build a single nation, perceive themselves as Chinese, and unite to fight against foreigners, such as
Japanese andWesterners. Nevertheless, the content of Chinese nationalism differs between Taiwan and China
and varies over time. Before 1987 in Taiwan, the “China” in Chinese nationalism refers to the Republic of
China (ROC) represented by the Kuomintang (KMT) government, in contrast to the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) represented by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The KMT government has deliberately
constructed and strengthened Chinese nationalism to “legitimate its dictatorship” after it lost a civil war to
CCP in 1949 (Hughes & Stone, 1999).
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leases of the Chinese government institution in charge of the policies towards Taiwan, the
Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO). Based on this comparison, I place each Taiwanese newspaper
on a one-dimensional ideological line that ranges from less to more pro China. A more pro-
China newspaper is more likely to focus on positive facts regarding the cooperation or even
unification of Taiwan with China (e.g. potential economic gains), provide greater coverage
of positive news about China (e.g. economic development in China), frame news stories
in ways that favor China and the Chinese government, and attack politicians, scholars, and
protesters in Taiwan and elsewhere with positions that are less pro-China. To evaluate the
pro-China stance of each Taiwanese newspaper in all these dimensions, the measure of me-
dia ideology considers diction, issue coverage, and context. In particular, I first examine
press conference transcripts from TAO and compile monthly lexicons to represent the Chi-
nese government’s stance on topics about China-Taiwan relations. Then, I build a second
order co-occurrence model (Murphy &Westbury, 2013) to compare TAO’s use of the words
in this lexicon with Taiwanese newspapers. If a Taiwanese newspaper systematically uses
the same words in a similar fashion as TAO does, and diction, issue coverage and context
also resemble TAO press conference transcripts, and the newspaper is classified as ideologi-
cally close to the Chinese government.
My measure of the pro-China stance of Taiwanese newspapers is novel in two aspects.
First, different frommeasures of media slant in the existing literature, it is based on interna-
tional politics, not on domestic political competition. That is, the measure does not exam-
ine bias towards a certain domestic political party, for example, whether U.S. newspapers
are more pro-Democratic or pro-Republican. Instead, it analyzes the extent to which Tai-
wanese newspapers agree with the position of the Chinese government on issues related
to China and Taiwan. Such agreement with the Chinese government is more relevant for
the study of subjective feeling of national identity in Taiwan as issues on cross-Strait rela-
tions are more likely to affect Taiwanese readers’ sense of national identity than other is-
sues. Also, it is easier to measure the degree of agreement with the official Chinese positions
directly than to examine how Taiwanese newspapers defend domestic political parties that
take more pro-China positions. The relationship with China is arguably the most impor-
tant issue in Taiwan and has a huge potential impact on its future. Nevertheless, due to its
subtlety, domestic political parties often choose an ambiguous stance on the pro-China to
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anti-China spectrum. Both the ruling party and the opposition party intentionally avoid
political disputes on the relationship with China and tend to support the status quo. Be-
sides, domestic politics encompasses various issues and creates numerous dimensions on
media ideology. Thus, instead of measuring media ideology based on domestic politics, it is
more direct and salient to examine media ideology in the way I do. The second novel aspect
of my measure of media slant is that it is one of the first objective measures available for the
Chinese language. The existing literature of mass media is generally focused on the English
language and text analysis techniques are therefore mostly developed for English. I borrow
techniques of Chinese text analysis from natural language processing to develop one of the
first measures of media ideology in Chinese.
I use my newmeasure of media slant to investigate ownership effects on media ideology.
According to the supply-side story in the literature, media ideology can be influenced by
owners, and a change of ownership usually comes with a modification of media ideology.
In November 2008, two mainstream newspapers, the China Times and the Commercial
Times, were sold to a businessman who has great business interests in China and openly
supports unification with China. Anecdotes suggest that the two newspapers became more
pro-China after the acquisition. To verify the anecdotes, I adopt a difference-in-difference
approach, where the treatment group is the China Times and the Commercial Times and
the control group consists of all other Taiwanese newspapers. The results are consistent
with the anecdote. Compared to the control group, the two newspapers in the treatment
group have become 14.7-26.7% more slanted towards China after the change of ownership,
which is both statistically and economically significant.
Finally, I also examine the effects of media ideology on the subjective feeling of national
identity of Taiwanese newspaper readers. Nation is “an imagined community” (Anderson,
1991) and socially constructed based on history, traditions, language, culture, etc. National
identity is the subjective feeling of a sense of belonging to a nation, regardless of one’s citi-
zenship (Guibernau, 2004). National identification involves the process of identifying with
one’s nation and differentiating with other nations (Smith, 1991). Mass media has a part in
shaping the “imagined community” as individuals understand and interpret their nation
(and other nations) partly based on the information provided by the media (Schiller, 1985).
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In the context of Taiwan, media ideology determines the degree to which news stories
are refracted through the lens of Chinese/Taiwanese identity. Media may choose to un-
derscore the similarities or differences between Taiwan and China. If people in Taiwan
recognize a large gap between themselves and people in China, they tend to self-classify as
a group different from Chinese and choose to be Taiwanese, instead of Chinese. For exam-
ple, pro-China media tend to emphasize the concept of Great China and cover stories about
traditional Chinese culture from which some Taiwanese culture originated. On the con-
trary, anti-China media are inclined to contrast China’s authoritarian regime with Taiwan’s
democracy. In addition, media may portray Taiwan/China in a good or bad light and create
an image of a country that one would (not) like to identify with. For example, pro-China
media are more likely to highlight the economic development in China, use commendatory
terms to describe China, and ignore the human rights situations in China. Moreover, me-
dia may play down or up areas where Taiwan outperforms China to minimize or maximize
the difference between Taiwan and China. For instance, pro-China media may cover lots of
news stories about legislative fights in Taiwan and praise China’s administrative efficiency
and economic growth, suggesting that Taiwan’s democracy is not an advantage compared to
China’s autocracy.
To examine the effects of media ideology on the subjective feeling of national identity in
Taiwan, I combine my measure of media ideology with rotating panel surveys of Taiwanese
newspaper readers to see whether changes in media ideology affect their subjective feeling
of national identity. There are several econometric challenges in doing so. First, the omitted
variable problem is unavoidable. For example, it is difficult to measure cross-Strait relations
between China and Taiwan, which is very likely to affect both media ideology and national
identity and introduce bias to the results. Second, reverse causality cannot be ignored. The
growing trend of Taiwanese identity can encourage profit-seeking newspapers to modify
their stance towards China to meet the demand of their readers.
To address some of the econometric challenges, I employ fixed effects models with two
instrumental variables. The fixed effects include both individual fixed effects and time fixed
effects. Individual fixed effects capture any time-invariant individual characteristics, such
as parents’ subjective feeling of national identity, while time fixed effects explain general
factors that influence all individuals over time, such as national elections in 2004, 2008,
7
and 2012. Since fixed effects cannot account for omitted time-variant individual factors and
reverse causality, I further utilize two instrumental variables. The first instrumental variable
is the media ideology of the newspaper read in the last period. I argue that the ideology of
the last media choice is correlated with the ideology of the current media choice, and that
the ideology of the last media choice only influences individual national identity through
the ideology of the current media choice. The second instrument variable is the corpus size
of a newspaper. I argue that corpus size is correlated with media ideology (corr = 0.702),
but does not directly relate to individual national identity. The correlation is based on the
fact that most words have low frequency in a corpus (Piantadosi, 2014) and that the sparsity
of words is more evident in small corpora. Since the measure hinges on the comparison
of word frequency, newspapers with small corpus size are more likely to be assigned low
values in the measure of media ideology, regardless of their actual stance on the cross-Strait
relations. The results frommy fixed effects models with instrumental variables indicate that
if a newspaper takes a more pro-China ideological position, the probability that readers
self-identify as Taiwanese drops significantly.
When combined with the ownership effects on the China Times and the Commercial
Times, my results suggest that it is possible for the Chinese government to alter individual
national identity in Taiwan by directly buying or indirectly capturing Taiwanese media.
As former Chinese party chief Jiang Zemin said in 1998, “Controlling Taiwanese media is
equivalent to controlling 50% of public opinion in Taiwan. This control is more useful
than sending army there.” The chapter provides some suggestive evidence that this claim
may not be exaggerated.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 contains a short lit-
erature review on media bias and national identity. Section 1.3 provides background on
cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan, contemporary national identification,
domestic politics, and the newspaper industry in Taiwan. Section 1.4 describes the data on
press conference transcripts from the Taiwan Affairs Office, the collection of newspaper
headlines, and the surveys on national identity and newspaper reading. Section 1.5 explains
my measure of the pro-China stance of Taiwanese newspapers. Section 1.6 covers empirical
applications, including ownership effects and the influence of media ideology on individual
national identity. Section 1.7 concludes.
8
1.2 Literature Review
This chapter is linked to the literature on media bias. Media can choose what facts or sup-
portive evidence to be included or excluded in a piece of news (facts bias). Groseclose and
Milyo (2005) provide one of the first objective measures of media slant based on facts bias.
By comparing think tank citation patterns of a news outlet with the ones of Congressmen,
they attach an adjusted Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) score to each news out-
let. Nevertheless, this measure is heavily criticized because think tanks are cited for various
reasons. For instance, it is likely that a Congressman cites an article from a think tank to
strengthen his point, while journalists use the same citation for sarcasm. Media can also se-
lectively cover certain issues and ignore others (issue bias). Larcinese, Puglisi, and Snyder Jr
(2011) study the news coverage of economic issues and find that, compared to newspapers
with Republican endorsement, newspapers with Democratic endorsement systematically
cover more economic bad news during Republican presidency than during Democratic
presidency.
The measure in this chapter is based on the ideas from Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010)
andMurphy andWestbury (2013). Their methods consider various types of media bias,
such as facts bias, issue bias, and framing bias, and provide a more comprehensive proxy
for media ideology (Prat & Strömberg, 2013). Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) measure the
similarity of language between newspapers and Congressmen (Prat & Strömberg, 2013).
They first examine the phrases used by Congressmen and make separate lists of Republican
and Democratic vocabulary. Then, they study the resemblance of phrases between each
newspaper and Democratic/Republican Congressmen, and construct a measure of relative
biasedness towards Democrats or Republicans. Murphy andWestbury (2013) apply co-
occurrence models to analyze contexts and construct objective measures of word meaning
and associations.
There are two alternative explanations for media bias: demand-side and supply-side sto-
ries. A demand-side story states that media bias originates frommedia revenue (or profit)
maximization and reflects reader preferences, while a supply-side story claims that media
bias comes from preferences of journalists, owners, or governments.
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This chapter is connected to the literature on the supply-side story. Djankov, McLiesh,
Nenova, and Shleifer (2003) compile a cross-sectional dataset of 97 countries on media own-
ership and examine two alternative theories on state-owned media: public interest theory
(a benevolent government cures market failure) and public choice theory (state-owned
media manipulate information and undermine economic and political freedoms). They
correlate media ownership with policy outcomes and find that the data support the latter
theory. Durante and Knight (2012) examine the effects of partisan control on media ideol-
ogy and study how viewers respond to the ideological change. Using data from Italy, they
first demonstrate that state-owned televisions shift to the right when the government moves
from the center-left to the center-right party. Then, they use individual survey data to show
that viewers respond by shifting to channels closer to their own ideology and conclude that
in a competitive media environment, the change of media control has limited influence on
viewers’ ideological exposure. For a comprehensive survey on media literature, refer to Prat
and Strömberg (2013) and Strömberg (2015).
This chapter is also related to literature on nationalism. In social science and political sci-
ence, there are two main perspectives on the origins of nationalism–primordialism and con-
structivism. On the one hand, primordialists argue that national identity is formed by pre-
determined characteristics and cannot be produced, modified, or transformed through ma-
nipulation. On the other hand, constructivists think national identity is not fixed. Nation
is a socially constructed community, imagined by the people who perceive themselves as
part of that group (Anderson, 1991), and national identity is constructed and transformed
by history, language, and culture. In this chapter, I follow the idea of constructivism and
assume national identity is changeable.
In contrast to the rich literature on national identity in social science and political sci-
ence, there are only few papers in economics about national identity. The existing empirical
literature centers on nation-building policies and emphasizes the potential benefits of a
common identity. For example, Miguel (2004) studies nation-building reforms in two East-
African countries by examining the effects on inter-ethnic cooperation in two neighboring
districts, one in Tanzania and the other in Kenya. Using “colonial-era national boundary
placement as a natural experiment,” he shows that given similar colonization histories, eth-
nic composition, and geographical conditions between the two countries, the adoption
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of nation-building policies in Tanzania leads to better economic outcomes, compared to
Kenya, where no such policies were implemented.
In addition to studies on nation-building policies, there is a growing literature focused
on the formation of national identity. Georgiadis andManning (2013) use data from Eng-
land andWales’ 2007 Citizenship Survey and investigate the determinants of national iden-
tity. Based on the seminal work of Akerlof and Kranton (2000), the first paper incorpo-
rating identity into utility functions, they construct a conceptual framework to predict
correlations between national identity and its potential determinants. Their main finding is
that people who feel well-treated and tolerated are more likely to identify with the society.
Masella (2013) studies 21 countries and uses data from theWorld Values Survey (WVS) to
measure national identity at the individual level. Examining the relationship between na-
tional identity and ethnicity diversity, he finds that in countries with high ethnic diversity,
nationalist feelings are weaker in minority groups than in the majorities, while in countries
with low ethnic diversity, the reverse is true. Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, Costa-Font,
andMasella (2008) investigate the 1983 educational reform in Spain that turned the Catalan
education system into a bilingual system. They use survey data to show that compulsory
language policies have a stronger impact on identity than non-compulsory language poli-
cies. Analyzing the effect of the same education reform on the process of national identity
formation, Clots-Figueras andMasella (2013) exploit variation in the number of years of
compulsory education under the new system and find that individuals with longer expo-
sure to bilingual education are more likely to identify themselves as Catalan.
The goal of the chapter is to explore the effect of media ideology on the construction of
national identity. The existing literature discussing the relationship between mass media
and national identity generally focuses on descriptive analysis, not quantitative research.
Karthigesu (1988) examines the role of TelevisionMalaysia, a national mass media organi-
zation, in nation building during the post-colonial period, and studies the adverse effects
of restrictive and manipulative programming on the democratic transition. Simeunovic
(2009) analyzes secondary data from different studies and investigates the effect of mass
media on European identity formation in the contemporary European media industry.
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1.3 Background
1.3.1 Cross-Strait Relations and Contemporary National Identification in
Taiwan
The term cross-Strait relations refers to the relations between the two political entities, the
People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) and the Republic of China (ROC, or Taiwan).
Since 1949, Taiwan and China have been separately governed, with governments on both
sides claiming to be the only legitimate political power of China. After over 60 years of sep-
aration, cross-Strait relations are now focused on the issue of unification with China versus
Taiwan independence. On the one hand, the PRC (or the Chinese government) insists on
a “One China Policy” and claims that Taiwan is a province of China. The PRC threatens
to use military force against Taiwan if Taiwan declares its own independence. On the other
hand, the majority of Taiwanese people prefer to maintain the status quo. According to
surveys from Election Study Center administered by National Chengchi University (Fig-
ure 1.2), over 50% of people favored the status quo in 2001; the proportion of status quo
supporters has increased over time and reached almost 60% in 2013. It is also worth noting
that since 2002, the proportion of people favoring Taiwan independence has exceeded the
proportion of people favoring unification with China. The share of Taiwan independence
supporters has maintained around 20% since 2003, but the majority still favors the status
quo.
Since 2008, both governments have set aside political dispute and focused on economic
prospects, bringing about more peaceful cross-Strait relations and greater economic integra-
tion. Nevertheless, Figure 1.1 shows that around the same time, the proportion of people
who identify themselves exclusively as Taiwanese stood at 48.4% in 2008 and exceeded the
proportion of people who identify themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese for the first
time (Election Study Center, NCCU). The proportion of Taiwanese identity continued to
increase over time and reached 57.1% in 2013, suggesting a surge of Taiwanese nationalism.
The relationship between economic integration and political disintegration has been stud-
ied by Chiang, Liu, andWen (2014). They find that rising investment in China strength-
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ens Taiwanese identification among unskilled workers but has had no effect among skilled
workers, leading to stronger Taiwanese nationalism overall.
Figure1.2:Changes in the unification-independence stances of Taiwanese from 1994 to 2014)
Source: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University (NCCU).
Originally, there are 7 options in the survey: (1) unification as soon as possible; (2) maintaining status quo
and moving toward unification; (3) maintaining status quo and deciding at a later date; (4) maintaining status
quo indefinitely; (5) maintaining status quo and moving toward independence; (6) independence as soon as
possible; (7) no response. In the graph, I combine (1) and (2) as unification, (3) and (4) as status quo, (5) and
(6) as independence, and ignore (7).
1.3.2 Contemporary Domestic Politics in Taiwan
During the martial law era (1949-1987), the formation of new political parties was prohib-
ited. Taiwan was under a de facto single-party state system, where Kuomintang (KMT, or
the Chinese Nationalist Party) had stayed in power for 38 years. However, after the lift of
martial law, the freedom of assembly was no longer restricted. Currently, there are 337 po-
litical parties in Taiwan (Ministry of the Interior, Department of Civil Affairs, 2018), but
only 5 parties hold places in the Legislative Yuan. Political parties are generally divided into
two camps–the Pan-Blue Coalition and the Pan-Green Coalition. Headed by the KMT,
the Pan-Blue Coalition adopts a softer stance towards China and promotes economic inte-
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gration with China. The Pan-Blue Coalition used to support unification of Taiwan with
China and claimed that Republic of China (ROC, the government in Taiwan), not Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (PRC, the government in mainland China), was the only legiti-
mate government of China. Nevertheless, given the rise of Taiwanese nationalism, the Pan-
Blue Coalition now adopts a more conservative position in favor of the present status quo
and opposes both immediate unification and immediate independence, as reflected by the
KMT’s “three noes” policy–no unification, no independence, and no use of force. On the
other hand, the Pan-Green Coalition advocates Taiwanese nationalism and favors Taiwan
independence over unification with China. However, since the majority of constituency
support the present status quo, the leading party of the Pan-Green Coalition, the Demo-
cratic Progressive Party (DPP), does not adhere to Taiwan independence and holds a more
moderate stance on cross-Strait relations to gain more votes in elections.
1.3.3 Newspaper Industry in Taiwan
Before the lift of martial law in 1987, press freedom in Taiwan was restricted and the main-
streammedia served as ideological apparatus of the state. The newspaper industry was
highly regulated and controlled either directly or indirectly by the KMT regime. In par-
ticular, three restrictions, known as press bans, were imposed on the newspaper industry:
(1) media operation control (entry permission); (2) pricing control; (3) media space control.
In addition to strict press censorship, social and political dissidents were excluded from the
newspaper industry (Hung, 2013).
The largest two newspapers, theUnited Daily News (UDN) and the China Times, were
owned by core members of the KMT’s Central Standing Committee, and UDNwas recog-
nized as party newspaper of the KMT. Until now, the two newspapers are still regarded
as pan-Blue mass media. UDN retained its pro-KMT stance, supports President Ma’s
cross-strait political reconciliation policy and is optimistic about the growing economic
cooperation between Taiwan and China, while the China Times changed from a moderate
pro-KMT political stance to a radical one and became a strong unification advocate after
the change in its ownership. In 2009, Yen-ming Tsai, a China-based food manufacturer,
acquired the China Times Group, merging the China Times, a KMT-owned terrestrial
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TV station, CTV, and another private TV station, CTI, into a media conglomerate. Tsai
takes a clear-cut stand in favor of China. The media group often promotes Chinese officials
and makes profits from Chinese product placement, which violates the current regulation
(Hung, 2013).
Following the end of martial law in 1987, declining media control and press censorship
led to a highly competitive print media industry (Fell, 2005). One of the most important
newly founded newspapers is the Liberty Times. Established as a local newspaper by a Tai-
wanese business group, it was turned into a national newspaper in 1987 and gained sub-
stantial market share in the 1990s by using aggressive marketing strategies (Chyi &Huang,
2011). Nowadays, the Liberty Times has become a major pan-Green newspaper and takes
a pro-independence political stance. Another important newspaper during post-martial
law period is theApple Daily. Launched by a Hong Kong-based media group in 2003, it
actively adopts a reader-first policy and selects its news content to meet readers’ demand
(Ho& Ping Sun, 2008). Featuring tabloid journalism and sensational content, theApple
Daily is currently the most circulated newspaper in Taiwan (Chyi &Huang, 2011). Unlike
the other three large newspapers, the political affiliation of theApple Daily is ambiguous,
neither pan-Blue nor pan-Green. Regarding the cross-Strait relations between Taiwan and
China, theApple Daily does not oppose unification of Taiwan with China (Apple Daily,
2012), nor does it protest against Taiwan independence. Nevertheless, it advocates the de-
mocratization of China and thus holds a political stance opposed to the Chinese govern-
ment (Chinese Communist Party).
The political stance of a newspaper can also be observed by how the medium is treated
by the Chinese government. For example, the Chinese government has refused to issue visas
to journalists from theApple Daily several times (International Federation of Journalists,
2014). Similarly, in “2013 Cross-Strait Media Prospects Forum” held in Beijing, the two
largest print media in Taiwan, the Liberty Times andApple Daily, were not invited (Apple
Daily, 2013). These discrimination policies reveal their ideology perceived by the Chinese
government.
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1.4 Data
1.4.1 Press Conference Transcripts
Mymeasure of media ideology requires a lexicon of pro-China ideology in China-Taiwan
relations as a reference. I collect press conference transcripts of a Chinese government in-
stitution, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council (TAO in short) from its official
website1. The TAO is an administrative institution in charge of Taiwan affairs under the
State Council of China. According to its official website, its main functions include “imple-
menting and carrying out guidelines and policies related to Taiwan stipulated by the CPC
Central Committee and the State Council” and “taking charge of the media and publicity
work related to Taiwan and releasing news and information concerning Taiwan affairs.”
Since the TAO is responsible for conducting and publicizing China’s policies towards Tai-
wan, I consider it a major official outlet of the Chinese government and use transcripts of
its press conferences to build monthly lexicons of China’s stance towards Taiwan. The press
conferences take place irregularly. From 2000 to 2014, there are 211 TAO press conferences
in total, 133 months with press conferences, and often one or two in each month. On aver-
age, I have 4,152 words each month to build a lexicon.
1.4.2 Newspaper Headlines
To measure media ideology, I collect newspaper headlines using the News Knowledge Man-
agement System (NKMS) administered by the Library of Legislative Yuan in Taiwan. The
system consists of daily headlines of 34 newspapers since 1980; I study 12 of them that are
also included in the TEDS surveys. I choose to analyze headlines to measure media ide-
ology, not full news text, for three reasons. First, headlines are usually set by editors, not
reporters, and more likely to reveal a newspaper’s ideology. Second, readers tend to read
headlines more often than to read full texts of news, so headlines are more influential than
news content. Third, data availability and compilation difficulty impede full text analysis.
1http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwfbh/index.htm
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The enormity of the data I use renders it impossible to collect it manually. Instead, I
write Python programs to collect information on 18,383,058 headlines from 2000 to 2014,
including newspaper names, headlines, dates, pages, sections, and sometimes reporters
and regions. Following the literature (Gentzkow& Shapiro, 2010; Groseclose &Milyo,
2005), I remove editorials and reviews for two reasons. First, the language used by editors
and opinion writers is usually sarcastic and difficult to tell its connotations with automatic
text analysis. It can be that an editor uses many positive verbs to criticize “One China Pol-
icy”. Second, news, editorials and reviews are utterly different from readers’ perspective.
News is supposed to be objective and truthful, while editorials and reviews are full of opin-
ions and judgments. While editorials and reviews may reveal the ideology of a newspaper
more directly and efficiently, they are less likely to have an impact on readers’ thoughts and,
in turn, influence their national identities. Therefore, I remove editorials and reviews in the
data set. Then, I write additional code to detect repetitions in the data set. As I request a
large amount of news, the NKMS system often responds with duplicates, which can seri-
ously distort the result–it turns out that nearly 10% of the data I collect are repetitions. In
the end, I collect 10,953,168 headlines. It is worth mentioning that the number of news sto-
ries from a newspaper in the NKMS system surges from 7.6 news stories per day in 2000
to 199.8 per day in 2014, suggesting that I need to be cautious about intertemporal analy-
sis: measures in earlier years are built on relatively small text corpora and may be less stable
compared to measures in later years. On average, there are 48,645 words per month per
newspaper.
1.4.3 Surveys
I compile rotating panel surveys from Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Studies
(TEDS), each containing two periods, (2001, 2004P), (2004L, 2008L), (2008L, 2008P)
and (2008P, 2012), where L stands for legislative elections and P stands for presidential elec-
tions. In the end, there are 7,820 observations in the sample, and the core questions are the
following:
• Which newspaper do you read most often?
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• In Taiwan, some people think they are Taiwanese. There are also some people who
think that they are Chinese. Do you consider yourself to be a Taiwanese, a Chinese
or both?
The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a person identifies him/herself
exclusively as a Taiwanese, not a Chinese. Figure 1.3 displays the proportion of people who
identify themselves as Taiwanese in the data set. The number increases from 41.9% in 2001
to 56.1% in 2012; the growing trend is comparable to the pattern of NCCU surveys men-
tioned in Section 1.3, where the proportion of Taiwanese identity increases from 41.6% in
2001 to 54.3% in 2012.
Figure1.3:The share of Taiwanese identity from 2001 to 2012 in 4 rotating TEDS panel surveys, (2001,
2004P), (2004L, 2008L), (2008L, 2008P) and (2008P, 2012), where L stands for legislative elections and P
stands for presidential elections.
The 12 newspapers distributed in Taiwan that I study comprise 98% of the market. The
largest four newspapers are theApple Daily, Liberty Times,United Daily News, and China
Times. In terms of political affiliations, the Liberty Times favors the Pan-Green Coalition,
theUnited Daily News and China Times are associated with the Pan-Blue Coalition, and
theApple Daily is not related to either camp. Regarding the current stance on cross-Strait
relations between Taiwan and China, the Liberty Times clearly supports Taiwan indepen-
dence, while the China Times openly advocates unification of Taiwan with China. The
United Daily News holds an equivocal stance on the issue; nevertheless, given its long-
lasting pro-KMT stance and Greater China ideological position, theUnited Daily News
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is often classified as a pro-unification newspaper (Kuo, 2007; Kuo &Nakamura, 2005).
TheApple Daily takes an ambiguous stance as well, resorting to the decision of Taiwanese
people.
Figure 1.4 shows the changes in newspaper readership of the top four newspapers in the
data set. The Pan-Blue affiliated newspapers, the China Times and theUnited Daily News,
suffer from declining readership, especially the China Times, whose readership drops from
28.5% in 2001 to 14.8% in 2012. On the other hand, the Pan-Green affiliated newspaper, the
Liberty Times, enjoys ca. 30% of readership over the period; theApple Daily joins the mar-
ket in 2003 and expands its readership from 12.0% in 2004 to 30.6% in 2012, and is currently
the largest newspaper in Taiwan.
Figure1.4:The change in the readership of the top four newspapers in 4 rotating TEDS panel surveys, (2001,
2004P), (2004L, 2008L), (2008L, 2008P) and (2008P, 2012), where L stands for legislative elections and P
stands for presidential elections.
Note: TheApple Dailywas introduced in 2003, so its readership in 2001 is 0.
The TEDS survey also contains questions about domestic politics and individual connec-
tions with China, such as partisanship, trips to China in the past 5 years, etc. Regarding par-
tisanship, since the Pan-Green Coalition promotes Taiwanese nationalism, supposedly its
supporters are more likely to favor Taiwanese identity, compared to supporters of the Pan-
Blue Coalition. Thus, Pan-Green partisanship and Taiwanese identity should be positively
correlated. In the data set, among 5,282 observations that recognize themselves as partisans,
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50.1% of people support the KMT, the largest party in Pan-Blue Coalition, while 41.8%
support the DPP, the largest party in the Pan-Green Coalition. Meanwhile, among the
partisans, 49.0% identify themselves as Taiwanese, not Chinese, suggesting a discrepancy
between national identification and partisanship. Firstly, this may reflect the election strate-
gies of the leading parties in both camps as they tend to weaken their stance on political
issues about cross-Strait relations. Secondly, this could also relate to multiple political issues
in Taiwan–issues about China are important, but economic development, environmental
protection, social security, etc. also play a role in individual political leanings. Lastly, and
most importantly, this may indicate that national identification is a broader concept relative
to partisanship. Many supporters from both camps think they are Taiwanese, not Chinese.
In this chapter, I include partisanship as a control variable. Additionally, the TEDS survey
includes the usual demographics like age, gender, education, ethnicity, religions, education,
language, etc. For more discussions on demographics, refer to the appendix.
Table1.1:Summary statistics of the combined TEDS panel surveys
Variable N Mean SD
National identity:
Taiwanese identity 7597 0.5 0.5
National envisioning:
Taiwan independence 7223 0.23 0.42
unification with China 7223 0.17 0.37
Choice of newspapers:
China Times 4914 0.19 0.39
United Daily News 4914 0.21 0.4
Liberty Times 4914 0.3 0.46
Apple Daily 4640 0.22 0.42
Commercial Times 4914 0.01 0.09
Commons Daily 4914 0 0.06
Economic Daily News 4914 0.01 0.1
Youth Daily News 4914 0 0
Taiwan Times 4914 0.01 0.09
United Evening News 4914 0.02 0.12
China Daily 4914 0.02 0.12
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Keng Sheng Daily News 4914 0 0.05
Partisanship:
KMT (Pan-Blue) 5282 0.5 0.5
DPP (Pan-Green) 5282 0.42 0.49
NP (Pan-Blue) 5282 0.02 0.13
PFP (Pan-Blue) 5282 0.05 0.21
TSU (Pan-Green) 5282 0.02 0.14
Age:
Age 7820 47.89 15.79
Gender:
Female 7820 0.49 0.5
Income:
Monthly income 5651 15504.07 12607.88
Ethnicity of father:
Min Nan 7744 0.75 0.43
Hakka 7744 0.13 0.34
Aboriginal 7744 0.01 0.09
Mainlander 7744 0.1 0.31
Foreigner 7744 0 0.05
Chinese 5020 0 0.02
Language spoken at home:
Mandarin 7806 0.49 0.5
Min Nan 7806 0.7 0.46
Hakka 7806 0.06 0.24
Aboriginal 7806 0 0.06
Mainlander 7806 0 0.06
Foreigner 7806 0 0.04
Education:
Elementary 7790 0.25 0.43
Junior high school 7790 0.13 0.34
High school 7790 0.27 0.45
Vocational school 7790 0.12 0.33
Above university 7790 0.22 0.41
Contact with China:
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Contact with Chinese people 6576 0.11 0.32
Travel in China (total times) 6569 0.7 2.37
Religion:
None 7212 0.22 0.41
Buddhism 7212 0.42 0.49
Taoism 7212 0.3 0.46
Catholicism 7212 0.01 0.1
Christianity 7212 0.04 0.19
Islam 7212 0 0.03
Yiguandao 7212 0.02 0.14
Other 7212 0.01 0.1
Marital status:
Married 7796 0.72 0.45
Divorced 7796 0.02 0.15
Single 7796 0.2 0.4
Note: (1) It happens that the data set do not include readers of Youth Daily News; I keep it just for consis-
tency. (2) I compute monthly income from family income and number of family, i.e. monthly income =
(family income)/(family N). (3) People often speak more than one language at home. As a result, the sum of
mean for all the language variables is larger than one.
1.5 Measurement
1.5.1 Lexicon of Chinese Ideology
To construct the monthly lexicon, I first need to process the press conference transcripts
and implement word segmentation. This task is non-trivial because, different from English,
there are no explicit word boundary markers in Chinese. For example, “台中國小” can
be segmented as “台中/國小” (Taichung Elementary School) or “台/中國/小” (Taiwan
China small) and, thus, can be interpreted quite distinctively. While this task is easy for
Mandarin speakers, it is challenging for computers. To implement word segmentation, I
use an online service called Chinese Knowledge and Information Processing (CKIP, http://
ckipsvr.iis.sinica.edu.tw/) provided by the Institute of Information Science and the Insti-
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tute of Linguistics of Academia Sinica.1 CKIP is built upon linguistic analysis and large
Chinese text corpora, and is capable of out-of-vocabulary word identification and part-of-
speech tagging; its recall, precision, and F score are ca. 93% - 97% (Ma & Chen, 2003). After
word segmentation, I remove words appearing only once, which is a common procedure in
text analysis. I aim to choose words that represent Chinese government’s ideology towards
Taiwan, and it is less likely that they appear only once. Then, I delete words with length
smaller than two characters because it is often difficult to tell the meaning of one-character
Chinese words. Next, I keep only content words (e.g. proper nouns). Presumably, non-
content words such as prepositions, pronouns, and conjunctions are less meaningful in
terms of building a lexicon. After that, I manually remove words that are common in gen-
eral press conferences but do not represent Chinese government’s ideology (e.g. reporters).
Finally, I keep the 30 most frequent words in the lexicon.
Table 1.2 shows sample lists of words fromNovember 2000 and December 2014 in the
lexicons, respectively. The discrepancies between the lists suggest that the topics in 2000 are
quite different from the ones in 2014, implying that the lexicons may capture the change
of China’s policies towards Taiwan. Figure 1.5 serves as an example. Figure 1.5a shows a de-
clining frequency trend of “一個中國” (One China Policy) and “台獨” (Taiwan Indepen-
dence) from 2000 to 2014, while Figure 1.5b displays a growing frequency trend of “經濟”
(economy) and “發展” (development). This pattern suggests a shift from political issues to
economic issues in China’s policies towards Taiwan. I further apply an unsupervised LDA
model2 to examine the topics of TAO over time. Figure 1.6 displays the topics in TAO press
conference transcripts fromDecember 2000 to December 2014 and Table 1.3 summarizes
the transition. Again, a similar trend is shown: the topics switch from politics to more di-
verse issues such as agriculture, tourism, and trade.
I also implement a popular keyword extraction method, TF-IDF (term frequency–in-
verse document frequency). In addition to the term frequency of a word, TF-IDF also con-
siders whether the word appears in other press conferences. If the word is used in all press
1I also use a modified N-gram algorithm and the results of word segmentation are very similar.
2Dirichlet parameters of the unsupervised model: 20 topics, topic-per-document distribution α = 0:1,
word-per-topic distribution β = 0:01, 2,000 iterations.
1Three Direct Links: shorthand for direct links of trade, mail, and air and shipping services across the
Taiwan Strait.
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Table1.2:Lexicons constructed from Taiwan Affairs Office transcripts in November, 2000 and December,
2014, respectively.
2000 Nov 2014 Dec
word translation word translation
台灣 Taiwan 台灣 Taiwan
兩岸 Cross-Strait 兩岸 Cross-Strait
大陸 Mainland 大陸 Mainland
關係 relations 關係 relations
發展 development 發展 development
共識 consensus 共識 consensus
張銘清 ZhangMingqing 范麗青 Fan Liqing
三通1 Three Direct Links 合作 cooperation
原則 principle 和平 peace
當局 authorities 交流 exchange
黨派 partisan 經濟 economy
實現 achieve 同胞 compatriots
採訪 interview 共同 together
海峽 strait 創業 venture
開放 open 成果 achievement
(a)Political issues (b)Economic issues
Figure1.5:The word frequency of selected words in Taiwan Affairs Office press conference transcripts from
2000 to 2014.
Note: Figure 1.5a displays the word frequency of “台獨” (Taiwan Independence) and “一個中國” (One
China Policy), while Figure1.5b shows the frequency of “發展” (development) and “經濟” (economy).
24
(a)2000-2003 (b)2004-2007
(c)2008-2011 (d)2012-2014
Figure1.6:Topics in the TAO press conference transcripts from 2000 to 2014.
Table1.3:Summary of topics in TAO press conference transcripts from 2000 to 2014
2000-2003
2004-2007
2008-2014
Topic 10 Topic 9 Topic 2 Topic 6
台灣 Taiwan 台灣 Taiwan 台灣 Taiwan
兩岸 Cross-Strait 兩岸 Cross-Strait 兩岸 Cross-Strait
大陸 Mainland 大陸 Mainland 大陸 Mainland
合作 cooperation 合作 cooperation 合作 cooperation
企業 enterprise 企業 enterprise
同胞 compatriot 同胞 compatriot
中國 China 農業 agriculture 交流 exchange 范麗青 Fan Li-qing
三通 Three Links 農產品 agricultural product 發展 development 協議 agreement
當局 authority 農民 farmer 共同 common 楊毅 Yang Yi
台獨 Taiwan independence 水果 fruit 旅遊 travel 關係 relations
原則 principle 李維一 LiWei-yi 居民 resident 台資 Taiwan-funded
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conferences, it may just be a common word and not representative of the current Chinese
government’s ideology towards Taiwan. Table 1.4 shows a list of words fromNovember
2000 and December 2014 in the TF-IDF lexicon. As expected, there are fewer common
words between the two months as TF-IDF underweights words that appear in multiple
documents. Besides, the topics are more specific than the previous lexicon. For example,
the TF-IDF method tends to pick up more proper nouns, such as “WTO”, “奧運會”
(Olympic Games), and “九合一” (nine-in-one elections). Despite the discrepancy between
the two lexicons, the final measures of media ideology are highly correlated (corr = 0.7879).
In the following sections, I will present the results from both lexicons.
Table1.4:TF-IDF Lexicons constructed from Taiwan Affairs Office transcripts in November, 2000 and De-
cember, 2014, respectively.
Nov 2000 Dec 2014
張銘清 ZhangMingqing 范麗青 Fan Liqing
倒退 fall back 峰會 summit
李遠哲 Yuan T. Lee 紅利 dividend
三通 Three Links 創業 venture
愚蠢 silly 台灣青年 Taiwanese youth
秦慧珠 QinHuizhu 法庭 court
偽造 forge 貿區 Free Trade Area
地步 extent 九合一 nine-in-one elections
黨派 partisan 兩黨 the two parties (CCP and KMT)
倒行逆施 perversely 抗日 resistance against Japan
拙劣 poorly 糾紛 dispute
信件 letter 企業家 entrepreneur
投降 surrender 勝利 victory
危險 danger 國共 KMT and CCP
駐點 on-site 光復 recovery
當局 authorities 前行 forward
奧運會 Olympic Games 中小企業 SMEs
早報 morning newspaper 柯文哲 KoWen-je
比賽 contest 青年 youth
衛星 satellite 利民 benefit the people
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1.5.2 Measurement ofMedia Ideology
I modify the method fromGentzkow and Shapiro (2010) and Larcinese et al. (2011) and
extend it based onMurphy andWestbury (2013). I refer to words in the lexicon as “key-
words,” and all the content words within the same sentences (or the same headlines) as
“neighboring words”. I start by extracting the keywords for my lexicon from TAO’s press re-
leases. Then, I compare TAO’s use of each keyword and its neighboring words with that of
Taiwanese newspapers. If a Taiwanese newspaper systematically uses the same set of words
in a similar way as the Chinese government institution does, my measure of the pro-China
slant of the newspaper will be high.
By taking neighboring words into consideration in addition to comparing keywords, my
approach addresses at least four issues. Firstly, it eliminates ambiguities caused by homo-
graphs, i.e. words with the same form but different meanings. Take English words, “bank”,
for an instance. “Bank” can refer to a financial institution or a sloping raised land along a
lake or river. Since the neighboring words of a financial institution differ from the ones of
a sloping raised land, the actual meaning of “bank” can be determined and thus the noise
from homograph ambiguity is lessened. Secondly, it helps avoid confusion caused by lexi-
cal differences between Taiwan and China. Although Taiwan and China both speakMan-
darin, the use of language in two regions differs. There are many “false friends,” i.e. words
that look or sound similar, but have different meanings. For example, “小姐” means Miss
in Taiwan, but refers to a prostitute in China. Nevertheless, through neighboring words,
false friends from one another can be distinguished and disturbance in the measure is re-
duced. Thirdly, it alleviates the negative effects of word segmentation mistakes on the mea-
surement of media ideology. As previously said, “台中國小” can be segmented as “台
中/國小” (Taichung Elementary School) or “台/中國/小” (Taiwan China small). Sup-
pose computers wrongly interpret “台中國小” as “台/中國/小” (Taiwan China small)
and “中國” (China) is a keyword in the lexicon. The measure will not be affected as long
as the neighboring words are about an elementary school and different from the neighbor-
ing words of “中國” (China) in TAO press conferences. Lastly, it detects different views
on a topic. For example, TAO often mentions “台獨” (Taiwan Independence). If I study
only keywords, then high frequency of “台獨” (Taiwan Independence) may imply that the
Chinese government supports Taiwan independence, which is not true. The actual posi-
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tion of Chinese government on Taiwan independence can be inferred from the neighboring
words: the neighboring words of “台獨” (Taiwan Independence) are “抵制”(boycott),
“危害”(endanger), “遏制”(containment), “阻礙”(obstruction), “破壞”(damage), etc. ,
showing a negative perspective. On average, there are 54.9 neighboring words per keyword.
An important feature of my approach is that it compares keywords and neighboring
words in TAO’s press releases and Taiwanese newspapers using a measure called positive
pointwise mutual information (PPMI) instead of raw frequencies. PPMI compares the
actual joint distribution of a keyword and its neighboring word to the joint distribution as-
suming independence of the keyword and the neighboring word. If the neighboring word
often appears with the keyword, PPMI will be positive and it is called word co-occurrence.
If the use of the neighboring word is independent of the keyword, PPMI will be zero. Us-
ing PPMI mitigates three potential problems. Firstly, the number of news stories is unbal-
anced between small newspapers and large newspapers. For example, 27.2 news stories from
theUnited Daily News are included in the data base per day, while only 3.0 news stories
fromKeng Sheng Daily News are included in the data base per day. If I use word frequency
to measure media ideology, then small newspapers are deemed less pro-China simply be-
cause of fewer news stories. Using PPMI lessens the influence since it uses probabilities in-
stead of raw frequency. Secondly, the number of news stories grows from 90.7 news stories
per day in 2000 to 2,398.0 news stories per day in 2014. Using PPMI reduces the concerns
for intertemporal comparison of media ideology.
Figure 1.7 displays the average raw frequency and PPMI per keyword for each newspaper
over time, where the legend is based on the total number of words ranging from 377 to
214,949 words for a newspaper in a month. Figure 1.7a demonstrates that newspapers with
larger total number of words tend to have higher raw frequencies, and the total number of
words is positively correlated to raw frequencies across newspapers over time (corr = 0.43).
However, this pattern does not exist in Figure 1.7b. Newspapers with small corpus size can
have high values of PPMI, and the total number of words is not correlated to PPMI across
newspapers over time (cor = 0.09).
Lastly, press conference transcripts and newspapers headlines are utterly different types
of text. Press conferences transcripts document complete conversation between a spokesper-
son and reporters, while newspaper headlines summarize news stories and convey informa-
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tion with much shorter texts. It is hard to justify the comparison between press conference
transcripts and newspaper headlines, but PPMI is more comparable across different types
of texts than word frequency.
The third attribute of the measure is that I use cosine similarity to assess the distance be-
tween two vectors. Cosine similarity is commonly used in natural language processing and
more appropriate than Euclidean distance in text classification. Another feature of cosine
similarity is that its values always range between 0 and 1, facilitating the interpretation of
the measure.
Formally, the measure can be written as follows:
PPMIi,j,k = max
{
log2
p(i, j)
p(i)p(j) , 0
}
PPMIi,k = (PPMIi,1,k,PPMIi,2,k, . . . ,PPMIi,J,k)
MIk =
1
I
∑
i∈I
cos (θi,k) =
1
I
∑
i∈I
PPMIi,kPPMIi,TAO
‖PPMIi,k‖‖PPMIi,TAO‖
• i: keyword
• j: neighboring word
• k: newspaper
• MIk ∈ [0, 1]
For each keyword i in the monthly lexicon, I construct a vector of its neighboring word’s
PPMI, building a 30 by J matrix for both TAO and each Taiwanese newspaper. Then, I
calculate the cosine similarity between the matrices and average over all keywords in the
monthly lexicon. If a Taiwanese newspaper systematically uses the same set of keywords
with a similar context as TAO does, its measure of media ideology is high and the newspa-
per is ideologically close to the Chinese government.
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(a)Raw Frequency
(b)PPMI
Figure1.7:The average values of raw frequency and PPMI per keyword for each newspaper over time, where
the legend is based on the corpus size.
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Mymeasure of media ideology aims to capture three aspects of texts: diction, issue cov-
erage, and context. To illustrate the nuance of diction, consider the use of phrases “中國”
(China) and “大陸” (mainland, or continent) when a newspaper refers to People’s Republic
of China (PRC). If one uses “中國” (China) to describe a piece of news about PRC but not
about Taiwan, this implies that the newspaper does not consider Taiwan as part of China.
Instead, if a newspaper uses “大陸” (mainland, or continent), then it does not exclude Tai-
wan from China because mainland and Taiwan can both be part of China. Take a piece of
news from the Liberty Times, presumably the most anti-China newspaper, for example:
中國勞力成本大增模組廠紛回台生產
Labor costs in China surge; many module manufacturing plants return to
Taiwan.
(Hong, 2012)
The Liberty Times assumes that Taiwan is not part of China and implicitly compares
the labor costs between China and Taiwan. If the Liberty Times uses Mainland instead of
China to refer to PRC, then it is inconclusive whether Taiwan is considered a part of China
or not. This piece of news also shows that non-political news stories may reflect the political
ideology of a newspaper. Figure 1.8a displays the word frequency of “中國” (China) and
“大陸” (mainland, or continent) in newspaper headlines in 2014, excluding the combina-
tion of the two words, “中國大陸” (mainland China). A large discrepancy is observed be-
tween Pan-Blue affiliated newspapers and other newspapers. For example, theUnited Daily
News uses “大陸” (mainland) for 1,006 times, compared to 378 times of its usage of “中國”
(China). On the other hand, the Liberty Times uses “中國” (China) for 1,874 times, but
only uses “大陸” (mainland) for 13 times. This difference is also shown in TAO press con-
ference transcripts. Figure 1.8b shows that the Chinese government consistently calls itself
“大陸” (mainland) instead of “中國” (China) when speaking to Taiwanese authorities and
Taiwanese people.
The measure also reveals different patterns of issue coverage. Take the keyword, “平潭”
(Pingtan), for instance. Pingtan stands for Pingtan Experimental Area in China and was
planned to be constructed in the Haixi Special Economic Zone in 2009. A major goal of the
zone is to strengthen cross-strait exchange and cooperation, and promote the strategic plan
of peaceful reunification with Taiwan (The Construction Outline of West Coast Economic
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(a)Newspapers (b)TAO
Figure1.8:The word frequency of “中國” (China) and “大陸” (Mainland, or continent), excluding “中國大
陸” (Mainland China).
Figure 1.8a shows 12 Taiwanese newspapers in 2014, while Figure 1.8b displays Taiwan Affairs Office press
conference transcripts between 2000 and 2014.
Figure1.9:The word frequency of “平潭” (Pingtan) in TAO and the largest four Taiwanese newspapers from
2008 to 2014.
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Figure1.10:The values of PPMI of 5 neighboring words of “平潭” (Pingtan) in TAO and the largest four
Taiwanese newspapers in March, 2012.
Zone in Fujian Province, 2010). Figure 1.9 shows the monthly frequency of “平潭” (Ping-
tan) during the period of 2008 to 2014. The thick line is the frequency in TAO transcripts,
while the other four lines are the frequency of the largest four newspapers in Taiwan, re-
spectively. Generally, the China Times and theUnited Daily News, the two pro-China
newspapers, report on “平潭” (Pingtan) more often than the Liberty Times and theApple
Daily, the two anti-China newspapers, suggesting that newspapers with distinct preferences
of China choose topics differently and that this behavior is captured by the measure.
However, this pattern does not always hold. For example, in March 2012, the frequency
of “平潭” (Pingtan) is almost the same between the China Times (14 times) and the Liberty
Times (12 times). In some other months even more “平潭” (Pingtan) is observed in the Lib-
erty Times than in pro-China newspapers. Nevertheless, despite similar frequency of “平
潭” (Pingtan) in March 2012, the views of the two newspapers on Pingtan are completely
different. The China Times reports the comments of the Fujian Governor and focuses on
the opportunities in Pingtan, while the Liberty Timeswarns violations of the law if Tai-
wanese citizens are recruited as Chinese public officials in Pingtan. Since my measure of me-
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dia ideology considers the context of “平潭” (Pingtan), it is able to capture different views
on the topic. Figure 1.10 shows PPMI of five neighboring words of “平潭” (Pingtan) for
TAO and the largest four Taiwanese newspapers in March, 2012. Some neighboring words
are neutral (Fujian, experimental area, and cross-strait), while others are positive (build and
communication). Although anti-China newspapers mention “平潭” (Pingtan), they tend
to use fewer positive neighboring words than TAO and pro-China newspapers do. As a
result, in spite of similar keyword frequency, pro-China newspapers and anti-China news-
papers are labeled with different media ideologies in terms of my measure. Only when a
newspaper uses the same neighboring words as TAO does will its measure of pro-China
stance be high.
It is worth mentioning that the measure can only capture the relative ideological position
of a newspaper, not the absolute resemblance between each Taiwanese newspaper and the
Chinese government. That is, the measure can tell if a newspaper shares more similar ideas
with the Chinese government compared to other Taiwanese newspapers, but it does not
show that the ideology of a newspaper is the same as the one of Chinese government. This
is due to fundamental differences in the nature between the two types of text. It is possible
that the measures of media ideology are low for all newspapers over time, suggesting that
newspaper headlines may not be perfectly comparable to press conference transcripts.
Table 1.5 displays the descriptive statistics of the measured media ideology using both ba-
sic and TF-IDF lexicons, respectively. The measure is between 0 and 1 by construction; a
higher value indicates more similar use of language between TAO and a Taiwanese news-
paper, suggesting that the Taiwanese newspaper adopts a more pro-China ideology. In
line with expectations, theApple Daily and the Liberty Times are less pro-China than
the China Times and theUnited Daily News are: theApple Daily and the Liberty Times
have an average of 0.089 and 0.143, respectively, while the China Times and theUnited
Daily News have an average of 0.236 and 0.3, respectively. In particular, the media ideology
of the China Times grows from 0.167 (0.054) in 2008 to 0.241 (0.061) in 2010, which un-
derpins the argument that the China Times leans towards China after it was sold to a pro-
unification businessman and included in theWant Want China Times Group in November
2008. For an extensive and formal discussion, see the next section.
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Table1.5:Descriptive statistics of media ideology
Newspaper Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
BASIC
Apple Daily 0.089 0.037 0.008 0.191 111
Keng Sheng Daily News 0.108 0.088 0 0.416 119
Liberty Times 0.143 0.05 0.033 0.35 133
Taiwan Times 0.157 0.064 0.015 0.282 133
United Evening News 0.159 0.072 0 0.281 133
Commons Daily 0.165 0.061 0.019 0.358 133
China Daily 0.173 0.068 0.014 0.366 119
Youth Daily 0.227 0.088 0.02 0.376 133
China Times 0.236 0.086 0.063 0.45 133
Commercial Times 0.24 0.08 0.014 0.4 133
Economic Daily 0.249 0.088 0.017 0.409 133
United Daily News 0.3 0.082 0.058 0.458 133
all 0.189 0.095 0 0.458 1546
TFIDF
Apple Daily 0.061 0.037 0 0.167 111
Keng Sheng Daily News 0.064 0.064 0 0.302 119
Liberty Times 0.091 0.052 0 0.315 133
Taiwan Times 0.097 0.058 0 0.273 133
United Evening News 0.099 0.06 0 0.305 133
Commons Daily 0.1 0.056 0 0.263 133
China Daily 0.105 0.055 0 0.292 119
Youth Daily 0.11 0.062 0 0.349 133
Commercial Times 0.12 0.061 0 0.289 133
Economic Daily 0.126 0.07 0 0.348 133
China Times 0.153 0.067 0.018 0.343 133
United Daily News 0.199 0.073 0.025 0.399 133
all 0.111 0.070 0 0.399 1546
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1.6 Applications
1.6.1 Ownership Effects
1.6.1.1 Methodology
According to anecdotal evidence, the newspapers in theWant Want China Times Group
have become more slanted in favor of China after they were sold to a pro-unification busi-
nessman in November 2008. To check on the anecdotal evidence, I use my measure of me-
dia ideology and adopt difference-in-difference approach, where the treatment group con-
tains the newspapers in theWant Want China Times Group and the control group contains
all other newspapers:
MIk,t = α0 + α11t≥200811 + α2WWk + α31t≥200811 ·WWk + Xt + ηk,t
MIk,t is the media ideology of newspaper k at time t. WWk is an indicator of newspa-
pers in theWant Want China Times Group; among the 12 selected newspapers, the China
Times and Commercial Times belong to theWant Want China Times Group. 1t≥200811 is an
indicator of all periods after November 2008, when the two newspapers were sold to the
unification advocate. Xt is a vector of control variables, which includes monthly trade share
with China, the total number of words in the headlines of a newspaper in a month, month,
year, and month× year fixed effects.
I expect α2 > 0, i.e. on average, the ideology of newspapers in theWant Want China
Times Group is closer to the Chinese government when compared to all other newspapers.
Moreover, I expect a positive α3, i.e. newspapers in theWant Want China Times Group
have become more slanted towards China again after the change of ownership when com-
pared to all other newspapers.
1.6.1.2 Results
Table 1.6 displays the baseline results. Column 1 considers only the main explanatory vari-
ables in an OLS model. As expected, the main coefficient of interest, 1t≥200811 · WWk, is
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positive and statistically significant. Compared to newspapers in the control group, the
media ideology of newspapers in theWant Want China Times Group increases by 0.032
after the ownership change. Column 2 also includes variables about (potential) structural
change. In particular, structural change refers to the large discrepancy of media ideology
between the periods before and after April 2005. One possible reason for the structural
change is the improvement of cross-Strait relations. In April 2005, the KMT–the opposi-
tion party then–launched a groundbreaking trip to mainland China, which was the highest
level of exchange between Chinese Communist Party and the KMT since 1945. The chair-
men of the KMT expressed interest in improving relations with mainland China and re-
affirmed the “One China principle.” This change of relations between Taiwan and China
could have led to a structural change of media ideology. After taking potential structural
change into consideration, the coefficient of the main explanatory variable, 1t≥200811 ·WWk
still remains highly significant, and the magnitude of the coefficient becomes even larger.
Compared to newspapers in the control group, the media ideology of newspapers in the
Want Want China Times Group increases by 0.056 after the ownership change, which is ca.
25.8% of the average media ideology of the treatment group before the ownership change.
Column 3 adds newspaper fixed effects; the size of the coefficient remains the same and is
still statistically significant. Column 4 further includes month and year fixed effects, and
the coefficient is weakly significant and slightly increase to 0.058. Column 5 incorporates all
time fixed effects variables, including month, year, and period fixed effects; the size of the
coefficient does not change but the coefficient becomes (just) statistically insignificant with
p-value at 10.8%.
In Table 1.7, I reproduce the baseline results with my measure of media ideology using
TF-IDF algorithm for keyword extraction, where TF-IDF stands for Term Frequency and
Inverse Document Frequency. The TF-IDF algorithm is designed to select keywords re-
lated to trendy topics in each period, but not keywords linked to popular topics across
different periods. Despite the difference in keyword extraction, the coefficients are of the
same magnitude as the ones in Table 1.6 and all statistically significant. In particular, this
remains the case in column 5, which employs a fixed effects model with all time fixed effects.
The baseline results from Table 1.6 and Table 1.7 show that the effect of ownership change
is both economically and statistically significant. For example, the results in Table 1.6 indi-
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cate that, compared to all other newspapers, the newspapers in theWant Want China Times
Group have become ideologically closer to the Chinese government by ca. 14.7-26.7% after
they were sold to a pro-unification businessman. In Table 1.7, the range for the same effects
is between 31.8% and 52.7%.
Table1.6:The baseline regressions for ownership effects on media ideology.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS FE FE FE
1(t≥ 200811) 0.023∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016 -0.016 0.079∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014)
WW 0.010 -0.045∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.007) (0.011) (.) (.) (.)
1(t≥ 200811) ·WW 0.032∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.058∗ 0.056
(0.009) (0.009) (0.024) (0.032) (0.032)
Total number of words 1.596∗∗∗ 1.367∗∗∗ 1.367∗∗∗ 1.377∗∗∗ 1.328∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.078) (0.274) (0.328) (0.371)
Trade share: China 0.064 0.577∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗ -0.520 0.000
(0.045) (0.076) (0.126) (0.299) (.)
Structural change No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year/month fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Period fixed effects No No No No Yes
Observations 1546 1546 1546 1546 1546
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.72 0.53 0.59 0.71
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays the baseline results of ownership effects on media ideology. The dependent variable
is the media ideology measure constructed on basic keywords. Column 1 only includes the main explanatory
variables in an OLS model. Column 2 adds variables about (potential) structural change. Column 3 adopts
fixed effects model (newspaper fixed effects). Column 4 adds month and year fixed effects. Column 5 incorpo-
rates all time fixed effects variables, including month, year, and month× year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the newspaper level.
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Table1.7:The baseline regressions for ownership effects on TF-IDF media ideology.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS FE FE FE
1(t≥ 200811) 0.030∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗ -0.016 0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.011) (0.020)
WW -0.009∗ -0.030∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.009) (.) (.) (.)
1(t≥ 200811) ·WW 0.035∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.058∗ 0.048∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.032) (0.016)
Total number of words 1.079∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗ 1.377∗∗∗ 0.861∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.065) (0.162) (0.328) (0.233)
Trade share: China 0.007 0.409∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗ -0.520 0.000
(0.033) (0.059) (0.083) (0.299) (.)
Structural change No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year/month fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Period fixed effects No No No No Yes
Observations 1546 1546 1546 1546 1546
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.52 0.35 0.59 0.63
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays the baseline results of ownership effects on media ideology. The dependent variable
is the media ideology measure constructed on TF-IDF keywords. Column 1 only includes the main explana-
tory variables in an OLS model. Column 2 adds variables about (potential) structural change. Column 3
adopts fixed effects model (newspaper fixed effects). Column 4 adds month and year fixed effects. Column 5
incorporates all time fixed effects variables, including month, year, and month× year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the newspaper level.
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1.6.1.3 Robustness Checks
One identifying assumption of my difference-in-difference approach is the common trend
assumption, i.e. the average outcome of the treatment group and the one of the control
group would follow the same trend in the absence of the treatment. In other words, the me-
dia ideology of newspapers in the control group must have the same trend as the one in the
treatment group before newspapers in the treatment group were sold to the pro-unification
businessman. Figure 1.11 displays the media ideology of the 12 selected newspapers from
2000 to 2014. While media ideology before November 2008 appears quite volatile, it does
not seem to follow any particular trend.1 I also apply synthetic control methods (Abadie
& Gardeazabal, 2003) and compare the evolution of media ideology between each newspa-
per and its synthetic control counterpart.2 Figure 1.12 displays the difference of predicted
media ideology between a newspaper and its synthetic control counterpart, where the lat-
ter is an estimate of the counterfactual predicted media ideology in the absence of owner-
ship change.3 The results of the two newspapers in theWant Want China Times Group are
quite different: the China Times seems to be affected by the ownership change with some
time lags and a potential dip before the change, while the Commercial Times does not differ
from its synthetic control counterpart. This may reflect the fact that the Commercial Times
held a strong pro-China ideological position even before the ownership change.
To formally assess the existence of any pre-treatment trend that undermines the com-
mon trend assumption, I incorporate lead and lag variables into the model (Autor, 2003)
as shown in Table 1.8. Column 1-4 use the media ideology measure constructed on basic
keywords, while Column 5-8 use the one based on TF-IDF keywords. In Column 1-4, the
results show no pre-treatment and post-treatment trends, and the coefficient on the main
explanatory variable decreases to 0.044 and becomes more significant with leads and lags
included into regressions. In Column 5-8, there are almost no pre-treatment trends, with
1It is worth noting that media ideology before April 2005 trends distinctively, compared to the ones after
April 2005, confirming the structural change hypothesis.
2I minimize the mean squared prediction error (MSPE) over the periods after April 2005 with fully
nested optimization.
3Due to limitations in the Stata program, only one newspaper is allowed in the treatment group, while
the difference-in-difference method in the chapter assumes two newspapers the China Times and Commer-
cial Times in the treatment group. This leads to some bias, but synthetic control method is applied here for
informal visual inspection, rather than for formal assessment of common trends assumption.
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Table1.8:The regressions for ownership effects with leads and lags.
basic TFIDF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
1(t≥ 200811) 0.079∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.045 0.009 -0.028 0.070∗∗ 0.009
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.032) (0.020) (0.019) (0.024) (0.023)
F6: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW -0.009 -0.011
(0.012) (0.017)
F5: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW 0.002 0.029∗
(0.027) (0.014)
F4: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW 0.001 -0.040
(0.039) (0.054)
F3: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW 0.000 0.000
(.) (.)
F2: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW -0.006 0.000 -0.022 0.000
(0.032) (.) (0.041) (.)
F1: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.012 0.010 0.010
(0.018) (0.033) (0.033) (0.015) (0.032) (0.032)
1(t≥ 200811) ·WW 0.056 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.035∗∗
(0.032) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
L1: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW 0.019 -0.007 -0.007 0.024 -0.013 -0.013
(0.040) (0.028) (0.028) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013)
L2: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW 0.027 0.005 0.038∗∗ 0.030
(0.017) (0.034) (0.013) (0.037)
L3: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW 0.006 -0.003
(0.015) (0.009)
L4: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW -0.008 -0.034
(0.039) (0.046)
L5: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW -0.000 0.069∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.010)
L6: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW 0.026 -0.023∗∗
(0.025) (0.011)
Structural change Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year/month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1546 1546 1546 1546 1546 1546 1546 1546
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays the regression results of ownership effects with lead and lag variables. The dependent
variable in Column 1-4 is the media ideology measure constructed on basic keywords, while Column 5-8 show
the one constructed on TF-IDF keywords. Standard errors are clustered at the newspaper level.
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Figure1.11:Media ideology of the selected newspapers from September 2000 to December 2014.
Note: The highlighted lines are newspapers from theWant Want China Times Group: the red line is the
China Times, while the blue line is the Commercial Times.
only one weakly significant lead variable. There may be some post-treatment time varying
effects, but this does not weaken the identifying assumption of the difference-in-difference
model and can be well explained: the ownership change increases the media ideology of
newspapers in theWant Want China Times Group and its influence lasts longer than one
period.
Table 1.9 and Table 1.10 include group-specific time trends to mitigate potential prob-
lems from violating the common trend assumption.1 Column 1 uses the full sample, while
Column 2-5 use only observations 6, 12, 18, or 24 months before and after the ownership
change. Table 1.9 shows that the media ideology of newspapers in the treatment group fol-
lows a time trend that is indistinguishable from the one of newspapers in the control group
and that the coefficient on the main explanatory variable 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW is generally
significant. On the other hand, Table 1.10 shows some evidence of group-specific trends:
the coefficients onWW · t in Column 1 and 3 are significant at 10% and 5% level, respectively.
1I also include newspaper-specific time trends instead of group-specific ones, and the results are quite
similar.
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(a)Basic
(b)TFIDF
Figure1.12:Synthetic control method
Note: The y axis shows the gap of predicted media ideology between a newspaper and its synthetic counter-
part, where the latter assumes no ownership change. The red line refers to the China Times, while the blue
line denotes the Commercial Times.
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Nevertheless, the magnitude of the coefficient is small and goes in different directions. Ad-
ditionally, the main coefficient of interest is statistically significant in every column. By and
large, the treatment group trend is either indistinguishable from the control group trend,
or the difference between the trends is economically insignificant.
Table1.9:The regressions for ownership effects on media ideology with group-specific time trends.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
all +/-6m +/-12m +/-18m +/-24m
1(t≥ 200811) -0.012 0.018∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗ -0.005
(0.016) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013)
1(t≥ 200811) ·WW 0.044 0.044∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.023∗ 0.019∗
(0.028) (0.021) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
WW · t 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Structural change Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year/month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1546 132 252 372 492
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.44 0.63 0.57 0.59
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays regression results of ownership effects with group-specific time trends. The depen-
dent variable is the media ideology measure constructed on basic keywords. Column 1 uses the full sample,
while Column 2-5 use only observations 6, 12, 18, or 24 months before and after the ownership change. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the newspaper level.
Finally, since I only have 12 newspapers (12 clusters), I apply a wild bootstrap approach
(Cameron, Gelbach, &Miller, 2008) to adjust the standard errors. Column 1-4 in Table 1.11
use basic media ideology, while Column 5-8 employ TFIDF media ideology. Column 1-3,
5-7 reproduce the baseline regressions, while Column 4 and 8 include lead and lag variables.
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Table1.10:The regressions for ownership effects on TF-IDF media ideology with group-specific time trends.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
all +/-6m +/-12m +/-18m +/-24m
1(t≥ 200811) -0.006 -0.023∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗ -0.017∗
(0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
1(t≥ 200811) ·WW 0.038∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.025∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.021) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008)
WW · t 0.000∗ -0.003 -0.002∗∗ -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Structural change Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year/month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1546 132 252 372 492
Adjusted R2 0.63 0.42 0.65 0.62 0.58
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays regression results of ownership effects with group-specific time trends. The depen-
dent variable is the media ideology measure constructed on TF-IDF keywords. Column 1 uses the full sample,
while Column 2-5 use only observations 6, 12, 18, or 24 months before and after the ownership change. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the newspaper level.
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The main coefficient of interest is of the same size as previous regressions, but only half of
them remain significant. Table 1.12 incorporates treatment group specific time trends into
the models. The results are consistent with Table 1.9 and Table 1.10: the coefficients on the
main explanatory variable 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW are mostly significant, and the coefficients on
the treatment group specific trend are either statistically or economically insignificant.
1.6.2 Media Ideology andNational Identity
1.6.2.1 Methodology
To examine the effects of newspaper ideology on readers’ subjective feeling of national iden-
tity, I combine my measure of the media ideology of Taiwanese newspapers with rotating
panel surveys from Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Studies (TEDS). The baseline
specification is a linear probability model as follows:
Pr(Taiwani,t = 1|Ω) = β0 + β1newspaperi,t + β2MI′t · newspaperi,t + β3Xi,t + μi + δt + εi,t
Taiwani,t is an indicator equal to 1 if individual i self-identifies as Taiwanese, not Chinese
at time t. newspaperi,t is a vector of dummy variables {newspaperi,k,t}12k=1 that newspaper
k is the most commonly read newspaper by individual i at time t. MIt is a vector of media
ideology {MIk,t}12k=1 constructed in previous sections. Xi,t contains control variables, e.g.
national envisioning preference1, partisanship, parents’ ethnicity, language used at home,
district of residence, occupation, income, education, age, gender, and personal experience
related to China (e.g. travel in China). μi represents individual fixed effects, and δt is time
fixed effects. I expect β2 < 0, i.e. if a person often reads a newspaper with an ideological
position closer to the Chinese government, s/he is less likely to identify herself/himself as
Taiwanese, not Chinese.
However, my linear probability model can be biased for several reasons. First, it is prob-
able that I do not include all relevant variables, mostly because they are not available. For
1National envisioning refers to “統獨”(tondu), i.e. unification with China or Taiwan independence.
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Table1.11:The regressions of ownership effects using wild bootstrap.
basic TFIDF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS FE FE FE OLS FE FE FE
1(t≥ 200811) 0.018 0.018 0.035∗ 0.030 0.025∗∗ 0.024∗∗ -0.042∗ -0.013
(0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.035) (0.011) (0.010) (0.022) (0.030)
WW 0.071 -0.051 0.088∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.030 -0.042 0.033∗∗ 0.037∗∗
(0.097) (0.059) (0.000) (0.040) (0.042) (0.033) (0.014) (0.016)
F6: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW -0.009 -0.011
(0.013) (0.021)
F5: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW 0.002 0.029∗
(0.227) (0.017)
F4: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW 0.001 -0.040
(0.011) (0.052)
F3: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW 0.000 0.000
(.) (.)
F2: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW 0.000 0.000
(.) (.)
F1: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW -0.001 0.010
(0.005) (0.026)
1(t≥ 200811) ·WW 0.062 0.058 0.056 0.044∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.035
(0.053) (0.043) (0.043) (0.017) (0.025) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022)
L1: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW -0.007 -0.013
(0.030) (0.015)
L2: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW 0.005 0.030
(0.030) (0.040)
L3: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW 0.006 -0.003
(0.017) (0.008)
L4: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW -0.008 -0.034
(0.019) (0.044)
L5: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW -0.000 0.069∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.000)
L6: 1(t≥ 200811) ·WW 0.026 -0.023
(0.034) (0.014)
Structural change No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Year/month fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Period fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1546 1546 1546 1546 1546 1546 1546 1546
Adjusted R2 0.68 0.72 0.82 0.82 0.49 0.52 0.72 0.72
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays the regression results of ownership effects using wild bootstrap. The dependent
variable in Column 1-4 is the media ideology measure constructed on basic keywords, while Column 5-8 use
the one constructed on TF-IDF keywords. Column 1-3, 5-7 reproduce the baseline regressions, while Column
4 and 8 include lead and lag variables. Standard errors are clustered at the newspaper level.
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Table1.12:The regressions of ownership effects with group-specific time trends using wild bootstrap.
basic TFIDF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
all +/-12m +/-24m all +/-12m +/-24m
1(t≥ 200811) 0.036∗ -0.060∗ 0.060∗∗ -0.041∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗
(0.019) (0.031) (0.024) (0.020) (0.025) (0.017)
WW 0.000 0.420 0.000 0.000 1.268 0.000
(.) (0.617) (.) (.) (0.786) (.)
1(t≥ 200811) ·WW 0.044 0.034∗∗ 0.019∗ 0.038∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.015) (0.010) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000)
WW · t 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000∗ -0.002∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Structural change Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year/month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1546 252 492 1546 252 492
Adjusted R2 0.82 0.87 0.86 0.72 0.77 0.72
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays the regression results of ownership effects using wild bootstrap. The dependent
variable in Column 1-3 is the media ideology measure constructed on basic keywords, while Column 4-6 use
the one constructed on TF-IDF keywords. Column 1 and 4 use the full sample; Column 2, 5 and 3, 6 use only
observations 12, 24 months before and after the ownership change, respectively. Standard errors are clustered
at the newspaper level.
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example, I lack data on cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan, which are difficult
to measure and very likely to influence both media ideology and national identity. Cross-
Strait relations have greatly improved since KMT, the largest Pan-Blue party, returned to
power in 2008. It is possible that this improvement leads to both growing pro-China media
ideology and higher Chinese identity. Figure 1.13 displays the average media ideology from
2000 to 2014, which shows a slightly upward trend of pro-China media ideology over time.
The reverse can also be true–Taiwanese people may recognize differences between China
and Taiwan through frequent exchange with Chinese people, motivating a stronger Tai-
wanese identity. Consequently, without taking these factors into account, the effects of me-
dia ideology on national identity may be spurious or overestimated. Second, instead of the
hypothesis that media ideology influences national identity, it could be the reverse: national
identity may affect media ideology. People tend to expose themselves to similar thoughts
and ignore opposite opinions. Those who identify themselves as Taiwanese may choose to
read newspapers criticizing China. As a result, growing Taiwanese identity can encourage
profit-seeking newspapers to modify their stance against China to meet the demand of their
readers.
To account for the above issues, I adopt a fixed effects model with two instrumental vari-
ables. The fixed effects include individual and time fixed effects. Individual fixed effects can
capture any time-invariant individual characteristics, such as parents’ subjective feeling of
national identity, while time fixed effects explain general factors that influence all individu-
als over time, such as national elections in 2004, 2008, and 2012. Since fixed effects cannot
explain omitted time-variant individual factors and reverse causality, I further utilize two in-
strumental variables. The first instrumental variable is the media ideology of the last media
choice, MI′t−1 · newspaperi,t−1, i.e., the ideology of the newspaper individual i used to read
at t − 1. I argue that the ideology of the last media choice is correlated with the ideology of
the current media choice, but does not have a direct impact on individual national identity,
assuming that the ideology of the last media choice can only influence individual national
identity through the ideology of the current media choice. The ideology of the last media
choice can be positively or negatively correlated to the ideology of the current media choice.
On the one hand, a reader tends to choose newspapers with ideology similar to oneself. If
one’s ideology is stable over time, so is the ideology of one’s media choice. As a result, if a
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(a)Basic
(b)TFIDF
Figure1.13:Media ideology from 2000 to 2014
Note: The red line links the mean of media ideology of all newspapers in a month; the grey error bar depicts
standard errors of media ideology in the relevant month; each dot is a value of media ideology of a newspaper
in a month.
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reader chose a pro-China newspaper in the last period, s/he is more likely to choose a pro-
China newspaper in the current period. On the other hand, a reader may recognize the bias
of the chosen newspaper and modify his/her media choice in the current period. Suppose
a reader chose a pro-China newspaper in the last period. S/he may still choose a pro-China
newspaper in the current period, but a less biased one compared to the last media choice.
Therefore, although the ideology of the current media choice is presumably correlated to
the one of the last media choice, the direction of the correlation is less obvious.
The second instrument variable is the total number of words in the headlines of newspa-
per k at time t, nk,t. I argue that nk,t is correlated with media ideology, but does not directly
relate to individual national identity. The first half of the argument can be supported by
the high correlation between media ideology and the total number of words in headlines
(corr = 0.702). According to Zipf’s law, the rth most frequent word has a frequency that is
inversely proportional to rα for α ≈ 1 (Piantadosi, 2014). This implies that the frequency
decreases with rank very quickly and most words have low frequency in a corpus. More-
over, the sparsity of words may be more evident in small corpora and lead to lower values
in the measure of media ideology. As a result, corpus size, i.e. the total number of words in
headlines, affects the measure of media ideology, and a smaller corpus is related to a lower
value of media ideology.
The second half of the argument is reasonable as well. A reader’s national identity may
be influenced by the newspaper s/he reads every day, but it is less likely to be affected by the
total number of words in the headlines. The total number of words in the headlines of a
newspaper is determined by two factors: the average length of a headline in a newspaper,
and the total number of headlines included in the NKMS system. The former is influenced
by the editors of the newspaper, while the latter may be affected by the actual total num-
ber of news stories produced by the newspaper and the administrator of the Legislative
Yuan Library. One potential problem is that the administrator of the library may select
more news stories from the newspapers that are politically affiliated with the ruling party.
Yet, s/he can hardly (and probably will not) manipulate the total number of words in the
headlines since it is also affected by the editors. Another potential problem is that a news-
paper may set headlines of certain length to cater to readers with Taiwanese identity and
increase its readership. However, it is hard to justify that readers with Taiwanese identity
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prefer shorter or longer headlines. Besides, headline length depends on the information in
the related news and contains some randomness, and thus is hard to control perfectly, not
to mention the total number of words in all headlines. Therefore, both factors are unlikely
to have an impact on individual national identity.
The modified model is as follows:
Pr(Taiwani,t = 1|Ω) = β0 + β1newspaperi,t + β2MI′t · newspaperi,t
∧
+ β3Xi,t + μi + δt + εi,t
where MI′t · newspaperi,t
∧
is the fitted value from the first stage regression.
1.6.2.2 Results
Table 1.13 displays the results from first stage regressions. Column 1 to 3 use media ideol-
ogy from basic lexicons, while Column 4 to 6 use media ideology from TF-IDF lexicons.
Column 1 and 4 apply a simple OLS model; Column 2 and 5 use fixed effects model and in-
clude current media choice and time fixed effects, while Column 3 and Column 6 further
add last media choice into the model. Despite different size of coefficients on the focused
explanatory variable, all models confirm that the ideology of the current media choice is
positively correlated to the second instrumental variable, total number of words in the
headlines of a newspaper. Meanwhile, all fixed effects models show that the ideology of
the current media choice is negatively correlated to first instrumental variable, the ideology
of the last media choice, implying that a reader tends to modify her/his media choice by
choosing a less biased newspaper over time.
Column 1 to 3 in Table 1.14 and Table 1.15 display the baseline results from linear proba-
bility model using basic lexicons and TFIDF lexicons, respectively. The control variables
include gender, ethnicity of parents, place of residence, age, occupation, education, lan-
guage(s) spoken at home, marital status, religion, partisanship, China experience, and na-
tional envisioning; China experience refers to personal contact with China, such as study-
ing, doing business, or traveling in China, while national envisioning indicates individual
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Table1.13:First stage regressions.
basic TFIDF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS FE FE OLS FE FE
L1 : MI · newspaper -0.0130 -0.563∗∗∗ -2.381∗∗∗
(0.0222) (0.107) (0.266)
L1 : MITFIDF · newspaper 0.369∗∗∗ -0.379∗∗∗ -3.498∗∗∗
(0.0241) (0.0915) (0.599)
total number of words 0.774∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗ 1.624∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗
(0.0194) (0.103) (0.169) (0.0181) (0.0665) (0.0395)
Media choice No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
L1: media choice No No Yes No No Yes
Time fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 1968 1963 1760 1968 1963 1760
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays the first stage regressions of media ideology effects on national identity. The depen-
dent variable in Column 1-3 is the media ideology measure constructed on basic keywords, while Column 4-6
use the one constructed on TF-IDF keywords. Column 1 and 4 apply a simple OLS model; Column 2 and 5
use fixed effects model and include current media choice and time fixed effects, while Column 3 and Column
6 further add last media choice into the model. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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preference of “統獨” (tondu), i.e. unification with China or Taiwan independence. Cur-
rent and last media choice and time fixed effects are also included in all columns.
The coefficient on the key independent variable, the ideology of the current media choice,
is positive and mostly insignificant in OLS and random effects model, but becomes neg-
ative and significant once individual fixed effects are included in the model, implying the
existence of reverse causality or omitted time-invariant individual characteristics. In Col-
umn 4 and 5, I employ an instrumental variable approach. The coefficient is still positive
and insignificant in random effects models, but becomes much larger and significant in
fixed effects models. This may reflect additional endogeneity problem, such as omitted
time-variant variables. Overall, the results suggest that given an individual reads some news-
paper, if the newspaper becomes more pro-China, the individual will be less likely to self-
identify as a Taiwanese.1
1.6.2.3 Robustness Checks
Considering that readers may choose a newspaper based on its ideology from the past, not
on its current ideology, I employ various versions of media ideology, such as media ideology
from last year, MI−12, moving average of media ideology over the past 6 months, MIMA(6),
and moving average of media ideology over the past 12 months, MIMA(12). Table 1.16 and
Table 1.17 display the results using basic lexicons and TFIDF lexicons, respectively. The
results are consistent with Table 1.14 and Table 1.15, but the coefficient magnitude is smaller.
1.7 Conclusion andDiscussion
In this chapter, I explore the relationship between media ideology and national identity in
a case study of Taiwan. First, I construct an objective measure of media ideology by com-
paring the use of language between Taiwanese newspapers and a Chinese government insti-
tution, the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO). If a Taiwanese newspaper systematically uses the
same set of words in a similar fashion as TAO does, the measure will be higher, suggesting
1Logit models are not applied here because individual national identity seldom changes and logit models
cannot converge.
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Table1.14:The linear probability models of media ideology on Taiwanese identity.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS RE FE RE + IV FE + IV
MI · newspaper 0.812∗ 0.629 -2.958∗
(0.482) (0.448) (1.668)
MI · newspaper
∧
1.144 -13.06∗∗
(0.725) (5.917)
Media choice Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
L1: media choice Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Partisanship Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
National envisioning Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
China experience Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1181 1181 1184 1150 1153
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays linear probability models of media ideology on national identity. Column 1 uses
an OLS model, Colunm 2 employs a random effects model, and Column 3 adopts a fixed effects model; Col-
umn 4 and 5 apply random and fixed effects models with instrumental variables, respectively. The dependent
variable is Taiwanese identity, and the key explanatory variable is the media ideology measure constructed on
basic keywords. The control variables include gender, ethnicity of parents, place of residence, age, occupation,
education, language(s) spoken at home, marital status, religion, partisanship, China experience, and national
envisioning. Current and last media choice and time fixed effects are also included in all columns. Standard
errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Table1.15:The linear probability models of TF-IDF media ideology on Taiwanese identity.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS RE FE RE + IV FE + IV
MITFIDF · newspaper 1.106 0.665 -4.398∗∗
(0.681) (0.610) (1.732)
MITFIDF · newspaper
∧
1.891 -10.21∗∗
(1.266) (4.908)
Media choice Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
L1: media choice Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Partisanship Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
National envisioning Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
China experience Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1181 1181 1184 1150 1153
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays linear probability models of media ideology on national identity. Column 1 uses
an OLS model, Colunm 2 employs a random effects model, and Column 3 adopts a fixed effects model; Col-
umn 4 and 5 apply random and fixed effects models with instrumental variables, respectively. The dependent
variable is Taiwanese identity, and the key explanatory variable is the media ideology measure constructed on
TF-IDF keywords. The control variables include gender, ethnicity of parents, place of residence, age, occu-
pation, education, language(s) spoken at home, marital status, religion, partisanship, China experience, and
national envisioning. Current and last media choice and time fixed effects are also included in all columns.
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Table1.16:The linear probability models using various versions of basic media ideology.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
t-12 t-12 MA(6) MA(6) MA(12) MA(12)
MI−12 · newspaper -5.310∗∗∗
(1.783)
MI−12 · newspaper
∧
-6.409∗∗
(2.811)
MIMA(6) · newspaper -5.001∗∗
(2.160)
MIMA(6) · newspaper
∧
-8.553∗
(4.432)
MIMA(12) · newspaper -4.244∗∗
(1.730)
MIMA(12) · newspaper
∧
-5.176∗∗
(1.976)
Media choice Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
L1: media choice Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Partisanship Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
National envisioning Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
China experience Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1184 1086 1184 1151 1184 1152
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays linear probability models of basic media ideology on national identity. The de-
pendent variable is Taiwanese identity, and the key explanatory variable is the media ideology measure con-
structed on basic keywords. Column 1 and 2 show the results using media ideology from last year, Column
3 and 4 adopt the moving average of media ideology over past 6 months, and Column 5 and 6 employ the
moving average of media ideology over the past 12 months. The control variables include gender, ethnicity of
parents, place of residence, age, occupation, education, language(s) spoken at home, marital status, religion,
partisanship, China experience, and national envisioning. Current and last media choice and time fixed effects
are also included in all columns. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Table1.17:The linear probability models using various versions of TFIDF media ideology.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
t-12 t-12 MA(6) MA(6) MA(12) MA(12)
MI−12TFIDF · newspaper -2.648∗∗
(1.094)
MI−12TFIDF · newspaper
∧
-2.988∗∗
(1.248)
MIMA(6)TFIDF · newspaper -5.858∗∗∗
(2.086)
MIMA(6)TFIDF · newspaper
∧
-8.244∗
(4.285)
MIMA(12)TFIDF · newspaper -6.397∗∗
(2.467)
MIMA(12)TFIDF · newspaper
∧
-5.548∗
(3.130)
Media choice Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
L1: media choice Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Partisanship Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
National envisioning Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
China experience Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1184 1086 1184 1151 1184 1152
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays linear probability models of TFIDF media ideology on national identity. The de-
pendent variable is Taiwanese identity, and the key explanatory variable is the media ideology measure con-
structed on TFIDF keywords. Column 1 and 2 show the results using media ideology from last year, Column
3 and 4 adopt the moving average of media ideology over past 6 months, and Column 5 and 6 employ the
moving average of media ideology over the past 12 months. The control variables include gender, ethnicity of
parents, place of residence, age, occupation, education, language(s) spoken at home, marital status, religion,
partisanship, China experience, and national envisioning. Current and last media choice and time fixed effects
are also included in all columns. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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that the newspaper is ideologically close to the Chinese government. The average media ide-
ologies of the largest four newspapers in Taiwan are in line with expectations: the measures
of the China Times and theUnited Daily News are higher than the ones of theApple Daily
and the Liberty Times, indicating that the former two newspapers are ideologically closer
to China. Next, I verify the anecdote that China Times and the Commercial Times became
more pro-China after they were sold to a pro-unification businessman in November 2008. I
adopt a difference-in-difference approach, where the treatment group includes newspapers
in theWant Want China Times Group and the control group comprises all other Taiwanese
newspapers. TheWant Want China Times Groupwas purchased by a pro-China business-
man in November 2008 and the anecdotal evidence suggests that newspapers in the media
group have become more pro-China after the acquisition. The results are consistent with
the anecdote: compared to the control group, newspapers in theWant Want China Times
Group have become 14.7-26.7% more slanted towards China after the change of ownership.
Finally, I combine the constructed measure of media ideology with rotating panel surveys
from Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Studies to examine the effects of media ide-
ology on national identity. To account for potential endogeneity, I adopt an instrumental
variable approach with individual and time fixed effects. The results show that given an
individual reading a certain newspaper, if the newspaper adopts a more pro-China ideolog-
ical position, then the probability that the individual self-identifies as Taiwanese becomes
significantly lower.
There are two caveats worth noting. First, one implicit assumption of my measure of
media ideology is that Taiwanese newspapers and the Chinese government use the same
language, Chinese, so that their dictions are comparable. This ignores the cross-strait lexi-
cal difference between China and Taiwan. The measure may end up capturing the lexical
similarity between the Chinese press conference transcripts and each Taiwanese newspaper,
which is not related to political ideology. However, since the cross-strait lexical difference is
relatively moderate, I assume that the difference is not as salient as issue coverage, diction,
and context which are evaluated in the measure. Second, one assumption of the difference-
in-difference method is stable unit treatment value assumption: no interference between
units and no variation in the treatment. That is, I assume that the ownership change of
newspapers in theWant Want China Times Group does not affect the media ideology of
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newspapers in the control group and that the effects of ownership change are the same on
the newspapers in theWant Want China Times Group. Both parts of the assumption are
unlikely to be strictly true. On the one hand, the ownership change of a newspaper with
a sizable market share may motivate other newspapers to adjust their ideology on the pro-
China to anti-China spectrum. Still, I argue that the ownership change should not immedi-
ately influence newspapers in the control group. As shown in Table 1.9 and Table 1.10, the
coefficient on the main explanatory variable 1t≥200811 ·WWk is significant even if the sample
is limited to 6 months before and after the ownership change.1 On the other hand, accord-
ing to Figure 1.12, the ownership change may not uniformly affect the two newspapers in
theWant Want China Times Group. To avoid the problem, I assume the China Times to be
the only newspaper in the treatment group and reproduce the baseline regressions. The re-
sults are consistent with Table 1.6 and Table 1.7, and the coefficient on the main explanatory
variable 1t≥200811 ·WWk is highly significant.
1I further reduce the sample to 1 month before and after the ownership change. With only 36 observa-
tions, the coefficient falls just short of statistical significance (p-value = 0.13).
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Chapter 2
Protest and Power Structure in China
2.1 Introduction
Protests are related to social instability and perceived as a threat to authoritarian regimes.
Previous studies have shown that protests can undermine autocratic stability and increase
the likelihood of democratization (Celestino &Gleditsch, 2013; Hollyer, Rosendorff, &
Vreeland, 2015; Ulfelder, 2005). In single-party regimes, such as China, the ruling party
often claims to represent the interests of the people (Ulfelder, 2005). Manifesting public
discontent with the government, mass protests challenge the claim and erode regime legiti-
macy. To justify its political monopoly and sustain the regime, maintaining social stability
becomes one of the most important goals of the Chinese government. Protests in China
have risen from 58,000 in 2003 to 180,000 in 2010 1, which amounts to almost 500 protests
a day in 2010 (Human Rights Watch, 2012; Sun, 2011). In the meanwhile, the cost of main-
taining social stability has been increasing over time. In 2016, it was estimated that the Chi-
nese government’s budget for social stability maintenance (the official category is named po-
lice and public security) has reached over 900 billion RMB (ca. 135.8 billion US dollars), al-
most equivalent to the budget for national defense (Lui, 2016).2 However, due to sensitivity
of the issue, protest data can hardly be found (Cai, 2008), and the existing literature either
1Protests are classified as “mass incidents” by the Chinese government, and each mass incident is defined
as “an illegal assembly” of more than 10 people (Gong & Scott, 2016).
2The official budget for police and public security has exceeded the budget for national security since
2011; the Chinese government has ceased to disclose detailed information on the budget for police and public
security since 2015.
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focuses exclusively on labor protests or only consists of a handful of observations for qual-
itative analysis (Chan, Backstrom, &Mason, 2014; X. Chen, 2017; Chou, 2011; Yanwei Li,
Koppenjan, & Verweij, 2016; Yuan Li, 2014; O’Brien & Li, 2005). The chapter contributes
to the existing literature on protests in China by assembling a comprehensive data set. More
specifically, the chapter focuses on the role of political leaders and provides evidence on the
causal relationship between power structure and protests. In addition, the chapter provides
novel insights into the role of the past experience of leaders by showing that local leaders
perform differently from outsiders.
Since the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, protests in China have been characterized
as transient, regional, and issue-specific events emerging from grievances against regional
governments or firms. Protesters rarely coordinate activities across regions and do not ap-
peal to central communist leaders for national reforms or democratization (Chan et al.,
2014; Gong & Scott, 2016; O’Brien & Li, 2005; Tong & Lei, 2010). These protests often
reveal people’s discontent with regional governments and further affect regional leaders’
political career. Maintaining social stability is one of the so-called “priority targets with
veto power” (一票否決) of the Chinese government, which means that failing to meet the
targets leads to a veto on a politician’s career advancement (Y. Wang, 2014).1 As a result, re-
gional leaders have strong incentives to reduce protests. To analyze the influence of regional
leaders on protests, I use text mining to compile a detailed data set on over 50,000 protests
in 2014 and 2015 from a citizen media outlet,Not the News (非新聞), with information on
dates, locations, pictures, videos, online discussion archives, the cause of a protest, the form
of a protest, the identity of protesters, and whether a protest is repressed.
I propose that power structure among regional leaders plays a crucial role for protests.
The number of protests depends on two factors: the degree of dissatisfaction (grievances)
and the ease to engage in protests due to collective action problems, and county leaders
can influence protests through both factors. On the one hand, protests stem from percep-
tions of injustice, and the root of grievances may relate to a certain policy and reveal public
1Performance targets are classified into three categories ordered by their significance: priority targets with
veto power, hard targets, and soft targets. Priority targets are often political and necessary for career advance-
ment. Hard targets are quantifiable economic goals, such as regional economic growth rate and fiscal revenue
collection, whereas soft targets are non-quantifiable objective, for example, propaganda work (Edin, 2003;
Göbel & Ong, 2012; Shih, Adolph, & Liu, 2012; Xu, 2011; Zuo, 2015).
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discontent with the government. Under a regionally decentralized system (Xu, 2011), a re-
gional leader can establish regional policies and directly impact the well-being of people
in his/her jurisdiction, and the degree of influence depends on power structure. On the
other hand, people are more likely to participate in a protest when they perceive a higher
chance of success, or a political opportunity, which hinges on state strength, repression
level, and elite division (Cragun Cragun, D., 2006; Klandermans & van Stekelenburg, 2013).
In particular, when power is divided among elites, aggrieved citizens are more likely to find
powerful allies to support their claims (Klandermans & van Stekelenburg, 2013; O’Brien,
2013; O’Brien & Li, 2006). If a county leader holds many public positions and dominates
the region, the probability of finding a strong advocate is slim and citizens are less prone to
challenge the leader. Because power structure influences protests through both grievances
and collective action, whether power has positive or negative effects on protests remains an
empirical question.
In this chapter, power structure is specified in the context of county leadership–how
much power is held by a county party secretary, the most powerful leader in a county. I col-
lect the biographical data of 2,714 county leaders from an online database, Local Leadership
Database, provided by People’s Daily Online (人民網地方領導資料庫) and further
complement the data by Baidu Encyclopedia (百度百科). To proxy for power structure,
I create a measure, Position, for the number of public positions held by a county leader at
the same time. Position indicates the level of power held by a county leader: the more po-
sitions s/he has, the more powerful s/he becomes. Given the panel structure of the data
set1, Position can be interpreted as power concentration as well. If a county party secretary
occupies many public positions, it not only implies a powerful leader, but also suggests a
concentrated power structure in a county.
The empirical results show that power structure has negative effects on protests. On av-
erage, if a county leader gains one more position, the frequency of protests decreases by
around one-fifth of the average number of protests in a county2. The results are both statis-
tically and economically significant and imply that political opportunities play a prominent
role in protests–concentrated power structure negatively influences the chance of success
1In addition, I assume fixed total number of public positions between 2014 and 2015 in a county.
2On average, there are 0.34 protests in a county in a month.
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for a protest and deters aggrieved citizens from participating in a protest. I address the issue
of endogeneity by adopting an instrumental variable approach with fixed effects. Reverse
causality can be a potential threat since protests may influence promotion probabilities
and alter power structure. I first use one-period lag of power structure to alleviate reverse
causality. Then, I employ fixed effects models with two instrumental variables. The first
instrumental variable is the average number of positions held by other county leaders in the
same prefecture,Average Position. Since county leaders in the same prefecture are evaluated
based on the comparison of one another by the same prefecture authority,Average Position
can be interpreted as the level of power held by the competitors of a county leader and
should be negatively correlated to Position. Furthermore,Average Position should not influ-
ence Protest through protests in other counties in the same prefecture because most protests
are transient and arise from regional grievances. Besides, vast and comprehensive censorship
prohibits communication across counties. Without the help of media and the Internet, a
short-term, regional protest can hardly have an impact on protests in other counties. The
second instrumental variable is the power structure twice lagged. I argue that the power
structure twice lagged is correlated with the lagged power structure, but does not have a di-
rect impact on current protest. Put differently, I argue that power structure two months
ago can only influence current protests through power structure in the previous month.
I identify the underlying mechanisms by examining the two components of protests,
grievances and collective action, respectively. First, I show that under the rule of a power
leader, the difficulty of forming collective action is elevated and thus fewer protests take
place. I focus on environmental protests and use pollution as a proxy for the root of grievances.
The results show that given the same level of pollution, more concentrated power structure
leads to fewer environmental protests. In other words, holding grievances constant, people
are less likely to protest if county leaders are more powerful.
Second, I find that a “local” party secretary behaves differently from an “outsider” in
terms of the level of grievances when they become more powerful. A party secretary is
defined as “local” if his/her hometown and ruling county are located in the same prefec-
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ture1. The empirical evidence shows that in counties ruled by outsiders, power structure
negatively affects protests, but this negative relationship is not found in counties ruled by
locals. One plausible explanation for the distinct empirical pattern is that there are more
grievances when a local party secretary obtains more power. To verify the explanation, I an-
alyze the level of air pollution for counties ruled by locals and outsiders respectively. The
results show that when a local party secretary wields a lot of power in the government, the
level of air pollution is significantly higher, whereas the effects of power on air pollution are
negative and insignificant for outsiders. I also examine the causes of protests and find that,
given the occurrence of protests, people tend to protest against the government, not firms
or other entities, if a local party secretary becomes more powerful. Moreover, protests are
more likely to arise from governmental policies, such as environmental protests and land
protests, when power is more concentrated at the hands of a local leader.
To answer why there are more grievances when a local leader becomes more powerful, I
analyze who gains more power. Examining the link between power and leaders’ characteris-
tics, I find that economic performance and workplace connection are positively correlated
to power2, consistent with the literature on political selection in China (T. Chen & Kung,
2016; Persson & Zhuravskaya, 2016; Shih et al., 2012). Despite the fact that economic perfor-
mance and workplace connections are both crucial for promotion, the two factors exhibit
different patterns for locals and outsiders: compared to outsiders, local party secretaries
tend to fail in economic performance and have worked under the direct superior author-
ities before their terms in the office. If economic performance is a proxy for competence
and workplace connections represent ties with superior authorities (T. Chen & Kung, 2016;
Persson & Zhuravskaya, 2016), the empirical evidence implies that local leaders are less com-
petent but have better connections with superior authorities.
1In most cases, a county leader comes from the province where his/ her ruling county belongs, so there
are not many outsiders for analysis. Similarly, there are not enough observations if hometown connection is
defined at the county level.
2Economic performance is proxied by nighttime light, which is frequently used as an indicator of GDP
growth in the literature. Workplace connection is a dummy of previous work experience in a prefectural
government. Since county leaders are promoted based on the evaluations of prefectural authorities, working
in a prefectural government suggests a closer tie to prefectural authorities and may increase the chance of
promotion.
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In sum, the results demonstrate that power has negative effects on the frequency of
protests. I also show that power plays a crucial role in the two major components of protests,
grievances and the formation of collective action. Moreover, the effects differ in terms of
leaders’ hometown. Local leaders, who are less competent and rely on better connections
with superior authorities, generate more grievances when they wield a lot of power in the
government.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2.2 covers related literature
on protests and power structure. Section 2.3 describes the data, including two novel data
sets on protests and county leaders in China. Section 2.4 explains the empirical strategy and
analyzes the relationship between power and protest. Section 2.5 discusses the underlying
mechanism. Section 2.6 provides some evidence on the correlation between power and
county leaders’ personal characteristics. Section 2.7 concludes the chapter.
2.2 Related Literature
The chapter contributes to several strands of literature. First, the chapter speaks to the rich
literature on local capture in developing countries. Bardhan (2002) points out that with-
out political participation of the disadvantaged, decentralization can hardly achieve local
accountability under weak institutions, and regional governments are often captured by
local elites, which may harm local business development. Given highly restricted opportu-
nities for political participation in China, the results in this chapter are aligned with the
theory of local capture and demonstrate that higher levels of air pollution are observed
in counties ruled by local leaders, and the situation deteriorates if local leaders gain more
power in the government. On the other hand, positive outcomes of local capture have been
documented. Persson and Zhuravskaya (2016) classify provincial leaders based on their ca-
reer background and find that “local” governors, who build their careers in their ruling
provinces, provide more public goods in health care and education, while “outsiders” spend
more on construction infrastructure. The authors provide suggestive evidence that the dis-
tinct behavior comes from local elite capture. Local capture has been discussed in other
developing countries as well. Slinko, Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya (2005) study regional reg-
ulatory capture in Russia and find that regulatory capture benefits politically connected
66
firms but is detrimental to firms without political ties. In addition, regulatory capture has
negative effects on small-business growth and fiscal collection. Alatas et al. (2013) document
that local elites with formal leadership positions tend to benefit more from government
welfare programs than non-elites in Indonesia. Panda (2015) finds evidence in India that
politically connected households are more likely to receive poverty-alleviating entitlements.
Nath (2014) employs difference-in-difference models and finds that without re-elections,
politicians in India tend to allocate resources on projects catering to the wealthy.
Second, the chapter contributes to the literature on protest in China by introducing a
large comprehensive protest data set. Protest data in China are rarely available and the ex-
isting literature often focuses on labor protests, which are less sensitive to the Chinese gov-
ernment. Yuan Li (2014) uses labor disputes as a proxy for collective action and studies the
downward accountability of provincial leaders to collective actions in China. The author
examines policies with opposing preferences between the central authority and the people,
say, One-Child Policy, and finds that more labor disputes lead to decreased fines on exces-
sive fertility. One weakness of the paper is the ambiguous link between labor disputes and
excessive fertility fines since, essentially, workers do not protest against One-Child Policy.
In my data set, protests of different causes display distinct patterns, and One-Child Policy
is rarely a reason for protest. Chan et al. (2014) and Cai (2008) discuss all kinds of protests
at the provincial level, but the sample size is under 100 observations and not enough for
robust empirical analysis. Using the data set on protests of different protest causes and
protester identities at the county level, the chapter expands the literature by exploring previ-
ous unanswerable questions and documenting different patterns of protests in China.
Third, the chapter also relates to the literature on political selection in China. On the
one hand, promotion is based on competency–the cadre evaluation systemmotivates re-
gional leaders to pursue economic growth and regional leaders with outstanding economic
performance are more likely to get promoted. Hongbin Li and Zhou (2005) and Y. Chen,
Li, and Zhou (2005) provide empirical evidence that economic performance is positively
correlated to the promotion probability of provincial leaders but negatively correlated to
the likelihood of termination. On the other hand, political connections are crucial to ca-
reer advancement. Shih et al. (2012) introduce a quantitative measure of factional ties with
top leaders and find that connections to top leaders have a positive impact on elite rank-
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ing. Keller (2015) uses social network analysis to investigate the informal network among
Chinese elites and confirms that links to patrons increase the probability of becoming top
leaders in the Communist Party. The key independent variable in the chapter, Position, can
be perceived as a measure of “concurrent job promotions”–a change in Position indicates
a minor promotion or demotion and captures the fluctuations of power structure within
the term of office of a politician, while the traditional definition of promotion evaluates
the career of a politician only at the end of his/her term. Despite different definitions, the
two types of promotion share similar patterns. Consistent with the literature, empirical
evidence shows that “concurrent job promotions” are also based on meritocracy and pa-
tronage: county leaders with better economic performance and workplace connections are
more likely to obtain positions in the government.
Finally, the relationship between power structure and collective action has been dis-
cussed in the literature of sociology and political science. O’Brien and Li introduce the
concept of rightful resistance and point out that protesters exploit elite divisions to locate
suitable benefactors and use official rhetoric and slogans to advance their claims (O’Brien
& Li, 2005, 2006). Rightful resistance relies on the fragmentation of state power and dis-
tinct interests of officials in different departments or at different levels of the governments.
Accordingly, if a leader is dominant in a region and the power is concentrated in his/her
hands, people can rarely find strong advocates to help address their grievances, leading to
fewer protests. The chapter is built on the theory of rightful resistance and shows empir-
ically that given the same level of grievances proxied by air pollution, there are fewer envi-
ronmental protests if leaders wield a lot of power in the government. The chapter is also
motivated by Somers (1993), which documents divergent regional patterns in the emer-
gence of citizenship identities among working class in the 18th century of England. Under
the same legal system in a country and within the same social class, the author finds that
in arable regions, the working population perceived the law as “a form of social control”,
whereas working communities in pastoral regions expressed identities with various dimen-
sions of citizenship rights and used the law to protect their rights. The author claims that
the disparity stemmed from the difference in regional power structure–arable regions were
dominated by powerful elites and the public sphere were controlled by the wealthy, while
pastoral regions were featured by small farms and people were encouraged to participate in
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the public sphere. Since rights-consciousness is essential to rightful resistance, the finding
lends support to the theory of rightful resistance and indicates that regional power struc-
ture has an impact on protest by shaping the public sphere of a region.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Protests
One major contribution of the chapter is to introduce two novel data sets. The first data
set includes all kinds of protests in China from a citizen media outlet,Not the News (非新
聞). Since 2012,Not the News had documented daily protests systematically throughout
China from online sources and reported the data on Youtube, Twitter and other social me-
dia which are blocked in China till 13th June 2016. The founders ofNot the News, Lu Yuyu
and Li Tingyu, were awarded the Reporters Without Borders (RSF) Prize in 2016 for their
commitment to the promotion of press freedom in China (Reporters Without Borders,
2016).1
The original data set consists of 50,129 protests from 2014 to 20152 with information on
dates, locations, pictures, videos, online discussion archives, the cause of a protest, the form
of a protest, the identity of protesters, and whether a protest is repressed. Based on the la-
bels in the data set, I develop Python programs to compile a list of keywords for each type
of protests and mark the causes, forms, and identities of participants for each unlabeled
protest. Then, I classify protests into 11 types of protest causes, 7 types of protest forms, and
18 types of protesters. To match the protest data with the county leadership data, I keep
only protests with place names that can be identified at the county level. That is, protests
with no place information or with only information on provinces or prefectures are re-
moved from the data set. Figure 2.1 displays the number of protests at different adminis-
1Lu Yuyu and Li Tingyu were found missing on 15th June 2016, and confirmed arrested by the police
for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” in late July 2016 (Qiao, Wong, &Mudie, 2016; Wong, Yang,
&Mudie, 2016). Li Tingyu was given a suspended sentence, while Lu Yuyu was sentenced to four years in
prison in 2017 (Ramzy, 2017).
2AlthoughNot the News started collecting data from 2012, it has only released text data from the second
half of 2013, and labeled the protest cause, protest method, or protester identities since November 21st, 2013.
Therefore, I focus on protests from 2014 instead of 2012.
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trative levels over time. 8.44% of the protests take place at the provincial level, 40.35% of the
protests arise in prefectures, and 1.79% of the protests are not labeled with any place. In the
end, the data set is trimmed down 50.58% of the observations.
Figure2.1:The number of protests at different administrative levels.
Overall, there are 24,774 protests at the county level from 2014 to 2015. On average, 0.44
protests occur in a month in a county1, which translates into 33.94 protests per day all over
China. Protests usually arise from labor (37%), land (28%), or commerce disputes (21%),
protests are often initiated by workers (40%), consumers (16%), or peasants (11%), and the
most popular protest forms are demonstrations (84%), strikes (10%), and conflicts (6%).
Figure 2.2 displays the number of protests for the major protest causes in China, including
labor disputes, land acquisition and resettlement, commercial disputes, and environmental
damage. There are two spikes before the Chinese New Year on January 31st 2014 and Febru-
ary 19th 2015, which mainly come from protests about labor and commercial disputes. Tra-
ditionally, people would like to pay all debts by New Year’s Eve. Besides, migrant workers
and merchants prefer to go home with their earnings for the Chinese New Year. As a result,
the number of protests related to labor and commercial disputes usually skyrocket before
the Chinese New Year, while environmental and land protests remain the same level around
the Chinese New Year.
1There are 2,368 counties covered in the protest data set.
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(a)Monthly (b)Daily
Figure2.2:The number of protests for the major protest causes in China.
Note: The dashed lines represent the Chinese New Year on January 31st 2014 and February 19th 2015.
(a)2014 (b)2015
Figure2.3:The log number of protests in 2014 and 2015, respectively.
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Figure 2.3 illustrates the maps of log number of protests in 2014 and 2015 on the same
scale. There are relatively more protests in the east (22%) and central south (22%), and rel-
atively fewer protests in the northeast (10%) and northwest (12%), and considerable vari-
ations within each region. Figure 2.3a displays 21,266 protests in 2014, while Figure 2.3b
shows 28,875 protests in 2015, which is 35.6% higher. The increase may reflect an acceler-
ating trend in the frequency of protests, but also the improvement in data collection. To
account for this issue, time fixed effects are included in all regression models.
To corroborate the credibility of the data fromNot the News (NN), I compare labor
protests from the dataset with the data from China Labour Bulletin (CLB), a Hong-Kong
based non-governmental organization devoted to the promotion of workers’ rights in
China.1 Figure 2.4 shows the maps of log number of protests fromNN dataset and CLB
dataset on the same scale. NN documents much more labor protests than CLB does: NN
reports 19,056 labor protests in 2014 and 2015, while CLB archives 4,107 protests during the
same period. Despite the discrepancy in terms of the quantity, the two datasets are highly
correlated at 93.5% across regions over time, and the two maps suggest similar distributions
of protests all over China.
(a)Not the News (b)China Labour Bulletin
Figure2.4:The total number of labor protests fromNot the News and from China Labour Bulletin, respec-
tively.
1Since China Labour Bulletin only records labor protests at the prefecture (city) level, I select only labor
protests from the dataset ofNot the News and re-compile the data at prefecture level to make the two datasets
more comparable.
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Figure 2.5 displays the share of protests with labels about protest causes, protester identi-
ties, or protest methods. Given the original labeling byNot the News, 36.94% protests are
categorized into one or more protest causes, 84.48% protests are labeled with at least one
type of protester identities, and 41.63% protests are tagged with some protest methods. In
total, 87.81% protests are marked with at least one of the protest causes, protester identities,
or protester methods, and Figure 2.5 does not seem to indicate any particular pattern regard-
ing the labeling. After extending the labeling based on keyword matching, 99.42% protests
are marked with at least one type of protest causes, protester identities, or protest methods.
In the following sections, I always use the original manual labeling whenever possible, and
only use the extended labeling if too few observations are available.
(a)Protest Causes (b)Protester Identities
(c)Protest Methods
Figure2.5:The percentage of protests with labels on protest causes, protester identities and protest methods,
respectively.
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2.3.2 County Leadership
The second novel data set comprises the biographical data of county leaders scraped from
an online database, Local Leadership Database (人民網地方領導資料庫), provided
by People’s Daily Online and further complemented by the information from Baidu Ency-
clopedia (百度百科). The data set includes 2,714 county leaders with each leader’s name,
gender, ethnicity, birth year, ancestral home place, birthplace, education, and work history.
The average age of county leaders is 48.9, and most of them are Han Chinese (89%) and
male (94%); almost all county leaders hold a bachelor’s degree (98%) and almost two thirds
possess a master or doctoral degree (65%); more than half of the county leaders are from the
central south or the east of China.
To proxy for power structure, I create a measure, Position, or the number of public po-
sitions held by a county leader at the same time. The measure is built on the work history
in the biography and processed by self-written Python programs. I first identify the service
time of each county leader. Since the data set only includes the information on current lead-
ers, anyone who comes in office after 2015 or leaves office before 2014 is defined as missing.
Then, given a politician takes up the post of a county party secretary (the position with the
largest power), I count the number of other positions taken by the politician. There are
multiple public positions in regional party organizations and the regional government, such
as county party secretaries, county magistrates (the position with the second largest power
in a county), bureau chiefs, governmental department heads, party school principals, etc.
It is not uncommon for a county leader to be assigned more than one role and hold many
public positions at the same time. In the data set, a county leader holds 1.45 positions on
average, 11.80% of county leaders hold more than two positions, and the maximum number
of positions held at the same time is 8.
The reasons for a county leader to hold multiple positions vary. In some cases, a pub-
lic position suddenly becomes vacant because the previous position holder resigns, passes
away, or gets arrested, and a county leader temporarily takes the position until a suitable
candidate for the position is determined. In some other cases, a county leader is appointed
as the leader of a new administrative area established nearby or within the jurisdiction. In
either case, the Chinese government fails to assign a non-incumbent politician to a vacant
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public position within a short period. It can be that the incumbent leader is competent and
well-connected to serve several posts at the same time; it can also be the lack of powerful
candidates or competitors in the region. Nevertheless, both situations indicate a low level of
political competition and results in a more concentrated power structure.
Table 2.1 illustrates the concept behind the measure. Suppose there are 6 official posi-
tions in a county, including the most powerful position, county party secretary, which is
represented by a joker card. Under the most decentralized power structure (Table 2.1a),
each position is taken by a different official and each official belongs to a different faction,
denoted by the suit of a card. In this case, the county party secretary only occupies one po-
sition and possesses limited power. On the other hand, in the case of unitary power struc-
ture (Table 2.1b), all 6 positions are held by the county party secretary–the power is concen-
trated in the hands of the county party secretary with few checks and balances from other
officials. As a result, given the total number of positions in a county1, if the county party
secretary is appointed more positions, the power structure becomes more concentrated in
the region.
Table2.1:Power structure
(a)Divided power structure
🂫🃏🃃
🃗🂵🂡
(b)Unitary power structure
🃏🃏🃏
🃏🃏🃏
1Although information on the total number of public positions in a county is not included in the data
set, it is controlled by the county fixed effects in the model if assuming the number is constant within each
county in 2014 and 2015.
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Figure2.6:Number of positions
Figure2.7:The percentage of positions with non-missing values.
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Figure 2.6 maps the average number of positions held by each county party secretary
from 2014 to 2015. The white area depicts missing values in the data set, which is 33.55% of
all county party secretaries. The information on the number of positions held by a county
leader is missing for two reasons. First, the leader’s biography is incomplete in both Local
Leadership Database and Baidu Encyclopedia, and the information on position number is
unavailable. Second, Local Leadership Database only keeps track of the information on cur-
rent regional leaders. If a regional leader is appointed as a county party secretary after 2016,
then s/he is not included in the data set and labeled as missing to match the protest data set
in 2014 and 2015. Figure 2.7 displays the percentage of positions with non-missing values
all over China. In spite of the nonnegligible number of missing values, the counties with
non-missing values are arguably random and located all over China. More importantly, as
shown in the next section, the baseline regression model includes county fixed effects–the
empirical results are based on the analysis within each county and what really matters is the
relative number of positions, not the absolute number of positions.
2.3.3 Others
2.3.3.1 Precipitation
Precipitation is often used as a source of exogenous variations in protest participation
(Madestam, Shoag, Veuger, & Yanagizawa-Drott, 2013; Wasow, 2017) because people are less
likely to take to the streets to protest on rainy days. In this chapter, I include precipitation
as a control variable and collect monthly global data on Global PrecipitationMeasurement
(GPM) between April 2014 and December 2015 from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). Combing the data on administrative areas from the Database of
Global Administrative Areas (GADM), I use QGIS to calculate rainfall for each county in
China.
It is worth mentioning that 36.8% of the observations are missing, resulting in a siz-
able reduction in the sample size. The considerable missing data come from two sources.
First, NASA used to collect rainfall data under the Tropical Rainfall MeasuringMission
(TRMM) fromDecember 1st 1997 to June 1st 2015 and only started the GPM project from
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March 12th 2014, so monthly GPM data before April 2014 are not available. Second, the ad-
ministrative areas from the GADM database are not up to date and cannot be completely
matched with the more current administrative structure in the protest and leadership data
sets. Nevertheless, the two sources are arguably random and should not bias the regression
results.
2.3.3.2 Nighttime Light
Economic performance can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of participating a protest
(Dorsch, Dunz, &Maarek, 2015). That is, people are less willing to take to the streets given
high opportunity costs, such as protesters’ monetary income if they have to take a day off
to participate in a protest. I include nighttime light as a proxy of regional GDP. In partic-
ular, I use monthly NPP-VIIRS nighttime light data by the Earth Observation Group of
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/National Geophysical Data Center
(NOAA/NGDC), an updated version of the DMSP-OLS nighttime light data that provide
images with higher resolution and serve as a better proxy of GDP and other socioeconomic
indicators (Ou, Liu, Li, Li, & Li, 2015; Shi, Huang, et al., 2014; Shi, Yu, et al., 2014).
I use nighttime light instead of official GDP released by the Chinese government for
two reasons. First, monthly county-level GDP data are unavailable.1 Second, GDP data in
China are notorious for measurement errors(Lü & Landry, 2014). Similar to precipitation
data, nighttime light data contain quite substantial missing values: 27.8% observations are
missing solely because of mismatch in the administrative areas.
2.3.3.3 Air Pollution
I collect data on air quality from Berman (2017), which consists of self-reported data on
particulate matter 2.5 micron diameter μg/m3 (PM 2.5) and other indicators of air pollu-
tion three times per day2 from nearly 1,700 ground monitoring stations in China. I choose
1Yearly county-level GDP data can be found in China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy till
2013.
2The timing corresponds to morning rush hour, the end of a work day, and midnight.
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Berman (2017) over remotely sensed data provided by NASA because the latter is suscepti-
ble to temporary weather conditions and can barely measure the severity of local pollution
on the ground. Nevertheless, the more accurate ground data come with a cost–the ground
monitoring stations are far from abundant and 76.6% counties are not covered. That being
said, Figure 2.8 shows that the stations are widely distributed throughout China. More im-
portantly, as mentioned previously, the empirical strategy of the chapter takes advantage of
the panel data structure and the identification comes from within-county variations. There-
fore, any time-constant county-specific characteristics should be explained by county fixed
effects. The average value of PM 2.5 is 118.21 μg/m3 in the data set, which is far beyond the
limits in the European Union (25 μg/m3), the United States (12 μg/m3), and even China (35
μg/m3) (Environment of European Commission, 2016; Ministry of Environmental Protec-
tion (China), 2012; US EPA, 2015).
Figure2.8:Ground monitoring stations
Table2.2:Summary Statistics: County-level
count mean sd min max
PROTEST
# Protests 72360 0.34 0.90 0.00 23.00
Area: Northeast 72360 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Area: Central South 72360 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00
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Area: East 72360 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00
Area: North 72360 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
Area: Northwest 72360 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
Area: Southwest 72360 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
LEADERSHIP
# Positions 39174 1.45 0.83 1.00 8.00
Duration 39980 29.62 20.25 0.00 170.00
Birth Year 56811 1965.47 3.76 1951.00 1982.00
Age 56811 48.88 3.81 31.08 64.00
Female 69234 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00
Ancestral Place
Ancestry: Northeast 38940 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00
Ancestry: Central South 38940 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00
Ancestry: East 38940 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
Ancestry: North 38940 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
Ancestry: Northwest 38940 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
Ancestry: Southwest 38940 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
Birthplace
Birthplace: Northeast 37398 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
Birthplace: Central South 37398 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00
Birthplace: East 37398 0.32 0.46 0.00 1.00
Birthplace: North 37398 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
Birthplace: Northwest 37398 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00
Birthplace: Southwest 37398 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Home
Home County: Ancestry 38940 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00
Home County: Birthplace 37398 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00
Home Prefecture: Ancestry 35622 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00
Home Prefecture: Birthplace 34107 0.57 0.49 0.00 1.00
Home Province: Ancestry 38940 0.82 0.38 0.00 1.00
Home Province: Birthplace 37398 0.84 0.37 0.00 1.00
Education
EDU: Vocational 32010 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
EDU: Undergraduate 32010 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
EDU: Graduate 32010 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00
Ethnicity
Ethnicity: HA 49542 0.89 0.31 0.00 1.00
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Ethnicity: ZH 49542 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00
Ethnicity: HU 49542 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00
Ethnicity: MA 49542 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ethnicity: UG 49542 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ethnicity: ZA 49542 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00
Ethnicity: MG 49542 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00
Ethnicity: Other 49542 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
OTHERS
Precipitation 40689 93.77 93.00 0.00 881.90
Nighttime Light 46512 0.80 2.04 -0.19 38.79
Flood 72360 0.02 0.18 0.00 2.00
PM 2.5 13228 118.21 41.36 0.00 342.31
Observations 72360
Table2.3:Summary Statistics: Protest-level
count mean sd min max
# Netizens 24774 3.41 5.97 0.00 198.00
# Protest Places 24774 1.00 0.02 1.00 2.20
# Protest Days 24774 1.01 0.08 1.00 2.00
State Power
Repression* 24774 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
Law Enforcer* 23304 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00
Casualties 24030 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Gangland* 23304 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00
Protest Cause
Labor 9152 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
Land 9152 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Commerce 9152 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
Environment 9152 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Medic 9152 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
Government 9152 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00
Chengguan 9152 0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00
Transport 9152 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00
Property* 18864 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
Disaster* 18864 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00
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Other 9152 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00
Protest Cause: Gov
Gov 9152 0.38 0.48 0.00 1.00
nGov 9152 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00
Gov: Policy 9152 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
Gov: nPolicy 9152 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00
Protester Identity: Social Class
Middle Class 20930 0.21 0.40 0.00 1.00
Lower Class 20930 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00
Army 20930 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00
Public Servant 20930 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00
Protester Identity: Other
School 20930 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00
Retired, Laid-off 20930 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00
Ethnic Minority* 23304 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00
Human Rights Activist* 23304 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00
Protest Method
Demonstration 10314 0.84 0.37 0.00 1.00
Strike 10314 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Conflict 10314 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Blocking 10314 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00
Petition 10314 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00
Violence* 18274 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00
Other* 18274 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00
Observations 24774
* In case of frequency < 50, I extended the protest classification based on discussion archives.
Figure 2.9 and Figure 2.10 illustrate the percentage of non-missing values in the data set.
Sample 1 contains two major variables of interest, protests and positions, Sample 2 adds two
control variables, precipitation and nighttime light, and Sample 3 further includes personal
characteristics of county leaders, such as age. Overall, there are 35,631 non-missing observa-
tions in Sample 1 (55.3%), 23,583 non-missing observations in Sample 2 (36.6%), and 5,736
non-missing observations in Sample 3 (8.9%).
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(a)Sample 1
(b)Sample 2
(c)Sample 3
Figure2.9:The percentage of non-missing values in each sample.
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Figure2.10:The percentage of non-missing values in each sample over time.
2.4 Does Power Affect Protest?
In this section, I investigate the relationship between power and protests. On the one hand,
protests stem from grievances, and the root of grievances may relate to a certain policy and
reveal public discontent with the government. Power structure can not only have an impact
on policy choices, but also determine the degree of a county leader’s influence on citizens.
On the other hand, people are more likely to participate in a protest when they perceive a
higher chance of success, or a political opportunity. If a county leader holds many public
positions and dominates the region, the probability of finding a strong advocate is slim and
citizens are less prone to challenge the leader. Because power structure influences protests
through both grievances and collective action, whether power has positive or negative ef-
fects on protests remains an empirical question.
2.4.1 Empirical Strategy
Combining the data set on protests with the one on county leadership, I examine the rela-
tionship between power structure and protests in China using the following baseline regres-
sion model:
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Protesti,t = β1Positioni,t−1 + β2Xi,t
+ Countyi + Periodt + Prefecturep × Periodt + εi,t
The dependent variable, Protesti,t, is the number of protests in county i at time t, and the
key independent variable, Positioni,t−1, is the number of positions a leader of county i holds
at time t-1, representing the level of power or power concentration in a county. Xi,t contains
precipitation, nighttime light, and personal characteristics of a county leader, such as age,
ethnicity, gender, etc. Precipitation lowers people’s willingness to take to the streets, while
nighttime light, a proxy of GDP growth, correlates to the opportunity costs of joining a
protest. Both variables should be negatively related to protests. The model also includes
county fixed effects and period fixed effects. Moreover, I add a period fixed effect for each
prefecture to capture the general time trend in each prefecture. Hence, the research ques-
tion should be interpreted as follows: given a county leader holds some public positions in
a county, if s/he is appointed one more public position in the next period and the power
structure becomes more concentrated, will it reflect on the frequency of protests in the
county?
Despite the inclusion of county and period fixed effects, endogeneity can still under-
mine the regression results. First, reverse causality can be problematic. Since maintaining
social order is one of the “priority targets with veto power” (一票否決) for a county leader,
protests are likely to influence the promotion opportunity of a county leader and indirectly
alter the power structure in a county. Second, the issue of measurement errors is inevitable.
The total number of protests in the data set is much smaller than the estimated number in
2010 (Sun, 2011) and cannot be verified as a representative sample because official informa-
tion on protests is confidential to the public. In addition, the number of positions held by
a county leader contains a non-negligible amount of missing values due to data limitations.
Third, omitted variables can be a serious problem. For example, the popularity, or prestige,
of a county leader is likely to have an impact on both power structure and protests, and be-
cause it is time-variant, the omitted variable problem cannot be solved by the inclusion of
county or leader fixed effects.
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To conquer the endogeneity, I first use one-period lag of power structure instead of the
current period to alleviate reverse causality. Then, I employ fixed effects models with two
instrumental variables. The first instrumental variable is the average number of positions
held by other county leaders in the same prefecture,Avg. Position−i,t−1. Since county lead-
ers in the same prefecture are evaluated based on the comparison of one another by the
same prefecture authority,Avg. Position−i,t−1 can be interpreted as the level of power held
by the competitors of a county leader and should be negatively correlated to Positioni,t−1
(Huiping Li, Wang, & Zheng, 2016; Lü & Landry, 2014; Yu, Zhou, & Zhu, 2016). Fig-
ure 2.11 displays the distribution of the number of counties in a prefecture. On average,
there are 9.68 counties in a prefecture and 5.45 counties with observed Positioni,t−1. Fur-
thermore,Avg. Position−i,t−1 should not influence Protesti,t through Protest−i,t for three
reasons. First, information on protests is censored. Press freedom is very limited in China
(FreedomHouse, 2017; Reporters Without Borders, 2017) and protests are rarely reported
by domestic media. In addition, due to vast and comprehensive Internet censorship, on-
line microblog posts and instant messages about sensitive topics are often quickly deleted
and people can barely distribute information on protests across counties. Second, protests
are usually driven by grievances from a specific region. Coordination across counties for
a protest is extremely difficult under censorship and rarely happens. In the data set, only
11 protests occur in more than one county, which translates to 0.04% of 24,780 protests.
Finally, most protests last only for a short period of time. In the data set, 98.98% of the
protests take at most one day. The average area of a county is ca. 3,400 km2, which is 1.3
times the area of Luxembourg. Without the help of media and the Internet, a short-term
protest can hardly have an impact on protests in other counties. The second instrumental
variable is the power structure twice lagged, Positioni,t−2. I argue that the power structure
twice lagged is correlated with the lagged power structure, but does not have a direct impact
on current protest. In other words, I argue that power structure two months ago can only
influence current protests through power structure in the previous month.
2.4.2 Results
Table 2.4 displays the baseline results. Column 1 runs an OLS regression, whereas Column
2-6 include county and period fixed effects. Column 1 and 2 assume the error terms to be
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Figure2.11:The number of counties in a prefecture.
independent and identically distributed. Column 3 relaxes the i.i.d. assumption and allows
for arbitrary correlation between errors within each county, while Column 4-6 cluster the
error terms at the prefecture level and incorporate a specific time trend for each prefecture
into the model; Column 6 further adds a set of personal characteristics of county leaders
into the model.
Figure2.12:The average number of positions. Figure2.13:The total number of protests.
Figure 2.12 and Figure 2.13 display the average number of positions held by each county
leader and the total number of protests, respectively. The two figures suggest that power
is positively correlated with the frequency of protests, which is consistent with the posi-
tive coefficient of interest from the OLS model in Column 1. However, after including the
county fixed effects and the month fixed effects, the coefficient of interest becomes nega-
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tive. In Column 2-6, the effects of power structure on protest frequency are significant and
negative, suggesting that people are less likely to protest under more concentrated power
structure.
Table2.4:The baseline regressions for power structure on protests.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
iid iid County Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture
L.Position 0.106∗∗∗ -0.0637∗∗ -0.0637∗ -0.0978∗∗ -0.0906∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗
(0.00593) (0.0282) (0.0368) (0.0480) (0.0361) (0.0236)
Precipitation -0.000569∗∗ -0.000860∗∗
(0.000238) (0.000416)
Nighttime Light -0.0119 -0.0746∗∗∗
(0.0368) (0.0199)
FE: County V V V V V
FE: Time V V
FE: Prefecture x Time V V V
Controls V
Observations 35134 35114 35114 34281 22033 4265
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.316 0.316 0.325 0.337 0.274
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays the baseline results of power structure on protests. The dependent variable is
Protesti,t, or the number of protests in a month in a county, and the key independent variable is Positioni,t−1,
or the number of positions a county leader holds in a month. Column 1 includes only the main explanatory
variable. Column 2 adds county and period fixed effects into the model. Column 3 relaxes the i.i.d. assump-
tion and allows the error terms to be correlated within each county. Column 4 clusters the error terms at
the prefecture level and incorporates a specific time trend for each prefecture. Column 5 adds two control
variables, precipitation and nighttime light. Column 6 further includes other control variables, such as age,
ethnicity, and gender of a county leader.
Next, I use two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis to mitigate the endogene-
ity. Table 2.5 shows the results from first stage regressions. The dependent variable is a
proxy of power, Positioni,t−1; the key independent variables are the instrumental variables,
Avg. Position−i,t−1 and Positioni,t−2. All models include county fixed effects and a specific
time trend for each prefecture. Column 1 assumes the error terms to be independent and
identically distributed. Column 2 relaxes the i.i.d. assumption and allows for arbitrary cor-
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Table2.5:First stage regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
iid County Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture
Avg. Position−i -0.343∗∗∗ -0.343∗∗∗ -0.343∗∗∗ -0.307∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗
(0.00695) (0.0628) (0.0926) (0.0800) (0.0821)
L.Position 0.785∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗ 0.872∗∗∗
(0.00343) (0.0365) (0.0460) (0.0426) (0.0381)
Precipitation -0.00000706 -0.000000246
(0.0000118) (0.00000787)
Nighttime Light -0.000474 -0.00147∗∗
(0.00102) (0.000649)
FE: County V V V V V
FE: Prefecture x Time V V V V V
Controls V
Observations 34149 34149 34149 21938 4243
Adjusted R2 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.987
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays the results from first stage regressions. The dependent variable is a proxy of power,
Positioni,t, or the number of positions a county leader holds in a month; the two key independent variables
areAvg. Position−i,t, the average number of positions held by other county leaders in the same prefecture, and
Positioni,t−1. Column 1-3 all include a specific time trend for each prefecture; Column 1 assumes i.i.d errors,
while Column 2 and 3 cluster the error terms at county and prefecture level, respectively. Column 4 adds two
control variables, precipitation and nighttime light. Column 5 further includes other control variables, such as
age, ethnicity, and gender of a county leader.
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relation between errors within each county, while Column 3-5 cluster the error terms at the
prefecture level; Column 5 further adds a set of personal characteristics of county leaders
into the model. In all models, the first instrumental variableAvg. Position−i,t−1 is signif-
icantly and negatively correlated to Positioni,t−1, while the second instrumental variable,
Positioni,t−2, is significantly and positively correlated to Positioni,t−1.
Table2.6:Second stage regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
iid County Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture IV1 IV2 FE
L.Position -0.0743∗∗ -0.0743 -0.0768 -0.0699 -0.0780∗∗∗ -0.461∗∗ -0.0708∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗
(0.0337) (0.0470) (0.0556) (0.0471) (0.0278) (0.208) (0.0249) (0.0236)
Precipitation -0.000447∗ -0.000787∗ -0.000977∗∗ -0.000815∗ -0.000860∗∗
(0.000251) (0.000450) (0.000439) (0.000437) (0.000416)
Nighttime Light -0.0138 -0.0743∗∗∗ -0.0740∗∗∗ -0.0737∗∗∗ -0.0746∗∗∗
(0.0333) (0.0164) (0.0205) (0.0163) (0.0199)
FE: County V V V V V V V V
FE: Time V V
FE: Prefecture x Time V V V V V V
Controls V V V V
Observations 33664 33664 33619 21639 4169 4252 4181 4265
Adjusted R2 0.305 0.305 0.324 0.336 0.273 0.269 0.273 0.274
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays the results from second stage regressions. The dependent variable is Protesti,t,
or the number of protests in a month in a county; the key independent variable is the predicted value of
Positioni,t−1, or the number of positions a county leader holds in a month from first stage regressions. Col-
umn 1-5 use both instrumental variables,Avg. Position−i,t−1 and Positioni,t−2, while Column 6 and 7 employ
each instrumental variable separately. Column 8 is the result from the baseline regression for reference. All
models include county fixed effects and a specific time trend for each prefecture.
Table 2.6 presents the results from second stage regressions. The dependent variable is
Protesti,t, and the key independent variable is the predicted value of Positioni,t−1 from first
stage regressions. Column 1 assumes the error terms to be independent and identically dis-
tributed. The coefficient of interest is statistically significant and its magnitude is slightly
larger than the one in Column 2 in Table 2.4. Column 2 relaxes the i.i.d. assumption and
allows for arbitrary correlation between errors within each county, while Column 3 and 4
cluster the error terms at the prefecture level and incorporate a specific time trend for each
prefecture into the model. After relaxing the i.i.d. assumption, the standard errors becomes
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larger and the coefficients of interest fall just short of statistical significance. Column 5 fur-
ther adds a set of personal characteristics of county leaders into the model, and the coeffi-
cient of interest becomes highly significant at the p-value of 0.006. Column 6 and 7 use
only the first and second instrumental variable, respectively, as a robustness check. The co-
efficient of interest in Column 6 becomes 5.9 times larger, but the coefficients of interest
in Column 6 and 7 are statistically significant as well. Column 8 copies the result from Col-
umn 6 in Table 2.4 for comparison. Overall, the results are consistent with the results from
baseline regressions–power structure has a negative effect on the frequency of protests.
In sum, the above results show that, on average, if the number of positions held by a
county leader increases by one standard deviation, the number of protests decreases by
0.0039-0.0044, equivalent to 1.14%-1.28% of the average number of protests in a county.
Given the discrete nature of positions, the results indicate that if a county leader obtains
one more position, the frequency of protests in the county drops by 20.3% - 22.8%. In
other words, more power or more concentrated power structure leads to fewer protests
in a county, which is consistent with the prediction from political opportunity theory.
2.4.3 Robustness Checks
In this section, I first present some supportive evidence of the exclusion restriction assump-
tion on the instrumental variable,Avg. Position−i,t−1. Then, I identify the sub-sample of
regional leaders who also serve as county magistrates. I find that when a county leader holds
the two most important positions in the county, county party secretary and county magis-
trate, the effects of power on protests are stronger.
2.4.3.1 Exclusion Restriction
To test the exclusion restriction assumption, I examine the direct effects of the instrumental
variable,Avg. Position−i,t−1, on the frequency of protests. Table 2.7 shows that, except the
OLS model in Column 1, the coefficients onAvg. Position−i,t−1 are insignificant in all other
models, while the key independent variable, Positioni,t−1, remains significant and the mag-
nitude of coefficients is comparable to the baseline results. The results suggest that the in-
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strumental variable,Avg. Position−i,t−1, is not directly related to the frequency of protests,
supporting the exclusion restriction assumption.
Table2.7:Exclusion restriction.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
iid iid County Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture
L.Position 0.0859∗∗∗ -0.0720∗∗ -0.0720∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.0884∗∗ -0.0834∗∗∗
(0.00611) (0.0281) (0.0375) (0.0446) (0.0344) (0.0202)
L.Avg. Position−i 0.0946∗∗∗ 0.0136 0.0136 -0.119 0.00731 0.386
(0.00955) (0.0288) (0.0315) (0.0817) (0.156) (0.271)
Precipitation -0.000534∗∗ -0.000855∗∗
(0.000255) (0.000427)
Nighttime Light -0.0118 -0.0767∗∗∗
(0.0368) (0.0191)
FE: County V V V V V
FE: Time V V
FE: Prefecture x Time V V V
Controls V
Observations 34256 34234 34234 34232 22007 4252
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.307 0.307 0.325 0.337 0.274
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table examines the exclusion restriction assumption of the instrumental variable,
Avg. Position−i,t−1. The dependent variable is Protesti,t, the number of protests in a month in a county, and
the key independent variables are Positioni,t−1, the number of positions a county leader holds in a month, and
Avg. Position−i,t−1, the average number of positions held by other county leaders in the same prefecture. Col-
umn 1 includes only the main explanatory variables. Column 2 adds county and period fixed effects into the
model. Column 3 relaxes the i.i.d. assumption and allows the error terms to be correlated within each county.
Column 4 clusters the error terms at the prefecture level and incorporates a specific time trend for each pre-
fecture. Column 5 adds two control variables, precipitation and nighttime light. Column 6 further includes
other control variables, such as age, ethnicity, and gender of a county leader.
Furthermore, I examine whetherAvg. Protest−i, the average number of protests in other
counties within the same prefecture, has a direct impact on the frequency of protests. As
mentioned previously, due to strict censorship, small, transitory, regional protests can
hardly be contagious and influence protests in other counties. Table 2.8 confirms the conjec-
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ture: except Column 1,Avg. Protest−i does not have an impact on the frequency of protests,
and the coefficients on the key independent variable, Positioni,t−1, are significant in all mod-
els.
Table2.8:No spillover effefcts.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
L0 L1 L3 L6 L0 L1 L3 L6
L.Position 0.00888 -0.0900∗∗ -0.0908∗∗ -0.0907∗∗ -0.0636∗ -0.109∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗
(0.0203) (0.0364) (0.0366) (0.0362) (0.0342) (0.0237) (0.0242) (0.0236)
Avg.Protest−i -3.326∗∗ 0.0532 0.0969 0.0843 -1.080 0.0309 0.00475 -0.0116
(1.593) (0.0667) (0.117) (0.0745) (1.007) (0.0531) (0.0655) (0.0408)
Precipitation -0.000176 -0.000545∗∗ -0.000535∗∗ -0.000552∗∗ -0.000918∗∗∗ -0.000885∗∗ -0.000886∗∗ -0.000916∗∗
(0.000124) (0.000252) (0.000253) (0.000247) (0.000337) (0.000410) (0.000398) (0.000420)
Nighttime Light -0.0659∗∗ -0.0119 -0.0118 -0.0119 -0.0866∗∗∗ -0.0754∗∗∗ -0.0740∗∗∗ -0.0757∗∗∗
(0.0271) (0.0370) (0.0370) (0.0366) (0.0117) (0.0193) (0.0205) (0.0191)
FE: County V V V V V V V V
FE: Prefecture x Time V V V V V V V V
Controls V V V V
Observations 22016 22016 21990 21891 4261 4261 4259 4244
Adjusted R2 0.577 0.337 0.338 0.337 0.325 0.274 0.274 0.276
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table examines the spillover effects of protests in the same prefecture. The dependent variable is
Protesti,t, the number of protests in a month in a county, and the key independent variables are Positioni,t−1,
the number of positions a county leader holds in a month, and several lagged periods ofAvg. Protest−i, the
average number of protests in other counties within in the same prefecture. Column 1-4 include the main
independent variables, precipitation, nighttime light, county and period fixed effects, and a specific time trend
for each prefecture, clustering the error terms at the prefecture level; Column 5-8 further add other control
variables, such as age, ethnicity, and gender of a county leader.
2.4.3.2 CountyMagistrate
The key independent variable is the number of positions held by a county leader, and the
positions include county party secretaries, county magistrates, heads of a governmental bu-
reau, party school principals, etc. Nevertheless, each position represents a different level of
power: a party school principal can hardly possess the same level of power as a county party
secretary, and counting the number of positions without attaching any “power weight” to
each position can be biased.
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To address the issue, I identify a sub-sample of county leaders who also serve as county
magistrates, the second powerful position, in the same county. If power indeed affects
protests, then the effects should be stronger if a county leader holds the two most powerful
positions at the same time. Of 35,639 county-period observations, county leaders hold both
county party secretaries and county magistrates in only 184 observations, which translates
to 0.5% of the observations and less than 8 county leaders each period on average. I then in-
teract the indicator of the sub-sample with the key independent variable, Positioni,t−1. If the
hypothesis is true and power does negatively influence protests, the coefficient on the inter-
action term should be negative and significant. Table 2.9 confirms the hypothesis.1 Column
1-4 show that power has negative effects on protests and the effects are stronger if a county
party secretary serves as a county magistrate at the same time. Column 5 reports the result
from Column 5 in Table 2.4 for comparison.
2.5 Mechanism
In this section, I discuss the underlying mechanism of power influence on protests. I first
disentangle the two essential components of protests–grievances and collective action–by
focusing on environmental protests and using the level of pollution as a control for the root
of grievances. Then, I document different patterns of power on protests between leaders
from the locality and leaders from other regions by examining pollution, protest causes,
and repression.
2.5.1 Grievances vs. Collective Action
Protests comprise two major elements–grievances and collective action, and county lead-
ers can influence protests through both elements. Classical collective behavior theories
claim that protests stem from indignation at injustice, and the root of grievances may re-
late to a certain policy and reveal public discontent with the government. For example, land
protests arise from enforced land acquisition, while environmental protests reflect pub-
1I do not present the results from 2SLS regressions because the interaction term is dropped out due to
stricter data requirement compared to fixed effects models.
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Table2.9:Dual jobs: county party secretary and county magistrate.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
iid County Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture
L.Position -0.0630∗∗ -0.0630∗ -0.0973∗∗ -0.0893∗∗ -0.0906∗∗
(0.0282) (0.0368) (0.0481) (0.0361) (0.0361)
L.Position× L.CountyMagistrate -0.996 -0.996∗∗∗ -0.703∗∗∗ -0.918∗∗∗
(1.091) (0.0445) (0.0481) (0.0458)
Precipitation -0.000569∗∗ -0.000569∗∗
(0.000238) (0.000238)
Nighttime Light -0.0120 -0.0119
(0.0368) (0.0368)
FE: County V V V V V
FE: Time V V
FE: Prefecture x Time V V V
Observations 35114 35114 34281 22033 22033
Adjusted R2 0.316 0.316 0.325 0.337 0.337
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays the additional effects of power structure on protests if a county leader holds the
two most important jobs in a county, county party secretary and county magistrate. The dependent vari-
able is Protesti,t, the number of protests in a month in a county, and the key independent variables are
Positioni,t−1, the number of positions a county leader holds in a month, and the interaction of Positioni,t−1
and County Magistratei,t−1 if a county leader serves as a county magistrate as well. Column 1 includes the
main explanatory variables, county and period fixed effects. Column 2 relaxes the i.i.d. assumption and allows
the error terms to be correlated within each county. Column 3 clusters the error terms at the prefecture level
and incorporates a specific time trend for each prefecture. Column 4 adds two control variables, precipitation
and nighttime light. Column 5 reports the result from Column 5 in Table 2.4 for comparison.
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lic dissatisfaction about weak regulation and governance on polluting industries. Under a
regionally decentralized system (Xu, 2011), a county party secretary can establish regional
policies and directly influence the well-being of people, and the degree of influence depends
on power structure. On the one hand, the more power a county leader wields within the
government, the more likely that s/he can use his/her clout to influence policies and the
welfare in the county. On the other hand, power concentration reflects political competi-
tion in a county, which relates to the quality of a politician, social welfare, and economic
performance (Ashworth, Geys, Heyndels, &Wille, 2014; Besley, Persson, & Sturm, 2010).
In places with lower political competition, reduced welfare and more grievances are antic-
ipated. Moreover, if power is highly concentrated, there is little separation of powers for
checks and balances among different departments and bureaus in the government, consider-
ing the absence of judicial independence and opposition parties in China.
In contrast to classical collective behavior theories, resource mobilization theory argues
that, to form a collective action, aggrieved people need resources and only take action when
the expected payoff of a protest dominates the associated costs. People are more likely to
participate in a protest when they perceive a higher chance of success, which hinges on state
strength, repression level, and elite division (Cragun Cragun, D., 2006; Klandermans & van
Stekelenburg, 2013). Particularly, a political opportunity is created when power is divided
among elites. Aggrieved citizens seize the opportunity and find powerful allies to help pro-
mote their claims (Klandermans & van Stekelenburg, 2013; O’Brien, 2013; O’Brien & Li,
2006). If a county leader holds many public positions and dominates the region, the proba-
bility of finding a strong advocate is slim and citizens are less prone to challenge the leader.
In the context of China, an authoritarian regime with poor human rights record (Amnesty
International, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2016), the risk of participating a protest is phe-
nomenal. When aggrieved citizens disagree with current policies and strive to voice their
claims, they tend to seek support from someone within the party organizations or the gov-
ernment. Without support from the powerful, citizens are much less likely to protest given
the high risk of participating a protest in China.
To separate power’s influence on the two components, I focus on environmental protests
and use one of the most prominent air pollution indicators, particulate matter 2.5 micron
diameter μg/m3 (PM 2.5), as a proxy for the root of grievances. Figure 2.14 displays the level
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of PM 2.5 over time. The average level of PM 2.5 is 118.21 μg/m3 in the data set, which is
far beyond the limits in the European Union (25 μg/m3), the United States (12 μg/m3),
and even China (35 μg/m3) (Environment of European Commission, 2016; Ministry of
Environmental Protection (China), 2012; US EPA, 2015).
Figure2.14:The level of PM 2.5 over time.
The regression model is shown as follows:
Environmental Protesti,t
= β1Positioni,t−1 + β2PM 2.5i,t−6 + β3Positioni,t−1 × PM 2.5i,t−6
+ β4Xi,t + Countyi + Periodt + Prefecturep × Periodt + εi,t
The dependent variable, Environmental Protesti,t, is an indicator of whether there is an
environmental protest in county i at time t. The key independent variables are Positioni,t−1,
PM 2.5i,t−6, and the interaction term. I use 6-month lag of PM 2.5 because, presumably,
air pollution is a long-term phenomenon that plagues residents for months or even years,
and people rarely protest based on air pollution in the current month.1 Xi,t includes pre-
cipitation and nighttime light in county i at time t2. In all specifications, county, period,
1I also use 3-month lag and 12-month lag of PM 2.5 as a robustness check, and the results are consistent
with 6-month lag of PM 2.5.
2Xi,t does not include county leaders’ characteristics because sample sizes are much smaller than the ones
in the baseline models. The drop in sample size comes from the inclusion of PM 2.5.
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and prefecture x period fixed effects are included, and the error terms are clustered at the
prefecture level.
Table2.10:The effects of power and air pollution on environmental protests.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE 2SLS FE 2SLS
L.Position -0.0789∗ -0.131 -0.0561 -0.107
(0.0437) (0.0802) (0.0445) (0.0780)
L6.PM 2.5 0.000365∗∗ 0.000315∗∗ 0.000639∗∗∗ 0.000607∗∗
(0.000151) (0.000150) (0.000214) (0.000215)
L.Position× L6.PM 2.5 -0.000177∗ -0.000186∗
(0.0000973) (0.000101)
Nighttime Light -0.00272 -0.00259 -0.00243 -0.00229
(0.00277) (0.00328) (0.00271) (0.00319)
Precipitation 0.00000511 -0.0000414 0.00000859 -0.0000407
(0.0000788) (0.0000815) (0.0000795) (0.0000817)
FE: County V V V V
FE: Prefecture x Time V V V V
Observations 1030 995 1030 995
Adjusted R2 -0.025 -0.018 -0.024 -0.017
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays the effects of power and air pollution on the environmental protests. The dependent
variable is Environmental Protesti,t, the frequency of environmental protests in a month in a county, and the
key independent variables are Positioni,t−1 and PM 2.5i,t−6, the level of air pollution 6 months ago. Column 1
and 2 include the two key independent variables, while Column 3 and 4 add the interaction term.
Table 2.10 displays the effects of power and PM 2.5 on environmental protests. In Col-
umn 1 and 2, 6-month lag of PM 2.5 is positively correlated to the probability of environ-
mental protests. In other words, more air pollution triggers more environmental protests.
The coefficients of power are negative and the magnitude is comparable to the baseline
models. Column 3 and 4 incorporate the interaction term of PM 2.5 and power. The coeffi-
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cients of the interaction term are negative and marginally significant, suggesting that given
the same level of grievances originated from air pollution, if a county leader wields a lot of
power in the government, people are less likely to participate in environmental protests,
which is consistent with the political opportunity theory. The coefficients of PM 2.5 stay
positive and significant; the coefficients of power remain negative but become insignificant,
implying that power affects protests mainly through the interaction term.
The result in Column 4 can be interpreted as follows: given the average level of PM 2.5, if
the number of public positions held by a county leader increases by one standard deviation,
the number of environmental protests decreases by 0.0012, translating to 20.28% of the av-
erage number of environmental protests in a county. The coefficients are both statistically
and economically significant, and the results further confirm the hypothesis that power has
substantial effects on protests by discouraging the formation of collective action.
2.5.2 Local vs. Outsider
In this section, I separate the sample into two subgroups–“local” and “outsider”. “Local” is
defined as a county leader whose ancestral home1 is located in the same prefecture as his/her
ruling county is, whereas “outsider” consists of all non-local leaders.2 Figure 2.15 shows the
geographical distribution of local leaders. Overall, there are 17,796 local observations, which
accounts for 27.6% of the data set.
Table 2.11 shows the effects of power on protests for the two subgroups, “local” and “out-
sider”. Column 1-4 present the results using the “local” sample, while Column 5-8 display
the results using the “outsider” sample. In contrast to the baseline results using the full sam-
ple, power does not have negative effects on protests in counties ruled by local leaders. In
other words, if a local leader becomes more powerful, people are not less likely to protest.
Since power always negatively relates to protests by lowering the success chance of protests
and reducing people’s willingness to protest, the positive coefficients indicates that more
power or more concentrated power structure generates a higher level of grievances and leads
to more protests.
1An ancestral home refers to the place that a person’s ancestors, usually parents, originally come from.
2“Outsider” also includes leaders with missing values on their ancestral home places.
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Figure2.15:The geographical distribtion of local leaders.
Table2.11:The effects of power structure on protest frequency by group.
Local Outsider
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FE IV1+2 IV1 IV2 FE IV1+2 IV1 IV2
L.Position 0.0684 -0.0465 -0.595 0.166∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.0543∗∗∗ -0.319∗∗ -0.0517∗∗∗
(0.0619) (0.186) (0.670) (0.0327) (0.0235) (0.00833) (0.150) (0.00928)
Precipitation -0.00141 -0.00145 -0.00162 -0.00138 -0.000529∗ -0.000378 -0.000604∗∗ -0.000424
(0.000987) (0.000995) (0.000985) (0.001000) (0.000260) (0.000264) (0.000289) (0.000258)
Nighttime Light 0.181∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ -0.0924∗∗∗ -0.0895∗∗∗ -0.0923∗∗∗ -0.0888∗∗∗
(0.0564) (0.0530) (0.0556) (0.0533) (0.00796) (0.00915) (0.00831) (0.00912)
FE: County V V V V V V V V
FE: Prefecture x Time V V V V V V V V
Controls V V V V V V V V
Observations 1513 1476 1513 1476 1775 1721 1762 1733
Adjusted R2 0.159 0.136 0.152 0.136 0.290 0.295 0.287 0.294
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays the effects of power on protests using “local” and “outsider” samples. A leader is
classified as local if his/her hometown is located in the same prefecture as his/her ruling county. The depen-
dent variable is Protesti,t, the frequency of protests in a month in a county, and the key independent variable is
Positioni,t−1 as a proxy of power. Column 1-4 use the local sample, while Column 5-8 present the results from
the outsider sample. All models include county fixed effects, a specific time trend for each prefecture, and
control variables.
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2.5.2.1 Air Pollution
To corroborate the hypothesis that local leaders arouse more public indignation when they
wield more power, I examine the effects of power on the root of grievances, which is prox-
ied by the air pollution indicator, PM 2.5. Figure 2.16 shows the average level of PM 2.5
for the local/outsider sample and its deviation from the average level of the entire sample
over time. Figure 2.16a shows that the average level of PM 2.5 for the local and outsider
groups exhibit the same pattern, and the level of PM 2.5 is relatively high in winter with
peaks around January. More importantly, Figure 2.16b illustrates that the level of PM 2.5
is above average in places under the rule of local leaders, while the level of PM 2.5 for the
outsider sample is below average for most of the time.
(a)The average level. (b)The deviation from the average.
Figure2.16:PM 2.5 for local leaders and outsiders.
Table 2.12 displays the regression results. Column 1 and 2 feature the results for the lo-
cal sample. The results show that the more power a local leader holds, the condition of air
pollution in the county becomes more serious. In contrast to the local sample, the outsider
sample depicts a different story–in counties rule by outsiders, the effects of power on air
pollution is negative. In Table 2.12, I employ different indicators of air pollution as a robust-
ness check. The results are consistent with Table 2.12 and confirm that under the rule of a
local leader, the more power s/he gains, there are higher chances for the county people to
suffer from air pollution.
Overall, the results from Table 2.12 suggest that in counties ruled by local leaders, an in-
crease in public positions by one standard deviation leads to a surge of PM 2.5 by 1.23-1.75
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Table2.12:The effects of power structure on air pollution by group.
Local Outsider All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE 2SLS FE 2SLS FE 2SLS
L.Position 21.83∗ 24.91∗∗∗ -8.176 -33.17∗∗∗ -5.070 -22.93
(10.86) (6.788) (8.557) (9.465) (7.148) (14.00)
FE: County V V V V V V
FE: Prefecture x Time V V V V V V
Observations 1105 1073 2867 2788 4596 4483
Adjusted R2 0.880 0.881 0.830 0.828 0.845 0.845
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays the effects of power on the level of air pollution using “local” and “outsider” sam-
ples. A leader is classified as local if his/her hometown is located in the same prefecture as his/her ruling
county. The dependent variable is PM 2.5i,t as a proxy of air pollution in a month in a county, and the key
independent variable is Positioni,t−1 as a proxy of power. Column 1 and 2 use the local sample, while Column
3 and 4 present the results from the outsider sample; Column 5 and 6 employ the whole sample for reference.
All models include county fixed effects and a specific time trend for each prefecture.
102
Table2.13:The effects of power structure on air pollution by group.
Local Outsider
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NO2 NO2 O3 O3 NO2 NO2 O3 O3
L.Position 3.654∗∗∗ 5.430∗∗∗ 4.602 12.71∗∗∗ -0.826 -5.954∗∗∗ -4.294 -6.253
(0.959) (1.941) (5.167) (3.127) (1.723) (1.832) (2.775) (6.288)
FE: County V V V V V V V V
FE: Prefecture x Time V V V V V V V V
Observations 1103 1071 1105 1073 2878 2798 2785 2706
Adjusted R2 0.807 0.804 0.758 0.764 0.790 0.788 0.702 0.701
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays the effects of power on the level of air pollution using “local” and “outsider” sam-
ples. A leader is classified as local if his/her hometown is located in the same prefecture as his/her ruling
county. The dependent variables areNO2i,t andO3i,t as indicators of air pollution in a month in a county,
and the key independent variable is Positioni,t−1 as a proxy of power. Column 1-4 use the local sample, while
Column 5-8 present the results from the outsider sample. Column 1, 3, 5, and 7 employ fixed effects models,
while Column 2, 4, 6, 8 adopt an instrumental variable approach. All models include county fixed effects and
a specific time trend for each prefecture.
on average, translating to 1.04%-1.19% of the average level of air pollution in China. The em-
pirical pattern indicates that the influence of power on grievances differ between locals and
outsiders, which results in the discrepancy in the effects of power on protests.
2.5.2.2 Protest against the Government
In this section, I explore the causes of protests to identify the root of grievances. More
specifically, I classify protests in terms of protest targets. On the one hand, aggrieved citi-
zens may protest against the government because of land acquisition, environmental pol-
lution, dissatisfaction with the government or a state-owned enterprise, etc. On the other
hand, people may protest against non-governmental entities. For example, workers assem-
ble to express their anger at private firms and claim their wages in arrears; merchants go on
strike to voice their discontent with suppliers about defaulted debts. Given that protesters
express their resentment against the government, I further categorize the causes into two
types: policy-related protests and policy-unrelated protests. Policy-related protests mostly
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contain land protests and environmental protests, while policy-unrelated protests refer
to bitter complaints against urban management officers or Chengguan (城管), regional
governments, or even the communist party in some rare cases. Figure 2.17 maps the num-
ber of protests against the government and non-governmental entities, respectively. Over-
all, 38% of the protests are against the government, while 61% of the protests are against
non-governmental entities. Figure 2.18 further maps the number of government-related
protests. Among the protests against the government, 89% of the protests are related to a
policy, while 11% of the protests are not policy-related.
(a)Government-related (b)Government-unrelated
Figure2.17:The log number of protests against the government and non-governmental entities, respectively.
(a)Policy-related (b)Policy-unrelated
Figure2.18:The log number of protests related to governmental policies and other governmental issues, re-
spectively.
The model is defined as follows:
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Pr(Protest Typei,t = 1|Ω) = β1Positioni,t−1 + β2Xi,t
+ Countyi + Periodt + Prefecturep × Periodt + εi,t
The dependent variable, Pr(Protest Typei,t = 1|Ω), is an indicator of a protest type given
Ω, i.e. one or more protests take place and at least one cause is identified at time t in county
i. There are four protest types: whether a protest is against the government or against non-
governmental entities, and for the former, whether a protest is related to a policy or not.
The indicators are not mutually exclusive, i.e., a protest can be classified as both against the
government1 and against non-governmental entities.2 The key independent variable is the
proxy of power, Positioni,t−1.
Table 2.14 shows the effects of power on protests by different protest targets.3 Column
1-3 display the effects of power on protests against the government. Column 1 shows that
an increase in a local leader’s power brings about higher chances of a government-related
protest, while Column 2 illustrates that an increase in an outsider’s power reduces the like-
lihood of a government-related protest; Column 4-6 show similar effects of power on
protests against non-governmental entities between locals and outsiders. The empirical evi-
dence suggests that given one or more protests take place, people are more likely to protest
against the government when local leaders wield a lot of power in the government, which
is consistent with the hypothesis that grievances play a crucial role in the distinct pattern in
Table 2.11 between locals and outsiders.
1State-own enterprises are classified as governmental entities.
2Precipitation and repression are not included in the controls for two reasons. First, since I focus on
observations with at least one protest, the formation of collective action is not of major concern. The research
question here is as follows: given that a protest takes place, how does power affect the probability that this
protest contains a certain characteristic? Therefore, whether people protest is not a question anymore. Sec-
ond, the sample size is often too small to generate plausible results, and the inclusion of precipitation and
repression exacerbates the situation.
3All models in this section only use fixed effects because the data requirement on instrumental variable
approach cannot be fulfilled for small samples. The samples shrinks considerably because I only consider ob-
servations with protests and at least one identified cause. In many cases, it is impossible to obtain reasonable
results or even successfully run regressions with small samples.
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Table2.14:The effects of power on protests by protest targets.
Gov non-Gov
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Local Outsider All Local Outsider All
L.Position 0.501∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.499∗∗∗ -0.0362∗∗ -0.0262
(0.00304) (0.0159) (0.0246) (0.00209) (0.0179) (0.0212)
Nighttime Light -0.0128 -0.000559 -0.00175 -0.0335 0.000932 -0.000137
(0.0764) (0.0125) (0.0136) (0.0527) (0.00670) (0.00674)
FE: County V V V V V V
FE: Prefecture x Time V V V V V V
Observations 235 656 1192 235 656 1192
Adjusted R2 0.128 -0.001 0.034 0.043 0.119 0.127
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays the effects of power on protests with different protest targets using “local” and “out-
sider” samples. A leader is classified as local if his/her hometown is located in the same prefecture as his/her
ruling county. Each protest is categorized into a protest against the government and/or a protest against non-
governmental entities. The dependent variables areGovi,t and non-Govi,t, which are indicators of protests
against the government or against non-governmental entities. The key independent variable is Positioni,t−1
as a proxy of power. Column 1 and 4 use the local sample, while Column 2 and 5 present the results from
the outsider sample; Column 3 and 6 displays the full sample for reference. All models include county fixed
effects and a specific time trend for each prefecture.
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Table 2.15 displays the effects of power on protests against the government for policy-
related and policy-unrelated issues. Column 1-3 focus on policy-related protests, whereas
Column 4-6 show the results of policy-unrelated protests. Column 1 and 4 indicate that
given that a county is ruled by a local leader and that at least one protest takes place and a
protest cause is identified, people are more likely to protest for a policy-related issue, not
policy-unrelated issue, while in counties governed by outsiders the opposite pattern is ob-
served. The evidence suggests that when a local leader gains more power in the government
and becomes more involved in regional policies, people are more likely to protest against
the government for policy-related issues. This further supports the hypothesis that power-
ful local leaders generate more grievances, leading to more protest.
Table2.15:The effects of power on policy-related and policy-unrelated protests.
Gov: Policy Gov: non-Policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Local Outsider All Local Outsider All
L.Position 1.001∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.500∗∗∗ 0.0197∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗∗
(0.00275) (0.0171) (0.0286) (0.000717) (0.00506) (0.00579)
Nighttime Light -0.0289 0.00593 0.00406 0.00738 -0.00913∗ -0.00892∗
(0.0692) (0.00981) (0.0107) (0.0180) (0.00497) (0.00491)
FE: County V V V V V V
FE: Prefecture x Time V V V V V V
Observations 235 656 1192 235 656 1192
Adjusted R2 -0.065 -0.024 -0.028 -0.411 -0.154 -0.234
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays the effects of power on policy-related and policy-unrelated protests using “local” and
“outsider” samples. A leader is classified as local if his/her hometown is located in the same prefecture as his/
her ruling county. Each protest is categorized into a policy-related or/and policy-unrelated protest, given that
it is a protest against the government. The dependent variables areGov: Policyi,t andGov: non-Policyi,t, which
are indicators of policy-related or policy-unrelated protests. The key independent variable is Positioni,t−1 as
a proxy of power. Column 1 and 4 use the local sample, while Column 2 and 5 present the results from the
outsider sample; Column 3 and 6 displays the full sample for reference. All models include county fixed effects
and a specific time trend for each prefecture.
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2.5.2.3 State Violence
In this section, I examine the effects of power on state violence to find out whether local
leaders behave the same as outsiders in terms of repression. If their choices of repression
are different, then it signals that local leaders may affect protests through the formation
of collective action as well, given that repression deters aggrieved citizens from participat-
ing in protests. On the other hand, if the results show similar patterns between locals and
outsiders, then it further supports the hypothesis that the discrepancy in the influence of
power on protests is originated from grievances. Figure 2.19a maps the number of protests
related to state violence. Since there are only 21 protests marked as relating to state violence
in the original labeling byNot the News, I use the extended labeling instead. Overall, there
are 5,246 protests related to state violence, which translate to 21% of the protests.
(a)State Violence (b)Casualties
Figure2.19:The log number of protests related to state violence and casualties, respectively.
Table 2.16 presents the effects of power on the probability of repression, given that one
or more protests take place. Column 1 and 2 display the results of local sample, Column
3 and 4 show the results of outsider sample, and Column 5 and 6 exhibit the results of all
sample. Despite the effects of power on repression probability become insignificant in 2SLS
models for the outsider sample, the coefficients are all negative and consistent with the “all”
sample.
In addition, I use an indicator of casualties as the dependent variable, given that there is
at least one protest in county i at time t. A protest is identified as involving casualties if key-
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words related to injuries, deaths, or hospitals are mentioned, excluding any protest about
medical malpractice or natural disasters. Presumably, casualties arise from repression and
should exhibit similar patterns as repression. Figure 2.19b maps the number of protests in-
volved casualties. Overall, there are 1,174 protests related to casualties, which translates to
5% of the protests. Table 2.17 presents the effects of power on casualties, given at least one
protest happens. The results show negative effects of power on casualties, which is consis-
tent with Table 2.16.
Table2.16:The effects of power structure on repression by group.
Local Outsider All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE 2SLS FE 2SLS FE 2SLS
L.Position -0.180 -0.410∗ -0.0380∗∗ -0.00439 -0.0692∗∗∗ -0.0524
(0.176) (0.214) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0251) (0.0330)
Nighttime Light 0.0410 0.0416 0.0162∗∗∗ 0.0128∗∗ 0.0173∗∗∗ 0.0135∗∗
(0.0377) (0.0366) (0.00614) (0.00587) (0.00657) (0.00610)
FE: County V V V V V V
FE: Prefecture x Time V V V V V V
Observations 939 915 1993 1931 3969 3851
Adjusted R2 -0.023 -0.023 -0.006 -0.010 0.006 0.003
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays the effects of power on repression using “local” and “outsider” samples. A leader
is classified as local if his/her hometown is located in the same prefecture as his/her ruling county. The de-
pendent variable is Repressioni,t, an indicator of whether a protest is repressed, given at least one protest takes
place. The key independent variable is Positioni,t−1 as a proxy of power. Column 1 and 2 use the local sample,
while Column 3 and 4 present the results from the outsider sample; Column 5 and 6 employ the whole sample
for reference. All models include county fixed effects and a specific time trend for each prefecture.
In general, Table 2.16 and Table 2.17 provide suggestive evidence that power lowers the
probability of state violence. More importantly, local and outsider samples present similar
empirical patterns of state violence, implying that the different effects of power on protests
do not result from state violence. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the
discrepancy emerges from grievances, not the formation of collective action.
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Table2.17:The effects of power structure on casualties by group.
Local Outsider All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE 2SLS FE 2SLS FE 2SLS
L.Position -0.0341 -0.0133 -0.0550∗∗∗ -0.0550∗∗ -0.0622∗∗∗ -0.0697∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.121) (0.0183) (0.0259) (0.0197) (0.0261)
Nighttime Light -0.00260 -0.00609 -0.00906∗ -0.00917 -0.00657 -0.00686
(0.0176) (0.0161) (0.00491) (0.00555) (0.00622) (0.00665)
FE: County V V V V V V
FE: Prefecture x Time V V V V V V
Observations 851 831 1845 1788 3653 3544
Adjusted R2 -0.016 -0.014 -0.082 -0.089 -0.011 -0.018
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays the effects of power on casualties using “local” and “outsider” samples. A leader
is classified as local if his/her hometown is located in the same prefecture as his/her ruling county. The de-
pendent variable is Casualtiesi,t, an indicator of whether there are casualties in a protest, given at least one
protest takes place. The key independent variable is Positioni,t−1 as a proxy of power. Column 1 and 2 use the
local sample, while Column 3 and 4 present the results from the outsider sample; Column 5 and 6 employ the
whole sample for reference. All models include county fixed effects and a specific time trend for each prefec-
ture.
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2.6 WhoHasMore Power?
Section 2.5 demonstrates that local leaders arouse more social grievances and spark more
protests when they wield a lot of power in the government. To investigate the phenomenon,
I first need to answer the question: who has more power? In the following model, I exam-
ine the correlation between power and various characteristics of county leaders:
Positioni,t = β1Locali + β2Nighttime Lighti,t + β3Prefecture Experiencei
+ β4Xi + β5Zi,t
+ Prefecturep + Periodt + Prefecturep × Periodt + εi,t
The dependent variable is Positioni,t, which can be understood as a measure of “concur-
rent job promotions”. In contrast to the literature which studies promotion only after a
politician leaves his/her current position, Positioni,t assesses the power granted to a politi-
cian when s/he serves as a county party secretary throughout the whole time, and a change
in Positioni,t indicates a minor promotion or demotion within the term of office of a county
leader. Two essential independent variables areNighttime Lighti,t, a proxy of regional GDP
growth, and Prefecture Experiencei, a proxy of connections to superior authorities. In par-
ticular, Prefecture Experiencei consists of three indicators–if a county leader has worked in
a prefecture before his/her term of office (Previous Prefecture Experiencei), is working in a
prefecture during the term (Current Prefecture Experiencei), and will work after the term
(Future Prefecture Experiencei). The most relevant one is Previous Prefecture Experiencei,
which is more likely to determine the promotion probability of a county leader and more
comparable to the literature (T. Chen & Kung, 2016). Since each county leader is evaluated
by the prefecture government, previous prefecture work experience helps build connections
to superior authorities and elevates the likelihood of promotion. Xi includes time-invariant
characteristics, such as gender, education, ethnicity, hometown, etc.; Zi,t consists of time-
varying characteristics: age and duration of the term.
Table 2.18 displays the empirical results. Column 1 uses a simple OLS model, while Col-
umn 2-4 add prefecture, period, and prefecture x period fixed effects, respectively. In all
specified models,Nighttime Lighti,t and Previous Prefecture Experiencei are significantly
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and positively correlated to Positioni,t, suggesting that higher economic growth and ties
to superior authorities contribute to more positions within the term of office of a county
leader.1 Table 2.19 examines the local and outsider samples separately, andNighttime Lighti,t
and Previous Prefecture Experiencei still positively predict the likelihood of promotion. De-
spite using a different definition of promotion, the empirical results are consistent with the
literature and show that “concurrent job promotions” are also based on meritocracy and
patronage.
Although economic performance and workplace connections are both correlated to pro-
motion, I find that the two factors exhibit different patterns for locals and outsiders. Table
2.20 and Table 2.21 show that being a local predicts lower levels ofNighttime Lighti,t and
higher chances of previous work experience in the prefecture government directly supe-
rior to his/her ruling county. In other words, compared to outsiders, local party secretaries
are more likely to have work experience under the direct superior authorities before their
terms in the office, but tend to fail in economic performance. If economic performance is
a proxy for competence and workplace connections represent ties with superior authorities
(T. Chen & Kung, 2016; Persson & Zhuravskaya, 2016), the empirical evidence implies that
local leaders are less competent but have better connections with superior authorities.
2.7 Conclusion andDiscussion
This chapter aims to provide empirical evidence on the relationship between protest and
power structure among regional leaders in China. I first use text mining to compile a com-
prehensive data set on the information of over 50,000 protests, and collect biographical
data of 2,714 county leaders and construct a measure to proxy for power, Position, or the
number of public positions held by a county leader at the same time, from the curriculum
vitae of county leaders. Next, I demonstrate the negative causal effects of regional power
structure on protests. To overcome the endogeneity issue, I employ fixed effects models
with two instruments. The first instrumental variable is the average number of positions
held by other county leaders in the same prefecture,Average Position, which can be inter-
1Additionally, Column 2-4 present the positive effects of age, being a female, and higher education on
Positioni,t; interestingly, the results indicate that being a local negatively correlates to Positioni,t.
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Table2.18:The determinants of power.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FE FE FE
Nighttime Light 0.212∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(0.00636) (0.00641) (0.00629) (0.00620)
Duration -0.00256∗∗∗ 0.000305 0.000671 0.000733
(0.000639) (0.000637) (0.000785) (0.000949)
Age 0.00457∗ 0.00972∗∗∗ 0.00977∗∗∗ 0.0115∗∗∗
(0.00278) (0.00242) (0.00241) (0.00291)
Female 0.372∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗
(0.0486) (0.0497) (0.0497) (0.0585)
Higher Education -0.104∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗∗
(0.0395) (0.0912) (0.0910) (0.111)
Local -0.164∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗
(0.0197) (0.0200) (0.0199) (0.0238)
Prefecture Work Experience
Previous 0.390∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗
(0.0163) (0.0273) (0.0275) (0.0334)
Current 0.561∗∗∗ 0.557∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗
(0.0372) (0.0342) (0.0348) (0.0413)
Future 0.0696∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗ -0.209∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗
(0.0204) (0.0257) (0.0253) (0.0296)
FE: Prefecture V V
FE: Time V
FE: Prefecture x Time V
Ethnicity V V V V
Ancestral Place V V V V
Birthplace V V V V
Observations 5592 5589 5589 3985
Adjusted R2 0.308 0.761 0.761 0.464
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays the determinants of power. The dependent variable is Positioni,t, a proxy of power.
The key independent variables areNighttime Lighti,t and Previous Prefecture Experiencei, which represent
economic performance and connections to superior authorities, respectively. Column 1 uses a simple OLS
model, while Column 2-4 add prefecture, period, and prefecture x period fixed effects, respectively.
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Table2.19:The determinants of power by group.
Local Outsider All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FE FE FE FE
Nighttime Light 0.218∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.0318∗∗∗ 0.0331∗∗∗ 0.0426∗∗∗ 0.0441∗∗∗
(0.00575) (0.00553) (0.00416) (0.00507) (0.00467) (0.00567)
Duration -0.00393∗∗∗ -0.00391∗∗∗ 0.00393∗∗∗ 0.00419∗∗∗ 0.00110 0.00136
(0.000623) (0.000750) (0.00138) (0.00161) (0.00106) (0.00128)
Age 0.0256∗∗∗ 0.0268∗∗∗ -0.0144∗∗ -0.0149∗∗ 0.00638∗∗ 0.00838∗∗
(0.00243) (0.00284) (0.00596) (0.00681) (0.00289) (0.00337)
Female 0.794∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(0.0645) (0.0699) (0.0489) (0.0566) (0.0500) (0.0584)
Higher Education 0 0 0 0 0 1.306∗∗∗
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (0.111)
Prefecture Work Experience
Previous 0.141∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.886∗∗∗ 0.846∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗
(0.0254) (0.0315) (0.0631) (0.0715) (0.0329) (0.0388)
Current 0.731∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗ -0.224 -0.263 0.539∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗
(0.0349) (0.0434) (0.146) (0.164) (0.0385) (0.0458)
Future -0.177∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ -0.0735∗∗ -0.0595
(0.0233) (0.0304) (0.0997) (0.110) (0.0330) (0.0383)
FE: Prefecture V V V
FE: Time V V V
FE: Prefecture x Time V V V
Ethnicity V V V V V V
Ancestral Place V V V V V V
Birthplace V V V V V V
Observations 2922 1713 3506 2011 6428 4848
Adjusted R2 0.900 0.679 0.559 0.153 0.555 0.181
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays the determinants of power using “local” and “outsider” samples. A leader is clas-
sified as local if his/her hometown is located in the same prefecture as his/her ruling county. The depen-
dent variable is Positioni,t, a proxy of power. The key independent variables areNighttime Lighti,t and
Previous Prefecture Experiencei, which represent economic performance and connections to superior author-
ities, respectively. Column 1 and 2 use the local sample, while Column 3 and 4 present the results from the
outsider sample; Column 5 and 6 employ the whole sample for reference. All models include either prefecture
and period fixed effects or a specific time trend for each prefecture.
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Table2.20:Previous prefecture experience.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FE FE FE
Local 0.146∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
(0.00352) (0.00372) (0.00372) (0.00417)
FE: Prefecture V V
FE: Time V
FE: Prefecture x Time V
Observations 74556 74556 74556 70800
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.390 0.390 0.192
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays the effects of power on previous prefecture experience using “local” and “outsider”
samples. A leader is classified as local if his/her hometown is located in the same prefecture as his/her rul-
ing county. The dependent variable is an indicator of whether a county leader has worked in the prefecture
government directly superior to his/her ruling county, which can be perceived as a proxy for workplace con-
nections. The key independent variable is Positioni,t, a proxy of power. Column 1 uses a simple OLS model,
while Column 2-4 add prefecture, period, and prefecture x period fixed effects, respectively.
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Table2.21:Nighttime light.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FE FE FE
Local -0.127∗∗∗ -0.0826∗∗∗ -0.0826∗∗∗ -0.0820∗∗∗
(0.0248) (0.0183) (0.0182) (0.0197)
FE: Prefecture V V
FE: Time V
FE: Prefecture x Time V
Observations 24072 24072 24072 22656
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.578 0.581 0.429
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table displays the effects of power on nighttime light using “local” and “outsider” samples. A
leader is classified as local if his/her hometown is located in the same prefecture as his/her ruling county. The
dependent variable isNighttime Lighti,t, a proxy of economic performance. The key independent variable is
Positioni,t, a proxy of power. Column 1 uses a simple OLS model, while Column 2-4 add prefecture, period,
and prefecture x period fixed effects, respectively.
preted as the level of power held by the competitors of a county leader and is negatively cor-
related to Position. The second instrumental variable is two-period lag of power structure.
The results from two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions show that if a county leader
obtains one more position and regional power structure becomes more concentrated, the
number of protests in the region will drop by 20.3% - 22.8%. I also show that power af-
fects protests through both increasing grievances and lowering the incentive for collective
action. On the one hand, with regard to the formation of collective action, I examine envi-
ronmental protests and use the level of air pollution as a proxy for the root of grievances.
The results show that, given the same level of air pollution, people are less likely to protest
under rule of a powerful leader, suggesting that power reduces the incentive for collective
action. On the other hand, the distinct patterns between local leaders and outsiders indicate
that power can induce more protests through evoking grievances of people. In particular,
the empirical results show that under the rule of a local leader, whose hometown is located
within the same prefecture as his/her ruling county, people are more likely to suffer from a
higher level of air pollution and tend to express discontent against the government. Finally,
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I provide some suggestive evidence that local leaders are less competent and depend more
on connections to superior authorities than outsiders.
It is worth mentioning that the protest data set in this chapter may not be representative.
Although it contains rich information on comprehensive protests all over China, the total
number of recorded protests is much smaller than the prediction in 2010 (Sun, 2011). More-
over, the fact that the data were collected from the Internet suggests that extremely poor
areas or places under strict control by the Communist Party, such as Xinjiang and Tibet,
may suffer more from under-representation. The identification strategy relies on the panel
structure and the results should not be affected, but external validity need to be taken into
consideration for less populated, remote districts or places with highly strict censorship.
In addition, there is only one county leader in each county in the data set, which means
that it is impossible to distinguish county leader fixed effects from county fixed effects. A
related point to consider is that there is no information on the quality of county leaders.
98% of the county leaders hold a bachelor’s degree or higher, so education is not informa-
tive in terms of quality comparison among county leaders. To partially address the issue,
I use economic performance to evaluate county leaders’ competence (Y. Chen et al., 2005;
Hongbin Li & Zhou, 2005). The negative coefficients of nighttime light, which is a proxy
of economic performance, in the baseline results can be interpreted as the opportunity cost
of participating a protest. It can also be understood as a manifestation of county leaders’
ability: the more capable a county leader is, the fewer protests there are in his ruling county.
Furthermore, I examine the hometown relationship of each county leader and find that
compared to outsiders, local leaders tend to rely more on connections to higher authorities
but perform worse in economic performance. Nevertheless, the above pieces of evidence
are quite indirect and merely suggestive. To pin down the relationship between politician
quality and protest frequency, a more thorough evaluation on the quality of politicians is
required and will be left for future studies.
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Chapter 3
ConstructingMedia Ideology in Chinese:
Methodology and an Application to Cross-Strait Relations
3.1 Introduction
The chapter explains a newmeasure of media ideology in Chinese with an application to
cross-Strait relations. I modify the English-based methods from Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2010) andMurphy andWestbury (2013) and construct one of the first measures of media
ideology in Chinese. There are two major challenges regarding Chinese text analysis. First,
most existing tools are developed in English and usually cannot be applied to Chinese text
directly. For example, the most popular Python package in Natural Language Processing,
NLTK, does not support all functions in Chinese, and in many cases, it is unavoidable to
take extra steps to process Chinese text before making good use of NLTK. Second, it is
much more complicated to implement word segmentation and identify words, the small-
est meaningful units, in a piece of Chinese text than English text. There is no explicit word
boundary marker in Chinese, such as a space between words in English, and this means that
even a piece of short text can be interpreted as many different possible word compositions.
This chapter discusses the difficulties in constructing media ideology in Chinese and exper-
iments with different word segmentation methods, keyword extraction algorithms, word
association measures, and similarity metrics.
Although my measure is developed in Chinese and devoted to cross-Strait relations, its
methodology allows a wide range of possibilities for applications. In principal, my mea-
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sure can be applied to any topic with a text corpus representing one extreme stance on the
topic so that subjects of interest, such as newspapers, can be assigned a score evaluating how
“extreme” the subjects are. The quality of the measure depend on two factors. First, the
text corpus should correctly characterize the extreme position on the topic. Second, the
chosen topic should be relevant to the subjects of interest so that the subjects of interest
actually discuss the topic and are considered holding some positions regarding the topic.
My measure of media ideology on the pro-China to anti-China position meets the two cri-
teria. On the one hand, the most pro-China stance is characterized by the press conference
transcripts of the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), which is the official Chinese government
institution in charge of policies related to Taiwan and representing the position of the Chi-
nese government on cross-Strait issues. On the other hand, cross-Strait relations are crucial
to Taiwanese citizens and have been one of the most important topics in Taiwan since 1949.
Therefore, Taiwanese newspapers cover lots of stories about the topic and usually have been
seen as holding some specific stance on cross-Strait relations.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the intuition of my measure. The core concept of the measure is
to compare the use of language in Taiwanese newspapers and in TAO press conference
transcripts. Based on the comparison, each Taiwanese newspaper is assigned a score that
evaluates how closely it aligns with TAO. If a Taiwanese newspaper receives a high score,
then it is considered more pro-China than other newspapers. The construction of my mea-
sure requires various steps. I first extract keywords from TAO press conference transcripts
to represent the Chinese government’s policies towards Taiwan. Then, I compare the use
of each keyword and its neighboring words by TAOwith the use by each Taiwanese news-
paper. If a Taiwanese newspaper systematically uses the same set of keywords in a similar
way as TAO does, the measure of alignment with TAOwill be high, implying that the Tai-
wanese newspaper is ideologically close to the Chinese government and considered more
pro-China.
To measure the alignment of Taiwanese newspapers with the Chinese government, I first
identify key issues in the relationship between China and Taiwan and the position of the
Chinese government on these issues. To do so, I scrape all press conference transcripts from
the official website of TAO and construct monthly lexicons that represent major issues re-
garding cross-Strait relations and the Chinese government’s stance on these issues. To con-
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Figure3.1:The intuition of the measurement
struct monthly lexicons, I first implement word segmentation on the TAO press conference
transcripts. Word segmentation breaks written text into words, the smallest meaningful
units, and is the first major task in text analysis. Unlike languages using the Latin alpha-
bet, such as English, where words are usually separated by a blank space, Chinese has no
explicit word delimiters and there are many possibilities to divide a chunk of Chinese text
into words. For example, “台中國小” can be segmented into “台/中/國/小” (Taiwan,
middle, country, small), “台/中國/小” (Taiwan, China, small), “台中/國小” (Taichung El-
ementary School), etc. To solve the problem, I adopt two methods for word segmentation
in Chinese1. The first method is called Chinese Knowledge and Information Processing
(CKIP)2 and provided by the Institute of Information Science and the Institute of Lin-
guistics of Academia Sinica. The second method is a popular Python package called jieba3.
CKIP is better at capturing Taiwan-related topics, while jieba is much more efficient and
can analyze enormous amount of text in a short period of time4. Word segmentation par-
tially influences keyword selection–only ca. 60% of the keywords in the monthly lexicons
1The two packages for Chinese word segmentation also implement part-of-speech tagging at the same
time.
2http://ckipsvr.iis.sinica.edu.tw/.
3https://github.com/fxsjy/jieba.
4Because CKIP is very slow and error-prone when analyzing large text, I choose jieba to perform word
segmentation on millions of headlines from Taiwanese newspapers
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are identical between CKIP and jieba. Nevertheless, the final measures of media ideology
are highly correlated across Taiwanese newspapers over time, with correlation coefficient
over 0.91.
Keyword extraction is implemented after word segmentation. I first pre-process the
words from press conference transcripts and keep only content words (such as nouns, ad-
jectives, verbs) that contain more than two characters, appear more than 5 times, and are
not common phrases in general press conferences (eg. reporters)2. Then, I select keywords
into the lexicons according to two algorithms. In the first algorithm, I simply pick the most
frequent words each month. If a word is constantly used by the Chinese government and
it is not a function word and not a commonly used word in general press releases, then the
word is likely to relate to some fundamental issues concerning cross-Strait relations and,
possibly, the Chinese government’s stance on these issues. The second algorithm is TF-IDF,
which stands for Term Frequency and Inverse Document Frequency. Term frequency is
the number of occurrences of a word in a document, such as a piece of press conference
transcript, while document frequency is the number of documents that contain the word.
The TF-IDF score is proportional to word frequency and divided by document frequency
as a weight to offset word frequency. Since the scarcity of words is considered, TF-IDF
can select words that are specific to a month but rare in other months. If a word appears
repeatedly in many months, then it is unlikely to be chosen by TF-IDF despite its high fre-
quency. For example, the average word frequency of “原則” (principle) is comparable to
“鮑威爾” (Powell, which refers to the 65th United States Secretary of State, Colin Luther
Powell). However, because “原則” (principle) appears in most months (82.72%) and “鮑
威爾” (Powell) only shows up in 2 months (1.23%), the average TF-IDF score of “原則”
(principle) is merely 4% of the score of “鮑威爾” (Powell). The two algorithms are com-
plements to each other–the first one selects keywords representing essential issues that are
relatively stable over time, while the second one chooses keywords relating to issues that
are very present in some months but not over longer time periods. Given the discrepancy
1All the correlation coefficients in the introduction are calculated by taking pairwise comparison between
the measures from two different algorithms across all newspapers over the entire time period. For example,
the correlation coefficient here comes from the comparison between the two word segmentation methods,
CKIP and jieba.
2The list of words commonly used in general press conferences are manually selected from the text
corpus.
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between the two algorithms, it is not surprising that there are only ca. 22.3-25.9% common
keywords on average. Despite these differences in the selection of keywords, the final mea-
sures of media ideology are highly correlated across Taiwanese newspapers over time (corr =
0.78).
Next, to understand the context of each keyword in the lexicon, I study the neighboring
words around each keyword. Neighboring words are defined as all content words within
the same sentence (or the same headline) as a keyword1. On average, I include ca. 40 neigh-
boring words for each keyword. Taking context into consideration has several advantages.
First of all, it can help detect different perspectives on a topic. For instance, one of the most
commonly used words in the lexicon is “台獨” (Taiwan Independence), and the Chinese
government’s negative stance on Taiwan independence can be inferred from its neigh-
boring words, such as “抵制”(boycott), “危害”(endanger), “遏制”(containment), “阻
礙”(obstruction), “破壞”(damage), etc. Secondly, analyzing context helps avoid the confu-
sion from lexicon differences between the official language in Taiwan, Taiwanese Mandarin
(國語) and the official language in China, Putonhua (普通話). Although both languages
are classified as Mandarin, there are many “false friends”, i.e. words that sound or look sim-
ilar but with different meanings, such as小姐 (Miss in Taiwanese Mandarin vs. prostitute
in Putonhua), and it is easier to distinguish one from another if neighboring words are con-
sidered. Thirdly, it helps alleviate the negative effects of word segmentation errors on the
measure. Word segmentation is a complicated task and mistakes cannot be completely
avoided. For example, “台中國小” should be segmented as “台中/國小” (Taichung
Elementary School) but is wrongly interpreted as “台/中國/小” (Taiwan China small)
by jieba. Since “中國” (China) is a keyword in the lexicon, the mistake may be perceived
as a sign of similarity between a Taiwanese newspaper and TAO, and introduce a bias to
the measure. Nevertheless, when context is taken into account, the measure should not be
much affected because the neighboring words around an elementary school are very differ-
ent from the ones around China. Lastly, it helps eliminate ambiguities from homographs,
i.e. words with the same written form but different meanings, such as易 (easy vs. change)
1The pre-processing for a neighbor word is similar to the one for a keyword except that it only requires its
term frequency to be larger than 1
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and長 (long vs. elder). Since homographs tend to have different contexts, examining the
neighboring words around a homograph can help identify the word and solve the issue.
To formally analyze the context, I calculate three different measures for word associa-
tion. One of the most popular measures is Positive Pointwise Mutual Information (PPMI).
PPMI compares the actual joint distribution of a keyword and a neighboring word to the
joint distribution assuming independence of the keyword and the neighboring word. If
the neighboring word often appears with the keyword, PPMI will be positive and there is
so-called word co-occurrence. For example, suppose台獨 (Taiwan Independence, denoted
asK) has two neighboring words,台灣 (Taiwan, denoted asNa) and決不允許 (never
allow, denoted asNb) with comparable average joint probabilities in the TAO press confer-
ence transcripts: p(K,Na) = 0.000755 and p(K,Nb) = 0.000753.1 However, because台
灣 (Taiwan) is much more frequent than決不允許 (never allow) with average marginal
probabilities p(Na) = 0.025817 and p(Nb) = 0.000753, respectively,台灣 (Taiwan) is
expected to have a higher joint probability under the assumption of independence between
台獨 (Taiwan Independence) and台灣 (Taiwan). As a result, the measure of PPMI for台
灣 (Taiwan) is much lower than the one for決不允許 (never allow): PPMINa = 2.630
and PPMINb = 8.053.
Using PPMI helps mitigate at least three potential problems. Firstly, the number of news
stories included in the database is unbalanced between small newspapers and major news-
papers. Since PPMI uses probabilities in its measure, small newspapers are not deemed
less pro-China simply because of fewer news stories. Secondly, the number of news stories
grows over time in the database, and adopting PPMI lessens the concerns for intertemporal
comparison of media ideology. Lastly, PPMI performs better than raw frequency in terms
of the comparison across different types of text, such as press conference transcripts and
newspaper headlines.
In addition to PPMI, I also calculate two measures of word association as robustness
checks. The first measure is the popular t-test statistics, which is conceptually very similar
to PPMI. The null hypothesis of t-test is that a keyword and its neighboring word are in-
dependent. In this case, the t-test statistic should be zero. A higher t-test statistic indicates
1All the numbers in this paragraph are calculated by averaging the probabilities or PPMI in the monthly
TAO press conference transcripts from 2000 to 2014.
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greater likelihood of word association. Given the similarity between PPMI and t-test, the
two measures of word association are highly correlated across Taiwanese newspapers (corr
= 0.78), and the corresponding final measures of media ideology are highly correlated as
well (corr = 0.85). The other measure is the raw frequency of a keyword and its neighboring
word. Intuitively, when a neighboring word often appears with a keyword, the two words
are more likely to be associated. The word association measure based on raw frequency is
moderately correlated to the one based on PPMI across neighboring words for all keywords
over time (corr = 0.52), and the corresponding measures of media ideology are very highly
correlated (corr = 0.95).
Finally, I calculate several versions of similarity metrics to compare the patterns of key-
words and neighboring words between the Chinese government and each Taiwanese news-
paper. I first adopt the most common similarity metric, cosine similarity, which measures
the cosine of the angle between two vectors and ranges between 0 and 1 for positive vec-
tors. If a Taiwanese newspaper tends to use a keyword along with its neighboring words in
a similar fashion as the Chinese government does, then the cosine similarity with regard to
the keyword is high. For example, the Chinese government often uses the keyword台獨
(Taiwan Independence) with危險性 (risk),鐵桿 (iron poles, a metaphor that describes
someone who is hardcore and stubborn), and老鞋 (old shoes, a metaphor for being old-
fashioned), and the average PPMI for each neighboring word is 9.24, 8.05, 8.66, respec-
tively1. The last two neighboring words are common phrases in China but rarely used in
Taiwan, not to mention in the context of台獨 (Taiwan Independence). Nevertheless, the
most pro-China newspaper in Taiwan, theUnited Daily News (聯合報, UDN), also uses
these neighboring words with台獨 (Taiwan Independence) and the corresponding average
PPMI is 9.41, 7.87, and 14.30. On the contrary, the least pro-China newspaper in Taiwan,
theApple Daily (蘋果日報), never uses these words with台獨 (Taiwan Independence)
and PPMI is zero for the three words. Overall, the average cosine similarity regarding the
keyword台獨 (Taiwan Independence) is 0.389 for theUnited Daily News and 0.173 for the
1All PPMIs in this paragraph are calculated by averaging the PPMI from 2000 to 2014, if台 獨 (Taiwan
Independence) is selected as a keyword in the month.
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Apple Daily.1 The final measure of media ideology is the average of cosine similarity metrics
for all keywords in the lexicon.
In addition to cosine similarity, I also use Jaccard similarity and Dice similarity for com-
parison. The two measures are based on “the weighted number of overlapping features”
with different normalization factors (Jurafsky &Martin, 2000), and the final measures of
media ideology based on different similarity metrics are highly correlated for all newspapers
over time (corr = 0.75-0.77).
My measure of media ideology is novel in two aspects. First, it is one of the first objective
measures of media bias in Chinese. The existing literature primarily focuses on American
politics and most analysis tools were developed in English, with only a few exceptions. Qin,
Wu, and Strömberg (2016) collect the content of 117 urban newspapers in China from 1999
to 2010 and measure the degree of political control and/or commercial incentives based
on the coverage of 9 content categories, such as mentions of political leaders, citations of
official media outlets, reports on entertainment news, etc., and then apply principal com-
ponent analysis to consolidate the categories into a one-dimensional measure. Yuan (2016)
utilizes unsupervised learning to classify 21 newspapers in China into two groups based
on hierarchical clustering. The measure I use is different fromQin et al. (2016) and Yuan
(2016) in several aspects. Firstly, it captures the influence of the Chinese Communist Party
in Taiwan, not China. Since Taiwan is a democracy with freedom of speech, the major con-
cern is not direct media control by the Chinese government. In addition to the application
context, the measurement itself is distinct from the two papers as well. Qin et al. (2016)
consider only keywords to identify topics, while the measure in this paper takes both key-
words and the corresponding context into account. Yuan (2016) is completely data-driven
and relies on the quality of the input text, whereas the measure in this paper takes TAO
as a reference for pro-China ideology and is robust to several different keyword extraction
methods. The second novel aspect of the measure is that its ideological spectrum is based
on international politics, not on domestic political competition. That is, the measure does
not examine bias toward a certain domestic political party, such as a pro-Democratic or pro-
1The values of cosine similarity here are calculated by averaging the cosine similarity between a Taiwanese
newspaper and the Chinese government from 2000 to 2014, if台 獨 (Taiwan Independence) is selected as a
keyword in the month.
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Republican newspaper in the U.S.; instead, it analyzes the bias of newspapers in Taiwan
towards official Chinese issues and positions.
The rest of paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes data sources. Section 3.3 ex-
plains the construction of the lexicons of issues regarding cross-Strait relations and the Chi-
nese government’s stance on these issues. Section 3.4 discusses the context of keywords in
the lexicons. Sections 3.5 compares the language between TAO and each Taiwanese newspa-
per. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Press Conference Transcripts
The measure of media ideology requires a lexicon of Chinese ideology as a reference that
I can compare with each newspaper. I collect press conference transcripts of a Chinese gov-
ernment institution, Taiwan Affairs Office from its official website (http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/
xwfbh/index.htm). The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, or Taiwan Affairs
Office (TAO), is an administrative institution in charge of Taiwan affairs under the State
Council of China. According to its official website, the main functions of Taiwan Affairs
Office include “implementing and carrying out guidelines and policies related to Taiwan
stipulated by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council” and “taking charge of the
media and publicity work related to Taiwan and releasing news and information concern-
ing Taiwan affairs.” Since Taiwan Affairs Office is responsible for conducting and publiciz-
ing China’s policies towards Taiwan, I consider TAO a major official outlet of the Chinese
government and use transcripts of TAO press conferences to build monthly lexicons of
China’s ideology about Taiwan. The press conferences take place irregularly: from 2000
to 2017, there are 265 TAO press conferences in total, 162 months with press conferences,
and often one or two in each month. On average, I have 4,211 words each month to build a
lexicon.
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3.2.2 Newspaper Headlines
To measure media ideology, I collect newspaper headlines fromNews Knowledge Man-
agement System (NKMS) administered by the Library of Legislative Yuan in Taiwan. The
system consists of daily headlines of 34 newspapers since 1980; I study 12 of them that are
also included in the TEDS surveys. I choose to analyze headlines to measure media ide-
ology, not full news text, for three reasons. First, headlines are usually set by editors, not
reporters, and more likely to reveal a newspaper’s ideology. Second, readers tend to read
headlines more often than to read full texts of news, so headlines are more influential than
news content. Third, data availability and compilation difficulty impede full text analysis.
The enormity of data renders it impossible to collect themmanually. Instead, I write
Python programs to collect information on 18,383,058 headlines from 2000 to 2014, in-
cluding newspaper names, headlines, dates, pages, sections, and sometimes reporters and
regions. Following the literature (Gentzkow& Shapiro, 2010; Groseclose &Milyo, 2005), I
remove editorials and reviews for two reasons. First, the language used by editors and opin-
ion writers is usually sarcastic and difficult to tell its connotations with automatic text anal-
ysis. It can be that an editor uses many positive verbs to criticize “One China Policy”. Sec-
ond, news, editorials and reviews are utterly different from readers’ perspective. News is
supposed to be objective and truthful, while editorials and reviews are full of opinions and
judgments. While editorials and reviews may reveal the ideology of a newspaper more di-
rectly and efficiently, they are less likely to have an impact on readers’ thoughts and, in turn,
influence their national identities. Therefore, I decide to remove editorials and review in
the data set. Then, I write additional code to detect repetitions in the data set. If I request
a large amount of news, the NKMS system often responds with many duplicates, which
can seriously distort the result–it turns out that nearly 10% of the data are repetitions. In
the end, I collect 10,953,168 headlines. It is worth mentioning that the number of news sto-
ries from a newspaper in the NKMS system surges from 7.6 news stories per day in 2000
to 199.8 per day in 2014, suggesting that we need to be cautious about intertemporal analy-
sis: measures in earlier years are built on relatively small text corpora and may be less stable
compared to measures in later years. On average, there are 48,645 words per month per
newspaper.
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3.3 Chinese Ideology Lexicons
To measure the degree of pro-China for each Taiwanese newspaper, I first construct a refer-
ence for Chinese preference. The reference contains a list of keywords extracted from the
press conference transcripts of a Chinese government institution, the Taiwan Affairs Office
(TAO), and represents China’s policies regarding Taiwan. The following sections explain
the word segmentation procedure and the keyword extraction process.
3.3.1 Word Segmentation
The first major task in text analysis is word segmentation, the process of breaking written
text into words, the smallest meaningful units. Different from English, Chinese does not
have explicit word boundary markers and word segmentation is far more challenging. For
example, there are at least 6 possible word combinations for a short text of 4 characters,台
中國小, with quite different meanings:
台/中/國/小 (Taiwan / middle / country / small)
台/中/國小 (Taiwan / middle / elementary school)
台/中國/小 (Taiwan / China / small)
台中/國/小 (Taichung / country / small)
台中/國小 (Taichung / elementary school)
台中國/小 (Taichung Country / small)
Without proper word segmentation, text can be mistakenly interpreted and introduce
errors to the measure of media ideology. To solve the problem, I employ two popular meth-
ods for word segmentation. The first method is called Chinese Knowledge and Information
Processing (CKIP) and provided by the Institute of Information Science and the Institute
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of Linguistics of Academia Sinica1. CKIP is built upon linguistic analysis and large Chinese
text corpora, and capable of out-of-vocabulary word identification and part-of-speech tag-
ging; its recall, precision, and F score are ca. 93% - 97% (Ma & Chen, 2003). The second
method is a widely used Python package called jieba (Ren & Tian, 2017; Shao, Sennrich,
Webber, & Fancellu, 2017; Xiu, Lan, Wu, & Lang, 2017; Zhang, Zeng, Jin, Yan, & Geng,
2017). Jieba adopts omni-segmentation, which lists all possible word combinations and
“use dynamic programming to find the most probable combination based on word fre-
quency” 2. Nevertheless, since jieba is developed in simplified Chinese text corpora, it is
relatively weak in capturing Taiwan-related topics.3 For instance, jieba usually interprets台
中國小 as台/中國/小 (Taiwan / China / small), while CKIP recognizes台中 (Taichung)
as a city in Taiwan and correctly breaks the term into台中/國小 (Taichung / elementary
school). Another example is蔡英文 (Tsai Ing-wen), the president of Taiwan. While CKIP
knows her and identifies the term as a name, jieba mistakenly perceives the term as蔡/英
文 (Tsai / English) because the last two characters happen to be the Chinese translation for
“English”.4 Although CKIP is better at recognizing Taiwan-related topics, jieba is much
more efficient and capable of processing a large chunk of text in a short period of time.
Therefore, I adopt both methods and take jieba as a robustness check.
Figure 3.2 shows the percentage of common keywords between CKIP and jieba from
2000 to 2017. On average, 59.5% of the keywords in the monthly lexicons are identical be-
tween the two methods, suggesting that word segmentation indeed has an effect on key-
word selection. Nevertheless, the final measures of media ideology under the two methods
are very highly correlated across newspapers over time (corr = 0.95). Figure 3.3 displays the
difference in media ideology between CKIP and jieba for all 12 newspapers from 2000 to
2014, and the values almost always lie within -0.1 and +0.1.
1I implement the CKIP word segmentation through an api provided by https:// github.com/ jason2506/
ckip.py
2https://github.com/fxsjy/jieba
3I always convert text into simplified Chinese when applying jieba and translate back to traditional Chi-
nese to compare with Taiwanese newspapers. Jieba can execute word segmentation directly in traditional
Chinese as well, but its performance is much worse than simplified Chinese, especially in terms of part-of-
speech tagging. The conversion between simplified Chinese and traditional Chinese is implemented by a
program called OpenCC (https://github.com/BYVoid/OpenCC).
4In some rare cases, jieba performs better in name recognition. For example, the accuracy of word seg-
mentation for李維一 (Li Weiyi) is 69.8% by jieba, but only 9.5% by CKIP.
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Figure3.2:The percentage of common keywords between CKIP and jieba from 2000 to 2017.
Figure3.3:The difference in the final measures of media ideology under the two word segmentation methods,
CKIP and jieba, from 2000 to 2014.
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3.3.2 Keyword Extraction
Keyword extraction is implemented after word segmentation. I first remove words with less
than 5 occurrences in a month. The purpose of the keywords is to describe China’s major
policies about Taiwan, and words with low frequency are unlikely to serve the purpose. Sec-
ondly, I discard words with only one character because there are many possible meanings
for a single-character word and it is more informative to use words with two characters or
more. For example, a single character “中” can be interpreted as “middle”, “China”, and
“to hit”, and it is much clearer when one more character is considered: “中間” (middle),
“中國” (China), and “命中” (to make a hit). Then, I keep only content words, including
nouns, verbs, and adjectives.1 Content words contain information and are usually stressed
in speech, while function words, such as determiners and prepositions, exist for grammati-
cal reasons and are quite unlikely to characterize a policy. Finally, I manually remove words
widely used in general press conferences, such as reporters, but do not relate to China’s poli-
cies about Taiwan.
3.3.2.1 Term Frequency
Next, I select keywords from the processed text according two different algorithms. In the
first algorithm, I sort the word list by term frequency and pick the 30 most frequent words
each month2. If a content word is constantly used by the Chinese government and not com-
monly used in general press releases, then the word is likely to relate to some fundamental
policies of the Chinese government concerning Taiwan.
1I use the part-of-speech taggers that come with the word segmentation packages. For CKIP, I include
N (nouns), A (adjectives), Vi (intransitive verbs), Vt (transitive verbs), and FW (words in a foreign language),
where foreign words usually stand for abbreviated proper nouns in Chinese text, such as WTO (World Trade
Organization). On the other hand, for jieba, I include eng (words in a foreign language), j (abbreviated terms),
i (idioms), l (slang terms), n (nouns), nr (a person’s name), ns (place names), nt (institution name), nz (other
proper nouns), nrt (foreign translated names), v (verbs), vn (words that can act as verbs and nouns), a (adjec-
tives), an (words that can act as adjectives and nouns), t (adverbs about time), s (direction nouns), f (direction
verbs), and b (distinguishing adjectives).
2In the earlier months, TAO did not hold press conferences as often and the size of text corpus in these
months is too small to contain 30 words satisfying all the conditions mentioned in the last paragraph. As a
result, in these months, the number of keywords is less than 30.
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Table 3.1 lists the 20 most frequent keywords based on term frequency and CKIP word
segmentation in each presidency from 2000 to 20171. There were three presidencies and
two rotations of parties during the period, fromDemocratic Progressive Party (DPP, May
2000 - April 2008), Kuomintang (KMT,May 2008 - April 2016), to DPP (May 2016 till
now). KMT is considered more pro-China and has many contacts with the Chinese govern-
ment, while DPP often relates to Taiwan Independence and emphasizes the subjectivity of
Taiwan. Table 3.1 shows some consistency in China’s attitude towards Taiwan. For example,
“同胞” (compatriots), “發展” (development), and “合作” (cooperation) were constantly
used throughout the three presidencies. More importantly, Table 3.1 reflects the change in
China’s policies about Taiwan. During the DPP presidencies, “台獨” (Taiwan Indepen-
dence) was often brought up, while “協議” (agreement) and “經濟” (economy) were the
main topics when KMTwas in power. Table 3.2 displays the top 20 keywords based on
jieba word segmentation and demonstrates the same pattern.
Figure 3.4 further exhibits this transition in topics across presidencies. On the one hand,
Figure 3.4a shows a sharp drop in the use of “一個中國” (One China) and “台獨” (Taiwan
Independence) after KMTwon the presidency in 2008, and a rising trend after DPP re-
gained power in 2016. On the other hand, Figure 3.4b displays a steep rise in the frequency
of “經濟” (economy) and “協議” (agreement) in the KMT presidency, and a declining
trend after DPP returned to power.
To study the keywords more systematically, I use a Python package called gensim (Ře-
hůřek & Sojka, 2010) and apply an unsupervised topic model, Latent Dirichlet Allocation
(LDA) (Blei, Ng, & Jordan, 2003), to examine the topics among keywords over time. LDA
is a topic model that aims to discover the topics in a collection of unlabeled documents. It
represents each document as a mixture of topics, and each topic is a probability distribu-
1I only have data on Taiwanese newspapers from 2000 to 2014, so the measures of media ideology range
from 2000 to 2014 as well, despite that I also have data on TAO press conference transcripts up to date.
1The correct word is “李 維 一” (Li Weiyi), the name of the former spokesman of the Taiwan Affairs Of-
fice, but both jieba and CKIP wrongly segmented the term as “李維/一” (Li Wei / yi).
2Three Direct Links: shorthand for direct links of trade, mail, and air and shipping services across the
Taiwan Strait.
1The correct word is “安峰山” (An Fengshan), the name of the former spokesman of the Taiwan Affairs
Office, but both jieba and CKIP wrongly segmented the term as “安/峰山” (An / Fengshan).
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Table3.1:Keywords based on term frequency and CKIP word segmentation
DPP (2000.5 - 2008.4) KMT (2008.5 - 2016.4) DPP (2016.5 - 2017.12)
keyword translation keyword translation keyword translation
兩岸 cross-Strait 台灣 Taiwan 兩岸 cross-Strait
台灣 Taiwan 兩岸 cross-Strait 台灣 Taiwan
大陸 mainland 大陸 mainland 關係 relationship
同胞 compatriot 同胞 compatriot 大陸 mainland
中國 China 共同 common 共識 consensus
關係 relationship 合作 cooperation 政治 politics
李維 (一)1 LiWei(yi) 關係 relationship 中國 China
當局 authorities 雙方 both sides 同胞 compatriot
發展 development 協議 agreement 共同 common
現在 now 海峽 strait 台獨 Taiwan independence
實現 realization 發展 development 和平 peace
台商 Taiwanese businessmen 經濟 economy 基礎 foundation
台獨 Taiwan independence 和平 peace 發展 development
包機 charter flight 企業 enterprise 當局 authorities
合作 cooperation 目前 currently 大家 everyone
原則 principle 中國 China 交流 exchange
三通2 Three Links 范麗青 Fan Liqing 馬曉光 MaXiaoguang
張銘清 ZhangMingqing 論壇 forum 合作 cooperation
共識 consensus 交流 exchange 海峽 strait
企業 enterprise 一下 a bit 堅持 adhere to
(a)Political issues (b)Economic issues
Figure3.4:The word frequency of selected words in the TAO press conference transcripts from 2000 to 2017.
Note: Figure 3.4a displays the word frequency of “台獨” (Taiwan Independence) and “一個中國” (One
China), while Figure3.4b shows the frequency of “協議” (agreement) and “經濟” (economy).
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Table3.2:Keywords based on term frequency and jieba word segmentation
DPP (2000.5 - 2008.4) KMT (2008.5 - 2016.4) DPP (2016.5 - 2017.12)
keyword translation keyword translation keyword translation
台灣 Taiwan 台灣 Taiwan 台灣 Taiwan
大陸 mainland 大陸 mainland 兩岸關係 cross-Strait relations
交流 exchange 交流 exchange 大陸 mainland
兩岸關係 cross-Strait relations 兩岸關係 cross-Strait relations 和平 peace
中國 China 雙方 both sides 共識 consensus
台灣同胞 Taiwanese compatriot 同胞 compatriot 基礎 foundation
李維 (一) Li Wei(yi) 和平 peace 政治 politics
台灣當局 Taiwanese authorities 協議 agreement 中國 China
發佈會 press conference 經濟 economy 同胞 compatriot
台獨 Taiwan independence 協商 negotiation 交流 exchange
台商 Taiwanese businessmen 企業 enterprise 台獨 Taiwan independence
共識 consensus 大家 everyone 大家 everyone
包機 charter flight 民眾 people 原則 principle
原則 principle 國台辦 Taiwan Affairs Office 民眾 people
三通 Three Links 論壇 forum 台灣同胞 Taiwanese compatriot
大家 everyone 海峽兩岸 cross-Strait 馬曉光 MaXiaoguang
同胞 compatriot 居民 resident 國台辦 Taiwan Affairs Office
企業 enterprise 共識 consensus 評價 evaluation
協商 negotiation 范麗青 Fan Liqing (安)峰山1 (An) Fengshan
國台辦 Taiwan Affairs Office 中國 China 立場 position
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tion of words.1 In the context of this paper, a document is a composition of the keywords
from TAO press conference transcripts each month2, and there are 162 documents from
2000 to 2017. Each document consists of 20 topics with certain weights, and each topic is
represented by a number of keywords with certain probabilities. For example, a text of the
keywords from the TAO press conference transcripts in September 2000 is a document
composed of Topic 2 with weight 0.57 and Topic 8 with weight 0.43, and Topic 2 and Topic
8 are probability distributions of keywords (the top 10 keywords with the highest probabili-
ties are listed in Table 3.3).
Figure 3.6 displays the weight of each topic in the monthly press conference transcripts
over time. The colored points are topics with high weights consistently3, and it turns out
that these topics contain “台獨” (Taiwan Independence), “協議” (agreement), or “共識”
(consensus) in the top 10 keywords, respectively. The keywords in these topics are listed in
Table 3.3. Again, Figure 3.5 demonstrates the transition of China’s key policies regarding
Taiwan across presidencies in Taiwan. During the first DPP presidency, the Chinese govern-
ment concentrated on attacking “台獨” (Taiwan Independence) and defending the “一個
中國” (One China), whereas various forms of “協議” (agreement) became the focus when
KMTwas in power. After the Sunflower Student Movement took place in March 2014 and
DPP regained its power in 2016, “共識” (consensus), which refers to “九二共識” (The
1992 Consensus) and represents a new form of One China Policy, has been consistently
emphasized. Figure 3.6 displays the word frequency of the above keywords and exhibits a
similar trend.
3.3.2.2 TF-IDF
The second algorithm for keyword extraction is TF-IDF4, which stands for Term Frequency
and Inverse Document Frequency:
1The number of topics in each document is chosen by the user manually.
2The goal is to find out the clusters of keywords, so I filter out all other words that are not classified as
keywords in the TAO press conference transcripts.
3The selected topics contain weights higher than 0.3 for at least five months.
4TFIDF is implemented by a Python package called gensim (Řehůřek & Sojka, 2010).
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Figure3.5:The weights of selected topics in the LDAmodel from 2000 to 2017.
Note: Among the 20 topics in the LDAmodel, only topics with weights over 0.3 for at least 5 months are
presented in the graph.
Figure3.6:The frequency of “台獨” (Taiwan Independence), “協議” (agreement), and “九二共識” (the 1992
consensus) in the TAO press conference transcripts from 2000 to 2017.
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Table3.3:Keywords in the selected LDA topics from 2000 to 2017.
台獨 (Taiwan Independence) 協議 (Agreement) 共識 (Consensus)
topic keyword translation topic keyword translation topic keyword translation
0
台灣 Taiwan
11
兩岸 cross-Strait
8
兩岸 cross-Strait
兩岸 cross-Strait 台灣 Taiwan 台灣 Taiwan
大陸 mainland 大陸 mainland 關係 relationship
同胞 compatriot 范麗青 Fan Liqing 大陸 mainland
楊毅 Yang Yi 合作 cooperation 發展 development
關係 relationship 協議 agreement 和平 peace
合作 cooperation 企業 enterprise 安峰山 An Fengshan
台獨 Taiwan independence 經濟 economic 同胞 compatriot
政策 policy 台資 Taiwan-funded 交流 exchange
居民 resident 共同 common 共識 consensus
2
台灣 Taiwan
12
兩岸 cross-Strait
18
兩岸 cross-Strait
兩岸 cross-Strait 台灣 Taiwan 台灣 Taiwan
中國 China 大陸 mainland 馬曉光 MaXiaoguang
大陸 mainland 合作 cooperation 大陸 mainland
原則 principle 楊毅 Yang Yi 關係 relationship
張銘清 ZhangMingqing 協議 agreement 發展 development
當局 authorities 關係 relationship 同胞 compatriot
台獨 Taiwan independence 交流 exchange 中國 China
關係 relationship 發展 development 共識 consensus
陳水扁 Chen Shui-bian 同胞 compatriots 大家 everyone
10
台灣 Taiwan
兩岸 cross-Strait
大陸 mainland
同胞 compatriot
李維 (一) Li Wei(yi)
中國 China
發展 development
當局 authorities
台獨 Taiwan independence
關係 relationship
138
TFIDFi,t = Frequencyi,t × log2
D
Document Frequencyi
Frequencyi,t is the number of occurrences of word i in document t, where a document is
the text of all press conference transcripts in a month. Document Frequencyi is the number
of documents that contain word i, andD is the total number of documents. In total, there
are 162 documents (months) with TAO press conference transcripts from 2000 to 2017.
TF-IDF uses the inverse of document frequency as a weight to each word and extracts
words that are specific to a month but rare in other months. If a word appears in many
months, then it is unlikely to have a high TF-IDF score despite its high frequency. For ex-
ample, the average frequency of “原則” (principle) is comparable to “鮑威爾” (Powell,
which refers to the 65th United States Secretary of State, Colin Luther Powell): Frequency(原則
(principle)) = 5.48 and Frequency(鮑威爾 (Powell)) = 5.50. However, because “原
則” (principle) appears in most months (82.72%) and “鮑威爾” (Powell) only shows
up in 2 months (1.23%), the average TF-IDF score of “原則” (principle) is much lower:
TFIDF(原則 (principle)) = 0.0098 and TFIDF(鮑威爾 (Powell)) = 0.2173.
Table 3.4 shows the 20 most frequent keywords based on the TF-IDF algorithm and
CKIP word segmentation in each presidency from 2000 to 2017. The TF-IDF algorithm
is designed to select keywords related to popular topics in each month, such as “奧運會”
(Olympic Game) and “災區” (disaster area), not topics existing for years, such as “台獨”
(Taiwan Independence). There is no common word across the three presidencies in Table
3.4, whereas 40% of keywords based on the first algorithm are the same in the three presi-
dencies.
The two algorithms are complements to each other–the first one selects keywords repre-
senting essential issues that are relatively stable over time, while the second one chooses key-
words relating to issues that are very present in some months but not over longer time peri-
ods. Figure 3.7 displays the percentage of common keywords between the two algorithms
from 2000 to 2017. Given the discrepancy between the two algorithms, it is not surprising
that on average, only 22.3-25.9% of the keywords are identical between the two algorithms
each month.
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Table3.4:Keywords based on TFIDF and CKIP word segmentation
DPP (2000.5 - 2008.4) KMT (2008.5 - 2016.4) DPP (2016.5 - 2017.12)
keyword translation keyword translation keyword translation
李維 (一) Li Wei(yi) 范麗青 Fan Liqing 馬曉光 MaXiaoguang
包機 charter flight 楊毅 Yang Yi 安峰山 An Fengshan
張銘清 ZhangMingqing ECFA ECFA 青年 youth
三通 Three Links 論壇 forum 李明哲 LeeMing-che
春節 Chinese New Year 協議 agreement 停擺 stop
陳水扁 Chen Shui-bian 馬曉光 MaXiaoguang 詐騙 fraud
農業 agriculture 赴台 go to Taiwan (蔡)英文 (Tsai) Ing-wen
航空 aviation 峰會 summit 受害人 victim
熊貓 panda 貨幣 currency 答卷 answer
祖國 motherland 台資 Taiwan-funded 縣市 county and city
當局 authorities 平潭 Pingtan 港獨 Hong Kong independence
奧運會 Olympic Game 互設 mutual establishment 年度 annual
WTO WTO 同比 year-on-year (yoy) 台企 Taiwanese companies
奧運 Olympics 清算 clearing 世衛 WHO
農民 farmer 青年 youth 一帶 One Belt (OneWay)
汪辜 Wang-Koo 災區 disaster area WHA WHA
直航 direct flight 影片 video 大會 conference
公投 referendum 航班 flight 衛生 health
水果 fruit 自由行 self-guided travel 電信 telecommunications
選舉 election 商簽 business visa 巴拿馬 Panama
Figure3.7:The percentage of common keywords between the algorithm based on word frequency and the
algorithm based on TF-IDF from 2000 to 2017.
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Figure 3.8 displays the difference in media ideology under the two algorithms for all 12
newspapers from 2000 to 2014. The media ideology based on the TF-IDF algorithm is sig-
nificantly lower (p-value < 2.2e−16), but the final measures of media ideology under the
two algorithms are highly correlated across newspapers over time (corr = 0.78).
Figure3.8:The difference in the final measures of media ideology between the algorithm based on term fre-
quency and the algorithm based on TF-IDF from 2000 to 2014.
3.4 The Context of Keywords
To study the context of each keyword in the lexicon, I investigate the neighboring words
around each keyword. A neighboring word is defined as a content word comprising at least
two characters, existing within the same sentence (or the same headline) as a keyword, and
appearing more than once in a month. Figure 3.9 shows the number of neighboring words
per keyword from 2000 to 2017. On average, there are ca. 44.21 neighboring words for each
keyword.
There are several advantages to consider the context of keywords. First, the perspective
on a topic can be inferred from the context. For instance, one of the most commonly used
words in the lexicon is “台獨” (Taiwan Independence). Despite its high frequency, “台獨”
(Taiwan Independence) is by no means advocated by the Chinese government. Through
examining the neighboring words of “台獨” (Taiwan Independence) such as “犯罪行為”
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Figure3.9:The number of neighboring words per keyword from 2000 to 2017.
(criminal behavior), “反對” (oppose), and “拋棄” (abandon), it is clear that the Chinese
government holds a negative view on “台獨” (Taiwan Independence).
Figure 3.10 shows the average sentiment scores of the neighboring words for each key-
word from 2000 to 2017. I first useGoogle Translate1 to translate each neighboring word
to English. Then, I use the most popular Python package in Natural Language Process-
ing, NLTK, to assign a sentiment score to each translated word, which ranges from -1 to
+1 (Hutto &Gilbert, 2014). If a word is given a higher sentiment score, then the word is
considered more positive. The average sentiment score for all neighboring words across
different keywords over time is 0.028. Suppose a positive sentiment score is classified as
“Positive”, a negative sentiment score is considered “Negative”, and a zero sentiment score
is labeled as “Neutral”. Overall, there are 86.02% neutral words, 3.32% negative words, and
10.66% positive words. In Figure 3.10, the highlighted green dots represent the average senti-
ment scores of neighboring words for the keyword “台獨” (Taiwan Independence), which
are mostly below the red line, the average sentiment scores of the neighboring words for all
keywords. The pattern further corroborates the point that the Chinese government tends
to use negative neighboring words around the keyword “台獨” (Taiwan Independence)
1The translation is implemented by a Python package called googletrans (https:// github.com/ ssut/ py-
googletrans).
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and does not support “台獨” (Taiwan Independence). Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 display top
20 keywords with the most positive and negative neighboring words, respectively.
Figure3.10:The average sentiment scores of neighboring words per keyword from 2000 to 2017.
Note: The red line denotes the average sentiment scores of neighboring words for all keywords from 2000 to
2017, while the green dots stand for the average sentiment scores of neighboring words for the keyword “台
獨” (Taiwan Independence).
Secondly, analyzing context helps avoid the confusion from lexicon differences between
the official language in Taiwan, Taiwanese Mandarin (國語) and the official language in
China, Putonhua (普通話). Although both languages are classified as Mandarin, there
are many “false friends”, i.e. words that sound or look similar but with different meanings,
such as “小姐” (Miss in Taiwanese Mandarin vs. prostitute in Putonhua), and it is easier to
distinguish one from another if neighboring words are considered. Thirdly, it helps allevi-
ate the negative effects of word segmentation errors on the measure. Word segmentation is
a complicated task and mistakes cannot be completely avoided. For example, “台中國小”
should be segmented as “台中/國小” (Taichung Elementary School) but is wrongly inter-
preted as “台/中國/小” (Taiwan China small) by jieba. Since “中國” (China) is a keyword
in the lexicon, the mistake may be perceived as a sign of similarity between a Taiwanese
newspaper and TAO, and introduce a bias to the measure. Nevertheless, when context
is taken into account, the measure should not be much affected because the neighboring
words around an elementary school are very different from the ones around China. Lastly,
it helps eliminate ambiguities from homographs, i.e. words with the same written form but
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Table3.5:Top 20 positive keywords by the average sentiment scores of neighboring words
keyword translation keyword score neighbor score
特事 special matter 0.4019 0.4019
民共 DPP and CCP 0.4019 0.3673
三句話 three sentences 0.0516 0.306967
獎牌 medals 0 0.29295
愛國主義者 patriots 0 0.287433
習蕭會 Xi-Xiao meeting 0 0.2787
吉祥鳥 lucky bird 0.4215 0.26455
吉祥 auspicious 0 0.26455
自豪 pride 0.34 0.263225
降格 degrade 0 0.24695
依法治國 rule by law 0 0.239267
撈取 gain 0.5267 0.2294
外貌 appearance 0 0.2268
相向 face-to-face 0 0.2202
飛航點 flight point 0 0.212133
體育健兒 sportsman 0 0.208095
倍加 double 0 0.2027
健兒 athlete 0 0.190382
成績 achievement 0 0.186682
經貿關係 economic and trade relations 0 0.185022
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Table3.6:Top 20 negative keywords by the average sentiment scores of neighboring words
keyword translation keyword score neighbor score
凶手 murderer -0.6808 -0.7184
嚴懲 punish severely -0.7184 -0.6808
愚蠢 silly 0.0258 -0.2793
晚集 evening market 0 -0.267933
註定 doomed -0.6369 -0.243941
失敗 failure -0.5106 -0.221386
祭典 festival 0.4939 -0.2202
困惑 confused -0.3182 -0.20095
極端分子 extremist 0 -0.199437
最低 lowest -0.3818 -0.191286
一己之私 selfishness -0.4019 -0.188486
身心 body and mind 0 -0.182139
何在 where 0 -0.1806
遣送回 deportation 0 -0.172983
很小 very small 0 -0.171029
堅強意志 strong will 0.5106 -0.166767
台灣籍 Taiwanese 0 -0.166356
地步 extent 0 -0.165854
金剛 King Kong 0 -0.16495
交代 confess 0 -0.1629
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different meanings, such as易 (easy vs. change) and長 (long vs. elder). Since homographs
tend to have different contexts, examining the neighboring words around a homograph can
help identify the word and solve the issue.
3.4.1 Positive PointwiseMutual Information (PPMI)
To systematically examine the context of each keyword, I first calculate one of the most
popular measures on word association, Positive Pointwise Mutual Information (PPMI):
PPMIi,j = max
{
log2
p(i, j)
p(i)p(j) , 0
}
PPMIi = (PPMIi,1,PPMIi,2, . . . ,PPMIi,J)
PPMI compares p(i, j), the actual joint distribution of keyword i and neighboring word
j, to p(i) × p(j), the joint distribution under the assumption that keyword i and neigh-
boring word j are independent from each other. If neighboring word j often appears with
keyword i, PPMI will be positive and it is called word co-occurrence. Table 3.7 displays
the top 25 neighboring words of keyword “台獨” (Taiwan Independence) along with the
average probabilities and PPMI in the TAO press conference transcripts.1 Take two neigh-
boring words, “台灣” (Taiwan) and “決不允許” (never allow) as an example. The two
neighboring words have comparable average joint probabilities in the TAO press confer-
ence transcripts, but “台灣” (Taiwan) has a much higher average marginal probability and
expected joint probability with “台獨” (Taiwan Independence) than “決不允許” (never
allow) does. As a result, the measure of PPMI for “台灣” (Taiwan) is much lower than the
one for “決不允許” (never allow).
Using PPMI helps mitigate several potential problems. Firstly, the number of news sto-
ries included in the database is unbalanced between small newspapers and major newspa-
pers. As a result, major newspapers have much larger text corpora than small newspapers.
1All the values are the average of monthly probabilities or PPMI from 2000 to 2014.
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Table3.7:Top 25 neighboring words for keyword “台獨” (Taiwan Independence) in the TAO press confer-
ence transcripts
j translation prob(i,j) prob(j) PPMI(i,j)
個別 individual 0.001881215 0.00268745 7.024973407
分裂主義 separatism 0.001698754 0.001698754 7.464341533
鐵桿 hardcore 0.001688316 0.001688316 8.045384248
分裂 split 0.001608869 0.002545965 7.383177579
主義 doctrine 0.001549587 0.00464876 6.011972642
黨員 party members 0.001147734 0.003730134 5.897535781
犯罪行為 criminal behavior 0.001132503 0.002265006 6.464341533
個別人 Individuals 0.001126071 0.001126071 7.474044311
不可動搖 unshakeable 0.001018849 0.001018849 8.616916363
活動 activity 0.001017438 0.002376222 6.741321055
言行 words and deeds 0.001011893 0.001011893 6.924268685
陳水扁 Chen Shui-bian 0.000987658 0.004620135 5.512937593
台聯黨 Taiwan Solidarity Union 0.00094436 0.002833081 6.005567734
不斷 constantly 0.000925497 0.001388246 6.405058015
民進黨 DPP 0.000898096 0.003590558 6.130260268
黨綱 party program 0.000849892 0.000849892 7.963991174
分子 activists 0.000832075 0.000901085 8.059182288
反對 oppose 0.000816797 0.001600096 7.102743516
法律依據 legal basis 0.000810701 0.000810701 7.361651405
公開 public 0.000795441 0.000795441 7.857236131
拋棄 abandon 0.000781514 0.000781514 7.575121168
本質 essence 0.000757406 0.000757406 7.452110141
依據 in accordance with 0.000755715 0.000944644 7.141051248
台灣 Taiwan 0.000754512 0.025816816 2.630092519
決不允許 never allow 0.000753012 0.000753012 8.053111336
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If I use word frequency to measure media ideology, then small newspapers are deemed less
pro-China simply because of fewer news stories. Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12 display the num-
ber of news stories and text corpus size for each newspaper from 2000 to 2014, respectively.
For example, 10,621.14 news stories from theUnited Daily News are included each month,
which is 8.34 times larger than the number of news stories from theKeng Sheng Daily
News. Similarly, the average text corpus size of theKeng Sheng Daily News is 12,341.78
words each month, which is less than 10% of the corpus size of theUnited Daily News.
Using PPMI lessens the influence since it uses probabilities instead of raw frequency. Sec-
ondly, the number of news stories from a newspaper grows over time in the database. In
2000, the average number of stories is 293.55 for each newspaper in a month, but the num-
ber surges to 6050.35 in 2014. Using PPMI reduces the concerns for intertemporal compari-
son of media ideology.
Figure3.11:The number of news stories for each newspaper over time.
Figure 3.13 displays the average word association statistics per keyword for each newspa-
per over time, where the legend is based on the total number of words ranging from 377 to
214,949 words for a newspaper in a month. Figure 3.13a demonstrates that newspapers with
larger total number of words tend to have higher raw frequencies, and the total number of
words is positively correlated to raw frequencies across newspapers over time (corr = 0.43).
However, this pattern does not exist in Figure 3.13b. Newspapers with small corpus size can
have high values of PPMI, and the total number of words is not correlated to PPMI across
newspapers over time (cor = 0.09).
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Figure3.12:The text corpus size for each newspaper and TAO over time.
Lastly, PPMI performs better than raw frequency in terms of the comparison across dif-
ferent types of text, such as press conference transcripts and newspaper headlines. Press con-
ference transcripts and newspapers headlines are utterly different types of text. Press confer-
ences transcripts document complete conversations between a spokesperson and reporters,
while newspaper headlines summarize news stories and convey information with much
shorter texts. It is hard to justify the comparison between press conference transcripts and
newspaper headlines, but PPMI is more comparable across different types of texts than
word frequency.
3.4.2 t-test
In addition to PPMI, I also calculate another popular measure, t-test, defined as follows
(Curran, 2003; Jurafsky &Martin, 2000):
t-testi,j =
p(i, j)− p(i)p(j)√
p(i)p(j)
t-testi = (t-testi,1, t-testi,2, . . . , t-testi,J)
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(a)Raw Frequency
(b)PPMI
(c)t-test
Figure3.13:The average word association statistics per keyword across Taiwanese newspapers over time.
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Similar to PPMI, the t-test statistic compares the actual joint distribution of keyword i
and its neighboring word j, p(i, j), to the expected joint distribution assuming keyword i
and neighboring word j are independent, p(i)p(j), and then normalizes the difference by
the standard deviation,
√
p(i)p(j). A higher t-test statistic indicates greater likelihood of
word association between keyword i and neighboring word j. Given that the concept is
quite comparable between PPMI and t-test, the two measures are highly correlated across
neighboring words for all keywords in the lexicon among Taiwanese newspapers and TAO
press conference transcripts over time (corr = 0.78). Figure 3.13c displays the average log
value of t-test statistic per keyword for each newspaper over time. Likewise, the t-test statis-
tic is based on probabilities and does not suffer from the unbalanced text corpus problem.
Newspapers with relatively small text corpora can have high t-test statistics as well.
Figure 3.14 displays the difference between the final measure of media ideology based on
the t-test association measure and the one based on PPMI across all Taiwanese newspapers
from 2000 to 2014. On average, the measure of media ideology based on the t-test statistic
is lower than the one based on PPMI. Nevertheless, the two measures are highly correlated
across newspapers over time as well (corr = 0.85).
Figure3.14:The difference in the final measures of media ideology between the two word association mea-
sures, t-test and PPMI, from 2000 to 2014.
151
3.4.3 Raw Frequency
As a robustness check, I calculate the word association measure, frequencyi,j, the count of
keyword i and its neighboring word j at the same time. Intuitively, when a neighboring
word often appears with a keyword, the two words are more likely to be associated. The
word association measure based on raw frequency is moderately correlated to the one based
on PPMI across neighboring words for all keywords among Taiwanese newspapers and
TAO press conference transcripts over time (corr = 0.52).
Figure3.15:The difference between the measures of media ideology based on the two word association mea-
sures, raw frequency and PPMI, from 2000 to 2014.
Figure 3.15 displays the difference between the final measure of media ideology based on
raw frequency and the one based on PPMI across all Taiwanese newspapers from 2000 to
2014. On average, the measure of media ideology based on raw frequency is higher than the
one based on PPMI, but the two measures are very highly correlated across newspapers over
time (corr = 0.95).
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3.5 Language Comparison
3.5.1 Cosine Similarity
To compare the patterns of keywords and neighboring words between the Chinese govern-
ment and each Taiwanese newspaper, I first calculate the most popular similarity metric,
cosine similarity, defined as follows:
vi,k ∈
{
PPMIi,k, t− testi,k, frequencyi,k
}
cos (θi,k) =
vi,kvi,TAO
‖vi,k‖‖vi,TAO‖
MIk =
1
I
∑
i∈I
cos (θi,k)
The cosine similarity metric measures the angle θi,k between the vector of word associ-
ation measures regarding keyword i, such as PPMIi,k, for newspaper k and the vector for
the TAO. The cosine similarity compares the directions of the two vectors and does not
discriminate against vectors with different levels of frequencies.
If newspaper k uses keyword iwith its neighboring words in a similar pattern as the Tai-
wan Affairs Office does, then the cosine similarity regarding keyword i is high. Given that
raw frequency and PPMI values are non-negative, the corresponding cosine similarity val-
ues always lie between 0 and 1.
Table3.8:Three neighbors of the keyword ”台獨” (Taiwan Independence) and the corresponding average
PPMI values for the TAO and four major Taiwanese newspapers.
neighbor translation TAO United Daily News China Times Liberty Times Apple Daily
危險性 risk 9.24 9.41 0.00 0 0
鐵桿 iron poles 8.05 7.87 7.62 0 0
老鞋 old shoes 8.66 14.30 12.85 0 0
Table 3.8 illustrates an example with the keyword “台獨” (Taiwan Independence) and
three neighboring words, “危險性” (risk), “鐵桿” (iron poles), and “老鞋” (old shoes). In
153
addition to its literal meaning, “鐵桿” (iron poles) can be used as a metaphor to describe
someone who is hardcore and stubborn. The connotation is widely used in China, but
rarely used in Taiwan. “老鞋” (old shoes) is a specific metaphor that was invented by the
Chinese government to criticize “台獨” (Taiwan Independence) as being old-fashioned and
leading to a dead end. Despite that the two words are not common phrases in Taiwan and
almost never used with “台獨”, the most pro-China newspapers, theUnited Daily News
(聯合報, UDN) and the China Times (中國時報), also use these neighboring words with
“台獨” (Taiwan Independence) in the headlines and the corresponding PPMI measures are
positive. On the contrary, the least pro-China newspapers, theApple Daily (蘋果日報)
and the Liberty Times (自由時報), never use these words with “台獨” (Taiwan Indepen-
dence) and the PPMI measures are all zeros for the three words.
Figure3.16:The PPMI measures related to the keyword “台獨” (Taiwan Independence) and all of its neigh-
boring words from 2000 to 2014.
Figure 3.16 shows the PPMI measures related to the keyword “台獨” (Taiwan Indepen-
dence) and all of its neighboring words for the TAO and 12 Taiwanese newspapers over
time. Since the neighboring words are chosen from the TAO press conference transcripts, it
is not surprising that the TAO PPMI measures are constantly higher than the measures of
Taiwanese newspapers. Figure 3.16 also demonstrates that the most pro-China newspapers,
theUnited Daily News (聯合報, UDN) and the China Times (中國時報), have relatively
higher PPMI measures compared to other Taiwanese newspapers over time.
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Figure3.17:The cosine similarity measures related to the keyword “台獨” (Taiwan Independence) from 2000
to 2014.
Figure 3.17 displays the cosine similarity measures regarding the keyword “台獨” (Tai-
wan Independence) over time. The cosine similarity measures of the most pro-China news-
papers, theUnited Daily News (聯合報, UDN) and the China Times (中國時報), almost
always stay above the average cosine similarity measures for all Taiwanese newspapers, while
the least pro-China newspapers, theApple Daily (蘋果日報) and the Liberty Times (自由
時報), have below-the-average cosine similarity measures over time.
Figure3.18:The PPMI measures related to the keyword “大陸” (mainland) and all of its neighboring words
from 2000 to 2014.
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Figure3.19:The cosine similarity measures related to the keyword “大陸” (mainland) from 2000 to 2014.
Figure 3.18 and Figure 3.19 illustrate another example of the keyword “大陸” (mainland).
There are several names of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Taiwan, such as “中
國” (China), “大陸” (mainland, or continent), “內地” (inland), and “祖國” (motherland),
and they contain different connotations. If one uses “中國” (China) to describe a piece of
news about the PRC but not about Taiwan, this implies that the newspaper does not regard
Taiwan as part of China. Alternatively, if a newspaper uses “大陸” (mainland, or conti-
nent), then it does not exclude Taiwan from China because mainland and Taiwan can both
be parts of China.1 Figure 3.18 displays the PPMI measures related to the keyword “大陸”
(mainland, or continent) and its neighboring words over time. The PPMI measures for the
most pro-China newspapers, theUnited Daily News (聯合報, UDN) and the China Times
(中國時報), are always closer to the TAO than the ones for the least pro-China newspa-
pers, theApple Daily (蘋果日報) and the Liberty Times (自由時報). Furthermore, Figure
3.19 shows that the cosine similarity measures regarding the keyword “大陸” (mainland, or
continent) for the two least pro-China newspapers are constantly below the average mea-
sures across all newspapers, whereas the two most pro-China newspapers are always above
the average measures, suggesting that pro-China newspapers tend to use “大陸” (mainland,
or continent) in a similar fashion as the TAO does.
1If a newspaper calls the PRC “內地” (inland) or “祖國” (motherland), then it assumes Taiwan is part of
China. However, they are rarely used in newspaper headlines and thus not presented here.
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The final measure of media ideology is the average cosine similarity metrics for all key-
words in the lexicon. If the word association measure is based on PPMI or frequency (non-
negative by construction), then the final measure of media ideology is between 0 and 1. A
higher value indicates more similar use of the language between a Taiwanese newspaper and
the Chinese government. Following the hypothesis, this implies that the Taiwanese news-
paper adopts a closer stance to the Chinese government. Figure 3.20 displays the measures
of media ideology based on the cosine similarity from 2000 to 20141, where the highlighted
dots refer to the four largest newspapers, theUnited Daily News (聯合報, UDN), the
China Times (中國時報), theApple Daily (蘋果日報) and the Liberty Times (自由時
報), and the red line indicates the average measures of media ideology of the 12 newspapers.
In line with expectations, the media ideology measures of the allegedly most pro-China Tai-
wanese newspapers, theUnited Daily News (聯合報, UDN) and the China Times (中國
時報), are almost always above the average red line and much higher than media ideology
measures of the presumably least pro-China Taiwanese newspapers, theApple Daily (蘋果
日報) and the Liberty Times (自由時報).
Figure3.20:The final measures of media ideology based on the cosine similarity from 2000 to 2014.
1The measure is based on the PPMI word association metric across the two word segmentation methods,
CKIP and jieba, and across the two keyword extraction algorithms based on word frequency and TF-IDF.
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Table3.9:Summary Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
United.Daily.News 133 0.267 0.074 0.056 0.417
Economic.Daily.News 133 0.219 0.076 0.010 0.343
Commercial.Times 133 0.216 0.072 0.017 0.343
Youth.Daily.News 133 0.203 0.078 0.018 0.330
China.Times 133 0.203 0.075 0.068 0.367
China.Daily 119 0.147 0.061 0.012 0.352
United.Evening.News 133 0.144 0.065 0.000 0.270
Commons.Daily 133 0.136 0.050 0.017 0.334
Taiwan.Times 133 0.131 0.051 0.016 0.251
Liberty.Times 133 0.121 0.042 0.030 0.295
Keng.Sheng.Daily.News 119 0.092 0.077 0.000 0.342
Apple.Daily 111 0.079 0.031 0.003 0.162
3.5.2 Jaccard Similarity
In addition to the cosine similarity, I also calculate the Jaccard similarity (Grefenstette, 1994;
Jurafsky &Martin, 2000) defined as follows:
vi,j,k ∈
{
PPMIi,j,k, t-testi,j,k, frequencyi,j,k
}
Jaccardi,k =
∑
j∈J min
{
vi,j,k, vi,j,TAO
}∑
j∈J max
{
vi,j,k, vi,j,TAO
}
MIk =
1
I
∑
i∈I
Jaccardi,k
The Jaccard similarity metric calculates the weighted number of shared attributes (in-
tersection) regarding the use of keyword i between newspaper k and the TAO, where the
weight is the values of word association between keyword i and its neighboring words, such
as PPMI. Then, the metric normalizes the intersection by the set of all attributes (union)
regarding keyword i between newspaper k and the TAO, weighted by the values of word
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association regarding keyword i. If newspaper k has more similar attributes about keyword
i to the TAO, the Jaccard similarity measure is higher and newspaper k is considered more
pro-China regarding keyword i. Figure 3.21 displays the difference between the cosine simi-
larity and the Jaccard similarity across all keywords and all newspapers over time, using the
PPMI word association measure. The values of Jaccard similarity are always lower than the
ones of cosine similarity, but the two are very highly correlated using the PPMI word asso-
ciation measure (corr = 0.96) and moderately correlated across different word association
metrics (corr = 0.64).
Figure3.21:The difference between the two similarity metrics, cosine and Jaccard, across all keywords from
2000 to 2014.
The final measure of media ideology is the average Jaccard similarity metric for all key-
words in the lexicon. Figure 3.22 displays the final measure of media ideology based on the
Jaccard similarity over time. Consistent with the measures of media ideology based on the
cosine similarity, the two most pro-China newspapers, theUnited Daily News (聯合報,
UDN) and the China Times (中國時報), are always higher in the values of Jaccard-based
media ideology than the least pro-China Taiwanese newspapers, theApple Daily (蘋果日
報) and the Liberty Times (自由時報). Figure 3.23 shows the difference between the mea-
sures of media ideology based on the Jaccard similarity and the cosine similarity over time.
On average, the Jaccard-based measure of media ideology is lower than the cosine-based
one, but the measures of media ideology based on the two similarity metrics are highly cor-
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related across different word segmentation methods, keyword extraction algorithms, and
word association metrics for all newspapers over time (corr = 0.77).
Figure3.22:The final measures of media ideology based on the Jaccard similarity from 2000 to 2014.
Figure3.23:The difference between the measures of media ideology based on the two similarity metrics, cosine
and Jaccard, from 2000 to 2014.
3.5.3 Dice Similarity
The Dice measure is similar to the Jaccard measure and defined as follows(Curran, 2003;
Jurafsky &Martin, 2000):
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vi,j,k ∈
{
PPMIi,j,k, t-testi,j,k, frequencyi,j,k
}
Dicei,k =
∑
j∈J min
{
vi,j,k, vi,j,TAO
}∑
j∈J
1
2
{
vi,j,k + vi,j,TAO
}
MIk =
1
I
∑
i∈I
Dicei,k
The formula of the Dice measure is the same as the one of the Jaccard measure except
that the normalization factor in the denominator is the average of the weighted number of
the attributes regarding keyword i for both newspaper k and the TAO. The interpretation
of the Dice similarity is the same as the ones of the cosine similarity and the Jaccard simi-
larity. The Dice similarity ranges between 0 and 1 for the PPMI word association measure,
and a higher value of the Dice similarity represents a closer stance to the Chinese govern-
ment. Figure 3.24 displays the difference between the cosine similarity and the Dice simi-
larity across all keywords and all newspapers over time, using the PPMI word association
measure. Similar to the Jaccard similarity, the values of Dice similarity are lower than the
ones of cosine similarity, but the two are very highly correlated using the PPMI word asso-
ciation measure (corr = 0.97). However, the Dice similarity and the cosine similarity only
have a low correlation across different word association metrics (corr = 0.34). After remov-
ing 0.05% outliers, the two measures of similarity become moderately correlated (corr =
0.68).
The final measure of media ideology is the average Dice similarity metric for all keywords
in the lexicon. Figure 3.25 displays the final measure of media ideology based on the Dice
similarity over time. The pattern is similar to the cosine similarity and the Jaccard similarity.
Figure 3.26 shows the difference between the measures of media ideology based on the Dice
similarity and the cosine similarity over time. On average, the Dice-based measure of media
ideology is lower than the cosine-based one, but the two similarity metrics are highly cor-
related across different word segmentation methods, keyword extraction algorithms, and
word association metrics for all newspapers over time (corr = 0.75).
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Figure3.24:The difference between the two similarity metrics, cosine and Dice, across all keywords from 2000
to 2014.
Figure3.25:The final measure of media ideology based on the Dice similarity from 2000 to 2014.
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Figure3.26:The difference between the measures of media ideology based on the two similarity metrics, cosine
and Dice, from 2000 to 2014.
Note: In the graph, two outliers are removed. The dice measure of the two observations are -2.63 and -2.64,
respectively. The average value of dice measure is 0.06, and the standard deviation is 0.06.
3.6 Conclusion andDiscussion
This chapter discusses the construction of my media ideology measure in the first chapter,
with details in word segmentation methods, keyword extraction algorithms, word associa-
tion measures, and similarity metrics. Conceptually, my measure of media ideology com-
pares the use of language in Taiwanese newspapers and in press conference transcripts of
the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), the official Chinese government institution in charge of
policies related to Taiwan. Based on the comparison, my measure evaluates how closely
each Taiwanese newspaper aligns with TAO. If a Taiwanese newspaper shares similar views
with TAO, then it is assigned a high score of my measure and considered more pro-China.
The first task of my measure is to find keywords to characterize the most pro-China
stance represented by TAO. The task begins with word segmentation, which divides a piece
of text into the smallest meaningful units–words. I adopt two different tools to implement
word segmentation, and 59.5% of the keywords in the monthly lexicons are identical be-
tween the two tools. Despite moderate overlap of keywords using the two tools, the val-
ues of my media ideology measure are very highly correlated across newspapers over time
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(corr = 0.95). After implementing word segmentation, I adopt two different algorithms
to extract keywords from the TAO press conference transcripts. The two algorithms select
keywords based on distinctive ideas: The former chooses the most frequent keywords that
illustrate fundamental enduring cross-Strait issues, while the latter selects keywords about
issues that are very present in some months but not over longer time periods. Neverthe-
less, although the two algorithms are based on quite different ideas and there are only ca.
22.3-25.9% common keywords, the final values of my media ideology measure are highly
correlated across Taiwanese newspapers over time (corr = 0.78).
One important feature of my measure is the consideration of keyword context, which
helps detect different views on a topic, avoids misunderstandings from the cross-Strait lex-
icon differences, mitigates the negative influence of word segmentation errors, and mini-
mizes ambiguities from homographs. To understand the context of each keyword in the
monthly lexicons, I examine the neighboring words around each keyword and use three
different word association statistics to assess the relationship between each keyword and its
neighboring words. The three statistics include PPMI, t-test, and raw frequency, and their
values are higher if a neighboring word is more likely to appear with a keyword. The results
from Section 3.4 show that the three word association statistics are moderately correlated
across neighboring words for all keywords over time (corr = 0.52-0.78), and the correspond-
ing values of my measure of media ideology are highly correlated as well (corr = 0.85-0.95).
After extracting keywords to characterize the most pro-China stance and studying the
context of each keyword, I calculate three different similarity metrics to compare the use of
language between each Taiwanese newspaper and TAO and evaluate how pro-China each
Taiwanese newspaper is. The three similarity metrics are the cosine similarity, Jaccard simi-
larity, and Dice similarity, and if the value of a similarity metric is higher, it suggests that a
Taiwanese newspaper is more similar to TAO. Section 3.5 demonstrates that the values of
my measure of media ideology based on different similarity metrics are highly correlated for
all newspapers over time (corr = 0.75-0.77).
It is worth mentioning that my measure compares TAO press conference transcripts in
simplified Chinese with Taiwanese newspapers in traditional Chinese, which generates two
types of errors. First, simplified Chinese is not directly comparable to traditional Chinese
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and the comparison relies on a conversion tool called Open Chinese Convert (OpenCC)1.
Sometimes it can produce unexpected errors because many different words in traditional
Chinese map to a single word in simplified Chinese (and that’s why it is called “simplified”).
For example, “范” in simplified Chinese can be converted to “範” (model) or “范” (Fan,
a family name). “范丽青” (Fan Liqing in simplified Chinese), the TAO spokesperson, is
often wrongly converted into “範麗青” (Model Liqing in traditional Chinese). I have man-
ually dealt with some common errors, including ‘范丽青” (Fan Liqing), but there may be
other undetected mistakes and the resulting measure of media ideology can be downward
biased.
Second, there are fundamental differences in the nature between the two types of text,
press conference transcripts and newspaper headlines. Even if a newspaper holds exactly the
same position as the Chinese government does, my measure of its media ideology would
not be equal to the maximal value of pro-China ideology. Therefore, essentially, my mea-
sure can be interpreted as the relative ideological position of a newspaper, not the absolute
resemblance between each Taiwanese newspaper and the Chinese government. That is,
my measure can tell if a Taiwanese newspaper shares a more similar perspective with the
Chinese government compared to other Taiwanese newspapers, but it does not show the
absolute ideology of a newspaper regarding issues about cross-Strait relations.
1https://github.com/BYVoid/OpenCC.
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Appendix A
Demographics in TEDS Surveys
Age is a potential determinant of national identity because a person’s nationalist feelings
may change over his/her lifetime and because people of different age experience different
periods of national history. Since the dataset spans over 10 years, I also include year of birth
to control for generation effects. On the one hand, it may be that the longer one lives in Tai-
wan, the deeper s/he loves Taiwan and the more likely s/he thinks s/he is a Taiwanese. As
a result, compared to the elderly, young people may have not developed emotional connec-
tions with their living place. With potentially weaker nationalist feelings, they may be in-
clined to change their national identity under some exogenous or endogenous shocks. For
example, suppose one has to move to China because of an unexpected event. The younger
when s/he moves to China, the more likely that s/he will change her/his national identity
and thinks s/he is a Chinese, not a Taiwanese. On the other hand, the change of history
education may lead to greater Taiwanese identification among the young over the past two
decades. History education had been focused on China in the postwar period. It was not
until 1997 did every middle school student in Taiwan begin learning a textbook calledUn-
derstanding Taiwan, which covered Taiwanese history, geography and society. BecauseUn-
derstanding Taiwanwas a separate textbook from other textbooks about China, students
might be prone to recognize Taiwan as a different and independent identity from China. In
2002, Taiwanese government undertook an education reform and adopted an “One guide-
Multiple Text (一綱多本)” textbook system. National textbooks have been abolished
since then, and textbooks are now edited based on an official guide–where Taiwanese his-
tory remains isolated from Chinese history. The Taiwan-isolated history education system
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may influence the national identification of students and lead to an increase of Taiwanese
identity among the young. As a result, whether age contributes to or hinders a burgeoning
trend of Taiwanese identity is an empirical question.
Ethnicity is a complicated issue in Taiwan. There are four main ethnic groups: Taiwanese
Min-Nan, Taiwanese Hakka, Aboriginal, andMainlander. If I assume a person’s ethnicity
is defined by his/her father’s ethnic background, 75% of people are Taiwanese Min-Nan,
13% are Taiwanese Hakka, 1% are Aboriginal, and 10% are Mainlander in the data set. The
first three are native Taiwanese, while Mainlanders consist of aliens who moved from China
around 1949 and their descendants born in Taiwan. The term “provincial complex” refers
to the conflicts between native Taiwanese andMainlander, which emerged around the 228
Massacre in 1947. The 228Massacre was an anti-government movement beginning on
February 27, 1947, which was violently suppressed by the KMT government and resulted
in 18,000 to 28,000 or more deaths (Research Report of the 228 Incident, 1992). The essen-
tial cause of the movement was unequal power distribution between native Taiwanese and
Mainlanders–according to Encyclopedia of Taiwan edited by Council for Cultural Affairs,
the government was “almost exclusively populated byMainlanders” who represented less
than 6% of Taiwanese population at that time. Therefore, the 228Massacre can be seen as
antagonism between the government (Mainlanders) and the people (native Taiwanese).
Many studies argue that the 228 massacre provides an impetus for the differentiation be-
tween Taiwanese and Chinese identity (Kao & Li, 2000; F.-c. Wang, 2005). On the one
hand, because the first generation of Mainlanders are mostly born in China and have more
connections with China, naturally, they are more likely to consider themselves as Chinese,
not Taiwanese. On the other hand, the 228Massacre pushed native Taiwanese further away
from Chinese identification. Nevertheless, as the first generation of Mainlanders fade away
and the successive generations are often born from intermarriage betweenMainlanders and
native Taiwanese, the provincial complex lessens over time. In 1995, former President Li
Teng-Hui proposed the concept of “New Taiwanese,” referring to anyone who loves Tai-
wan and calls Taiwan home. Currently, the provincial complex is less important and the
boundary between native Taiwanese andMainlanders becomes less salient. However, since
the dataset starts as early as 2001, to control for any potential lagging effects, I include eth-
nicity of both parents as explanatory variables.
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Language plays an essential role in the formation of identity and usually constitutes a
crucial part in nation-building policies (Aspachs-Bracons et al., 2008; Clots-Figueras &
Masella, 2013). Taiwan is a linguistically diverse society. The ancestral languages of Tai-
wanese Min-Nan and Taiwanese Hakka are Taiwanese Hokkien (also called Taiwanese)
and Hakka, respectively. Aboriginal consist of 14 recognized tribes and speak dozens of
non-sinitic languages. Originally from diverse regions of China, most Mainlanders speak
their own Chinese dialects. Nevertheless, after the KMT’s implementation of Mandarin-
only policy in public administration, media broadcasts and education in 1945, Mandarin
has become Taiwan’s lingua franca across all ethnic groups. According to Benchmark Sur-
vey 2013 administered by TEDS, 79% of people use Mandarin to conduct interview and
12% use bothMandarin and Taiwanese. Meanwhile, 42% of people usually speak Taiwanese
at home, 32% speakMandarin, and 20% speak both Taiwanese andMandarin, suggesting
that Taiwanese andMandarin become the two most prevalent languages in Taiwan. Since
Mandarin is also the official language of China, it is possible that compared to Taiwanese
speakers, Mandarin speakers are more likely to identify themselves as Chinese. Dupré (2013)
uses Taiwan Social Change Survey on National Identity in 2003 and finds that people speak-
ing Taiwanese at home are associated with more Taiwanese identification. To control for
any potential effect of language on national identity, I include language spoken at home as
an explanatory variable.
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